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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, Louisiana lawyers have begun to encounter on
an increasingly frequent basis the dispute resolution process known as mediation.
Some out-of-state clients, especially insurance companies, insist that their cases
be mediated. Attorneys are confronted by judges and magistrates who strongly
suggest that the parties try to settle their differences by mediation. Offers of
continuing legal education programs and publications abound, promising to
enhance practitioners' skills as advocates in mediation or to train them as
mediators. There is no doubt that mediation is a "hot topic."
However, the practitioner will search in the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure, the Louisiana Revised Statutes, the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court in vain for any reference
to the procedure in which he is increasingly expected to represent clients. Unless
the attorney's case happens to be pending before one of two courts in the State,'
there are no statutes, rules, or authoritative standards to serve as a guide through
the process, to inform the attorney-or the parties and the mediator-what the
process expects of them, or what they should expect from the process.
Today, Louisiana stands at a cross-roads. In 1991 and 1992, policy-makers
took what appeared to be a decisive step toward institutionalizing mediation in
Louisiana by authorizing the creation of an experimental program in New
Orleans. However, since then there seems to have developed a reticence to move
forward with the task. Inertia and strategically placed resistance have contributed
to a relatively low utilization of the experimental program and have helped to
defeat legislative proposals to adopt a state-wide mediation program.
This article is intended to assist policy-makers, practitioners, mediators, and
academicians to gain a greater understanding of mediation and its processes in
historical, theoretical, and practical contexts. Although it is far from a nuts-andbolts practical guide, we hope it also provides the uninitiated with some greater
understanding of the basics of the actual mediation process.
In this article, we attempt to survey the current state of the art of mediation
and to place the process in historical perspective. To do this, we define
mediation, review its history, and trace the development of the various schools
ofthought which have influenced the forms and methodologies used in mediation

1. A pilot mediation program has been adopted in Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans and New Orleans First City Court. See infra text accompanying notes 738-792.
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today. We then describe what we believe to be the dominant form of mediation
that is emerging in modem practice.
Next, we review both the criticisms and the accolades bestowed by commentators upon mediation and survey the results of empirical studies of the process. A
discussion of the trend toward adoption of state-wide court-annexed mediation
programs is followed by an analysis of ten crucial issues that policy-makers
generally consider when adopting state-wide programs orotherwise institutionalizing mediation. It is our hope that this information will be helpful to policy-makers
in identifying, confronting, and resolving these issues. We also seek to inform
mediators and other participants in mediation of pitfalls and dangers that will
continue to surround mediation practice so long as mediation remains ad hoc with
these crucial issues not being resolved through institutionalization.
Finally, we review the status of mediation in Louisiana, describe the state's
efforts toward institutionalization, and answer the question whether Louisiana
should adopt a state-wide mediation program.
It is our conclusion that Louisiana should institutionalize mediation by
adopting a state-wide mediation program. It is our opinion that mediation is a
valuable process that should be encouraged and promoted. We believe that
institutionalization is the best way to achieve that end. However, it is also our
thesis that because mediation is being used and will likely continue to be used in
Louisiana, institutionalization is a practical necessity, quite apart from any motive
to promote the process, in order to provide sufficient structure and certainty to
protect all of the participants in the process.

II. DEFINTION OF MEDIATION
The traditional form of dispute resolution employed in this country is the
adversarial adjudicatory system.' In recent years, however, use of alternative
forms of dispute resolution, either in conjunction with or separate from the
traditional adversarial court system, has expanded.
Mediation is but one of a variety of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
procedures available.3 Mediation, in particular, "is becoming an increasingly
popular alternative to formal adjudication,"' and has been winning praise from
many quarters, including attorneys, parties to the process, and scholars "as a

2. Honorable Bruce E.Bohlman &Erick J.Bohlman, Wandering in the WildernessofDispute
Resolution: When Do We Arrive at the PromisedLand ofJustice?,70 N.D. L. Rev. 235, 253 (1994).
3. William D. Underwood, Divergence In the Age and Cost in Delay Reduction: The Texas
Experience with Federal Civil Justice Reform, 25 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 261, 310 (1994). Other
commonly known ADR procedures are arbitration, early neutral evaluation, summary jury trial, and
the mini-trial. Id. All of these forms of ADR have the common goal of resolving disputes outside
the courtroom. Id. The current ADR movement offers ADR devices as a supplement to rather than
a replacement for litigation. Jethro K. Lieberman &James F. Henry, Lessons From The Alternative
DisputeResolution Movement, 53 U. Chi. L.Rev. 424, 433 & n.39 (1986).
4. Kent L. Brown, Confidentialityin Mediation: Status and Implications, 2 J.Disp. Resol.

307, 307 (1991).
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tremendous breakthrough in dispute resolution."' Mediation programs have been
adopted in certain federal and state district courts and increasingly in state courts
on a state-wide basis.'7 Almost daily, new applications are found for this
dynamic, flexible tool.

Despite the recent expanded use of alternative dispute resolution methods,
there remains much confusion regarding the distinctions among the various ADR
methods. 8 Apparently, this confusion stems from a lack of familiarity with the
various ADR methods and a resulting tendency to lump them together.9
However, some forms of ADR are as different from one another as they are from
the traditional adversarial process.
In the broadest sense, mediation can be defined as an alternative dispute
resolution device in which a neutral third-party assists two or more disputing
parties in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution of their dispute.'0 It is
important to distinguish mediation from arbitration." While both of these
forms of ADR involve the use of neutral third-parties, 2 the role of the neutral
third-party in each of these devices is vastly different. Unlike the arbitrator, the
mediator is not given the power to decide the outcome of the dispute 3 or to
force the parties to settle their dispute. 4
Il1.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDIATION

Although mediation has only recently begun to enjoy widespread use in this
country, it has a long history as a dispute resolution method. It is "deeply rooted

5.

Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense ofMediation, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 467, 467 (1991).

6. Many courts require mediation before cases are set for trial. At least five federal district
courts have local rules permitting mandatory mediation. See E.D. Mich. R. 53.1; W.D. Mich. R. 42;
N.D. Okla. R. 16.3 (mediation referred to as "settlement conference'); E.D. Wash. R. 39.1; W.D.
Wash. R. 39.1. See also D. Kan. R. 214 (mandatory settlement conference with mediation). See
generally Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts. 76 Iowa
L. Rev. 889 (1991). See infra part VIII.
7. See, e.g., Martha K. Gooding, NASD and IRS Implement Pilot Mediation Programs, I
A.B.A. Sec. Litig. Conflict Mgmt. Newsl. 1 (Summer 1995) (on file with the Louisiana Law Review).
The National Association of Securities Dealers and the Internal Revenue Service have both recently
initiated pilot mediation programs to resolve disputes. Id.
8. Leonard L. Riskin, The Special Place ofMediation In Alternative Dispute Processing, 37
U. Fla. L. Rev. 19, 24 (1988).

9. Id.
10. Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 471; Gary D. Condra, Representing Agricultural Clients in
Mediation. 73 Neb. L. Rev. 154 (1994) (noting that in recent years, as the use of mediation has
expanded, many states have promulgated more specific legal definitions); Jessica Pearson, An
Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 Just. Sys. J.420, 421-22 (1982).
11. Sandra E.Purnell, The Attorney as Mediator-Inherent Conflict ofInterest?, 32 UCLA L.
Rev. 986, 988 (1985).
12. Roger J.Patterson, Dispute Resolution in a World ofAternatives, 37 Cath. U. L. Rev. 591,
594 (1988). This fact may account for the frequent confusion between these two forms of ADR.
13. Rosenberg, supra note 5,at 471.
14.

Id.
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in the history and tradition of many lands and cultures."' 5 Ironically, mediation
actually predates litigation as a means of resolving disputes.'"
The earliest known use of mediation was in ancient Sumerian society. 7
In that culture, before a dispute could be presented to a judicial panel it must
have been submitted to a "mashkim," whose role (like that of a present-day
mediator) was to assist the disputants in attempting to reach a settlement of the
dispute."
Mediation is, and traditionally has been, a dominant method of resolving
disputes in Asian, European, African, and Native American cultures. 9 In fact,
in parts of the Orient, litigation is viewed as "a shameful last resort" used only
when all else has failed. "°
Mediation also has roots in Western religious tradition. A procedure for
dispute resolution is set forth in St. Matthew's gospel. 2' That procedure
provides for the parties to attempt to resolve their dispute first through
conversation between themselves. If that failed, mediation was to be employed.
Only in the event of the failure of mediation does the Biblical formula provide
for presentation of the dispute to representatives of the community.'
Mediation has a long history of selective use in the United States. In
addition to Native American mediation, the process has been used by the Quaker
denomination, as well as the Chinese and Jewish immigrant communities.3'
There is also a tradition of using mediation to resolve labor disputes."'
Moreover, legal aid societies, police departments, small claims courts, and
domestic relations courts made experimental use of mediation during the early
1900s.2

15. J.Sue Richardson, Mediation: The Florida Legislature Grants Judicial Immunity to CourtAppointed Mediators, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 623 (1990). See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and
Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L. J. 29, 29 (1982). See also Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve
ofModernization, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1201 (1966); Pyong-Choon Hahm, The Decision Process in Korea,
in Comparative Judicial Behavior 19, 19-20 (Glendon Schubert and David J. Danelski eds. 1969);
Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 Cal.
L. Rev. 1284, 1285.86 (1967); M.L. Marasingbe, The Use of Conciliation for Dispute Settlement:
The Sri Lanka Experience, 29 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 389, 393-400 (1980).
16. Richardson, supra note 15, at 623 n.4.
17. Patterson, supra note 12, at 594 n.22.

18. Id.
19. Rosenberg, supra note 5,at 471 n.15.
20. Riskin, supra note 15, at 29. Scholars often note the connection between Confucian
teachings and the dominance of mediation in oriental culture. Id.
21. Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 Yale L.J. 1660,1666

(1985).
22. Id.
23. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley & Maria L Volpe, Teaching Mediation as a Lawyering Role,
39 J.Legal Educ. 571, 574 (1989).
24. Id.

25.

Pearson. supra note 10. at 422 ("Progressive era conciliation tribunals, however, were soon

declared failures and fell into disuse because few parties would agree to submit their disputes to
voluntary conciliation." Id.).
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The modem development of mediation in the United States has expanded
into virtually all areas of civil litigation. That expansion
can generally be seen
26
as having progressed in three successive waves.
The first wave was in the 1960s and early 1970s with the development of
community-based mediation for resolving minor criminal and civil matters.27
Community mediation programs and neighborhood justice centers were set up
with a vision of substituting reconciliation for controversy and punishment.'
These programs generally served low income, unrepresented disputants.29
The second wave of the modem development of mediation followed the
1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, popularly known as the Pound Revisited Conference?' At the Pound Revisited Conference, Professor Frank A.E. Sanders of
the Harvard Law School introduced the concept of the multi-door courthouse.'
This concept "envisioned the courthouse of the future" as offering options to
traditional litigation, such as mediation and arbitration, for resolving disputes.32
During this phase of development, the use of mediation spread beyond minor
matters to specialized areas such as divorce and child custody cases.3 This
stage saw the emergence of mediation centers and private mediation programs.3 4
The third wave of the modem development of mediation came during
the late 1980s and has continued into the 1990s. During this period,
mediation has been recognized "as a viable dispute resolution tool" for
much more than just minor and specialized disputes." Mediation has
expanded to encompass all types of cases,3" often in a court-annexed set-

26. Peter S. Adler, State Offlces of Mediation:
Network, S1 Ky. L.J. 1013, 1014 (1993).
27. Id.

Thoughts on the Evolution of a National

28. Id. See also Riskin, supra note 15, at 31.
29. Pearson, supra note 10, at 423; Mori Irvine, Serving Two Masters: The Obligation Under
the Rules of Professional Conduct to Report Attorney Misconduct in a Confidential Mediation, 26
Rutgers L.J, 155, 161 (1994).
30. A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler, The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in
the Future (1979). The Pound Revisited Conference commemorated the 70th anniversary of Roscoe
Pound's address entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice"
given at the ABA annual meeting in 1906. Lloyd N. Shields, Arbitrationas ADR, 41 La. B.J. 222
n.2 (1993).
31. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3, at 427 n.17.
32. Honorable Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door
Courthouse,37 Cath. U.L. Rev. 577 (1988). The District of Columbia became one of these multidoor sites in 1984. Id. at 578. The first dispute resolution program or "door" to open was Small
Claims Mediation in April 1985. Id. at 580. That was followed by Domestic Relations Mediation
in November 1985. Id. at 581.
33. Riskin, supranote 15, at 31-32; Robert B.Moberly, Ethical Standardsfor Court-Appointed
Mediatorsand Florida'sMandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 702 (1994).
34. Adler, supra note 26, at 1015.
35. Id. at 1016.
36. In 1986 the first bankruptcy mediation program was established. Lisa A.Lomax, Alternative
DisputeResolution InBankruptcy: Rule 9019 andBankruptcyMediationProgram,68 Am. Bankr. L.J.
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ting," with the parties represented by attorneys and attorneys serving as
mediators."
The acceptance and expansion of alternative forms of dispute resolution,
including mediation, are, at least in part, reflected in and attributable to recent
legislative enactments. Many state legislatures have enacted legislation encouraging or mandating the use of ADR devices, including mediation.
In 1990,
Congress enacted two pieces of legislation dealing with ADR on a national level.
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act authorized and also encouraged the
use of ADR devices by federal agencies. 40 Congress also enacted the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, an important component of which is the Civil Justice
Reform Act ("CJRA"). 4' The CJRA provided for the selection of certain pilot
districts within the federal judiciary" and required these pilot districts to adopt,
and the other fedeqil district courts to consider adopting, ADR programs. 4 On
the executive level, President George Bush promulgated Executive Order 12,778
in October 1992, requiring government lawyers "to participate in ADR programs,
if this activity will foster prompt, fair and efficient resolution of civil cases."
There are now hundreds of mediation programs in the United States.' s
Court-annexed mediation has expanded and its use continues to increase.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT REGARDING
THE GOALS, FORM, AND METHODOLOGY OF MEDIATION

A number of forces and interests have joined to furnish the impetus for
growth in the use of mediation. Some of these forces arise from exigencies in

55, 70 (1994). Since 1994 mediation has been used in EEOC cases. Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of
Title Vii's RegulatoryRegime: Rights, TheoriesandRealities,46 Ala. L. Rev. 375, 463 (1995).
37. Mediation can be either private or court-annexed. Anne C. Morgan, Note, Thwarting
JudicialPower to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal District Court: Strandell v. Jackson
County, 40 Case W. Res. 491, 493 (1990). Private mediation is consensual and is subject to
individualization to meet the needs of the parties. Id. Court-annexed mediation can be just as
flexible but it is ordered by the court. Id. at 494.
38. Irvine, supra note 29, at 161.
39. See Moberly, supra note 33, at 702-03. See also Underwood, supra note 3, at 310-11.
Court-annexed mediation has become pervasive in many states, including Texas and Florida.
40. Cynthia B. Dauber, The Ties That Do Not Bind: Non-Binding Arbitration in Federal
AdministrativeAgencies, 9 Admin. L. J. 165, 167 (1995). The Act's sunset provisions provided for
the termination of the statutory authorization of ADR on October 1, 1995. Id. In 1993, VicePresident Albert Gore, in his Report of the National Performance Review, Creating a Government
That Works Better and Costs Less, "recommended additional use of ADR by federal agencies." Id.
at 176.
41. Dayton, supra note 6, at 947.
42. Id. at 948.
43. Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, PreliminaryObservationson Implementation of
the PilotProgramof the CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1303, 1330 (1994).
44. Carl Tobias, Executive Branch CivilJustice Reform, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1521, 1531 (1993).
45. Adler, supra note 26, at 1016.
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and dissatisfaction with the status quo adversary system. Increasingly, however,
interest in mediation appears to be growing of its own momentum as the process
gains acceptance as a valuable method of dispute resolution.
One's rationale for promoting mediation strongly influences his view of the
form that the mediation process should take and the goals that mediation should
seek to attain. An understanding of the historical development of the various
movements championing ADR generally, and mediation in particular, is the first
step in defining the competing schools of thought regarding these issues.
A. The Proliferation ofLitigation and the Efficiency Model
One of the predominant factors influencing the increased use of mediation
has been the "explosion" in litigation over the past twenty-five years. There
have been tremendous increases in the number of lawsuits filed, in the length and
complexity of pretrial proceedings, and in the length and complexity of the trials
themselves.' In the mid-1980s, Chief Justice Warren Berger noted with alarm
that from 1971 to 1981 there was a 344% increase in the number of trials lasting
more than thirty days.47 He warned that because of the trend in new filings and
longer trials the crisis would worsen unless a solution was found.'8 In 1987,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist reported a continuing increase in the number of
lawsuits and predicted that the situation would worsen.49
In 1990, litigation cost the United States an estimated $16.5 billion, an
increase of nearly 94% since 1971.'° Estimates regarding the total of direct and
indirect costs from litigation each year range from $80 billion to $300 billion."
A poll of America's leading corporate executives conducted in 1994 indicated
that 83% of them felt that concern over potential litigation influenced their
decisions to a greater degree than it did ten years before.52 Also, over 60% of
the executives felt that the justice system significantly weakened the ability of
United States companies to compete with Europe and Japan."
The deluge of litigation has been seen as resulting from society's increased
litigiousnesss4 and the more frequent resort to the courts to resolve business

46.

David A. Rammelt, Note, "Inherent Power" and Rule 16: How Far Can a Federal Court

Push the Litigant Toward Settlement?. 65 Ind. L.J. 965, 966 (1990).
47. Id. at 967.
48. Id.

49.

Id.

50. Robert M. Smith, Saving Ourselves From Being Lawyered to Death, Wash. Post, Sept. 24,
1995, at C21.

51.

Id.

52. Id. The poll was conducted by Business Week Magazine.
53. Id.
54. Edwin H. Greenebaun, Lawyers Agenda for Understanding AlternativeDispute Resolution,
68 Ind. LJ. 771 (1993) (citing 132 Cong. Rec. S948-49 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1986) (statement of Senator
Mitch McConnel) (introducing S.2038, 99 Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), the Alternative Dispute Resolution

Promotion Act)).
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disputes traditionally handled in other ways.ss Some suggest that a basic
change in the way businesses conduct disputes with one another took place in the
1970s and 1980s,m' giving rise to "megalitigation" characterized by intense
exploitation of the open-ended discovery afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." The typical "scorched earth" litigation, allegedly undertaken
largely for business reasons, led in most cases to out-of-court settlements, 8 but
only after extensive-and expensive-pre-trial proceedings.
In 1984, the Commission on Professionalism expressed serious concern over
these perceived developmen4.- The ABA Committee on Minor Disputes,
which was born of the bar's earlier civil justice reform efforts initiated after the
Pound Revisited Conference, emerged in 1987 as the Committee on Dispute
Resolution. The main theme of the ABA annual meeting in 1989 was dispute
resolution.'
In early 1993, a formal Section on Dispute Resolution was
established by the ABA and nearly every local and state bar association has
taken up the cause of ADR.6'
Even earlier, in 1979, a group of corporate counsel formed the Center for
Public Resources ("CPR"), whose program centered around "a pledge to seek
resolution of disputes short of litigation."' Many major corporations rushed to
embrace the CPR concept. 63 During the 1980s and 1990s, corporations, with the
power to shop for legal services, were able to advance the ADR agenda and to
secure pledges from over 1,400 law firms in forty-seven states that the law firms
"will be knowledgeable about ADR and offer [their] clients alternatives to
traditional litigation."M
The Reagan and Bush administrations also tapped into the criticisms of
"megalitigation." As chair ofthe President's Council on Competitiveness, former
Vice President Dan Quayle complained ofthe cost ofdiscovery, legal fees, delays
incident to trial, and appeals of contested cases, asserting that modern litigation---and especially discovery-was a principal cause for the loss of America's
competitive edge and the continuing decline of the United States' legal culture."

55. Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to PrivateJustice: Legal Practiceat War With the
Profeision and Its Values, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 931, 939 (1993).
56. There is disagreement as to the cause of this change. However, Ronald Gilson suggests
that businesses began engaging in "strategic litigation" designed primarily to gain economic
advantage. Garth, supra note 55, at 939-40 (citing Ronald J.Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal
Profession: A Demand Side Perspective,49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 872 (1990)).
57.

Garth, supra note 55, at 942.

58.

Id. at 944.

59.

Id.

60.

Id. at 947.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 950.
63. Id.
64. Smith, supra note 50, at CS.
65. Justice William H. Erickson, Limited Discovery In the Use ofAlternative Proceduresfor
Dispute Resolution, 71 Denv. U. L. Rev. 303 (1994).
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This and other criticisms led to the adoption of amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 1993."
Thus, the first group advocating the use of mediation is composed ofjudicial
administrators, politicians, and businesses, who advocate ADR as a solution to
congested dockets, gridlock in the judicial system, and the high costs and delays
which typify late twentieth-century litigation in the United States." ADR
adherents in this camp see mediation primarily as a tool for enhancing the
efficiency of the dispute resolution system.' This group considered mediation
a more expeditious, less expensive, and procedurally simpler process than the
adversary system."
B. The NeighborhoodJusticeMovement and the QualityProcess Model
A second dynamic contributing to the development of mediation as a form
of dispute resolution predates the emergence of the efficiency model activists.
This ideology, which differs vastly from the efficiency model, can be traced to
the 1960s, when a variety of groups began urging that dispute resolution should
more fully involve the disputants themselves." These champions of community
empowerment viewed mediation as both a means of allowing individuals to make
their own decisions and of enhancing access to justice." This movement
resulted in the creation of neighborhood justice centers, primarily involved with
resolving minor civil and criminal disputes using non-lawyer, largely volunteer
mediators.'
The primary interest underpinning this current of the mediation movement
is to encourage dispute resolution processes which are "less formal" and "more
responsive to the unique needs of the participants and to human values." 3 The
legacy of the early neighborhood justice programs is expressed today by those
proponents of mediation who see the primary value of mediation in the quality
of the process if affords disputants. 4 Although there are various opinions

66. A centerpiece of these amendments is the change in Rule 26 establishing disclosure
obligations. Concern has been expressed that these amendments will result in greater discovery abuse

and litigation costs. However, Erickson argues that the greater obligation to disclose information
could have the beneficial effect of increasing the use of ADR. Erickson, supranote 65 at 303-04.
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70. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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72.

Id.

73.
74.

Riskin, supra note 8, at 19.
Menkel-Meadow, supranote 68, at 6-8.

LOUISIANA LAWRE VIE[
W

[Vol. 57

regarding what it is about the mediation process that renders it of high quality,
two characteristics emerge as particularly important qualities for those who focus
on the process as a good in and of itself.
The first is the consensual nature of mediation which "seeks self-determined
resolutions. 7 5 Proponents view mediation as placing the outcome of disputes
"within the control and determination of the parties themselves," freeing them
from reliance upon and subjection to "opinions and standards of outside 'higher
authorities,' legal and otherwise." 6 In theory, mediation prompts the parties
to endeavor to find a resolution that they have the power to implement."
Whether or not they reach agreement, the parties come to recognize their
potential to solve their own problems independent of outside authority.7" This
"capacity to encourage the parties to exercise autonomy, choice and selfdetermination" has been referred to as the "empowerment function" of
mediation."
Mediation's "capacity to reorient the parties toward each other ... by
helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a
perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one
another'so is the second important characteristic. This quality is seen as
valuable not only because it facilitates settlement, but also because it encourages
each party to acknowledge, and perhaps even to empathize to some degree with,
the opposing party's situation."1 This potential has been referred to as mediation's "recognition function. "2
C. Protection-of-RightsModel
As mediation developed and was increasingly used as a dispute resolution
method, a third conception of its purpose and utility emerged. Under this view,
the role of mediation is to insure that neither party's rights are compromised
during the settlement process. This protection-of-rights view holds that the
principal value of the mediation process is that it assures that the disputants, as
well as others having an interest in the outcome ofthe controversy, are protected
by substantive and procedural safeguards in the mediation process that otherwise
would not exist.U Proponents of this approach emphasize the need to prevent
settlements from compromising important rights. Persons or groups promoting
75. Bush, supra note 67, at 267 (citing Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor, Mediation: A
Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation 245 (1984)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 267-68.
79. Id. at 268.
80. Id. at 269 (citing Lon Fuller, Mediation-ItsForms andFunctions,44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305,
325 (1971)).
81. Bush, supra note 67, at 269.
82. Id. at 270.
83. Id. at 260.
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a particular substantive agenda, such as protection of the weaker party in divorce
proceedings" and environmental protection, 5 often advocate this approach.
Under the protection-of-rights view, a dispute resolution device should produce
a "fair" or "just" result for the party or for society."
Given the diversity of orientation of the proponents of mediation, the
absence of any consensus regarding the ends and goals of that process comes as
no surprise." Indeed, "until now pluralism has reigned in mediation practice."M While the three dominant conceptions of the purpose of mediation are
not mutually exclusive, there are tensions among them and differences in the
form of mediation process called for by each of them."
D. Mediation Methodologies
The literature regarding the nature, goals, and advantages of mediation
discloses several competing conceptions of how the process is to be carried out.
Each of these conceptions is closely related to one of the goals that mediation
is thought to be designed to advance. However, there does appear to be some
consensus regarding certain essential qualities and goals of the process based
upon mediation's uncontested role as a form of settlement negotiation between
the parties.
1. The Basic Consensus Methodology-Mediation as Settlement
Negotiation Facilitator
It is well recognized that the vast majority of lawsuits filed in this
country-90-95% of them--are settled rather than being litigated to 'conclusion.'
However, a large proportion of these settlements occur "on the
courthouse steps.' 9I Research has indicated widespread dissatisfaction among
trial attorneys with this phenomenon, and 85% of those surveyed expressed the

84. See, e.g., Sydney E. Bernard et al., The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in Divorce
Mediation, Mediation Q., June 1984, at 61, 66-70; Leonard L. Loeb, Introduction to the Standards
ofPractice For Family Mediators, 17 Faro. L. Q. 451 (1984).
85. Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 Vt. L.
Rev. 1, 46-47 (1981).
86. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abussr of the Mandatory

Senlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485, 489-90 (1985).
87. Adler, supra note 26, at 1014.
88. Bush. supra note 67, at 257.
89. Press, supra note 68, at 1035.
90. Smith, supra note 50, at C3; Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury rrial:
Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1086, 1091 n.41 (1990);
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668,
670 (1986); Honorable S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 829, 832 (1986).
91. Press, supra note 68, at 1064 n.192 (citing Stephen Landsman et al., What to Do Until the
Lawyer Comes 139-40 (1977)).
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opinion that the negotiation process typically used during litigation "could be
significantly improved." In that system, the compromise comes too late, is
too expensive, and is too stressful. By the time of settlement, the vast majority
of the costs, fees, emotional distress, and diversion of time have already been
expended.' 3
Many lawyers delay initiating discussion of compromise for fear that their
actions will be viewed by their opponents as evidence of a lack of confidence in
their position."4 Moreover, the adversarial culture often causes lawyers to
acquire a false optimism regarding the strength of their cases and correspondingly inaccurate expectations regarding the likely outcome of the litigation. 5
Adversarial dynamics seem to mandate that disputants and advocates representing
them argue extreme positions which drive parties away from, rather than toward,
agreement. 96 In addition, discovery often results in additional strategic
skirmishes that preoccupy the litigants and further alienate them from one
another.' 7 Animosity between the parties arising out of the central dispute may
also impede negotiations."
Mediation can. assist in bringing the parties closer to settlement by
overcoming these institutional roadblocks. At the most basic level, the mere
occurrence of the mediation, particularly if initiated by someone other than one
of the parties, eliminates the "first move" obstacle that often prevents settlement
negotiations from getting started. If the lawyers or parties are having a difficult
time speaking to one another, due to animosity or otherwise, the mediator,
through performance ofhis most essential role as communications facilitator, can
help overcome this inhibition to negotiations." Thus, the essential goal of the
mediation process is simply getting the disputing parties to communicate
meaningfully with each other-an endeavor they often resist."°
The mediation process is often referred to as "supercharged negotiations.""' Mediation reduces the fragmentation that characterizes traditional
settlement negotiations 2 by offering an opportunity for intensive and focused
exchanges of information and discussion, concentrated into a matter of hours

92.
93.
94.

Edwards, supra note 90, at 670.
Smith, supra note 50, at C3.
Edwards, supra note 90, at 670.

95. Id.
96.
97.
(1993).

Patterson, supra note 12, at 600.
Id. See also Charles Thensted, Settlement: The New Old-FashionedWay, 41 La. B.J. 217
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99.

Patterson, supra note 12, at 602.
Riskin, supranote IS, at 25-26; Rosenberg, supranote 5, at 471; Patterson, supra note 12,

at 602.
100. Brown, supra note 4, at 309.
101. Irvin W. Sandman, Should BankruptcyLawers ResistMediation?,Am. Bank,. Inst. J., June
1995, at 26.
102. John 0. Mebane, III, An End to Settlement on the CourthouseSteps?, MediatedSettlement
Conferences in North CarolinaSuperior Courts, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1857, 1860 (1993).
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rather than weeks or months. Thus, even if the mediator does no more than
bring the parties together and insure the exchange of information between them
in an environment concentrated on settlement, an important promotion of the
settlement dynamic has been accomplished. Regardless of one's conception of
the goals of mediation or the role of the mediator, practically all would agree
that mediation should at least accomplish this much.
2. Variations in MediatorActivism
Beyond this basic consensus model, enormous differences exist in the
procedures employed and the roles adopted by mediators. The extent and
aggressiveness with which the mediator intervenes runs along a continuum, whose
application in anyparticular case will depend upon the situation and the philosophy
of the mediator. Some mediators limit their function to that of a go-between who
keeps the lines ofcommunication open.'w These mediators may do no more than
urge the parties to propose solutions. Others believe that participants do not want
a mediator to be a "totally uninvolved observer," and that it is appropriate to give
their own suggestions and to persuade the parties to accept them.'0 ' In the most
extreme case, mediators may "apply economic, social or moral pressure to achieve
a 'voluntary' agreement."10 However, the vast weight of opinion holds that the
mediator should not exercise coercive authority.' 0"
One factor which plays an important role in limiting the activism of the
mediator--or at least in causing the mediator's activism to be carefully channeled
and structured-is the need for apparent and actual neutrality. Neutrality is an
essential quality of a mediator and is "crucial to effective mediation."'W All
parties must have confidence in the mediator and in his neutrality.' The greater
the degree of mediator activism, the greater the risk that his neutrality will be
compromised in the view ofthe parties.
Among those who feel that the mediator should take a more active role in the
process, there is disagreement as to what activities the mediator should be pursuing.
Three broad mediation methodologies exist based upon the direction of the
mediator's activism--"rights-based" or"predictive" mediation, "interest-based" or
"problem solving" mediation, and "fairness" mediation.
a. Rights-BasedorPredictiveMediation
Weighing the legal merits of each party's case and offering their opinion
regarding the likely outcome if the case goes to trial is one type of activism

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
103.

Riskin, supranote 15, at 25.
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engaged in by some mediators.' 09 Such "reality testing" and "risk infusion"
can serve to remind attorneys suffering from adversarial delusions of the true
value of their cases and offer them an unbiased expert view of their chances if
they continue in their pursuit of litigation. The mediator can also serve as a
disinterested person affirming counsel's
advice to the client that he is unlikely
0
to prevail before the judge or jury."
When mediators forge settlements by advising the parties regarding the
strength of their cases and their conception ofthe likely outcome at trial, they are
engaging in predictive or rights-based mediation."' This version of mediation
consciously considers what is likely to happen if the case is litigated, and,
therefore, necessarily considers the legal rights of the parties. Active pursuit of
the predictive model tends to endanger mediator neutrality. However, a variety
of techniques have been developed which enable a mediator to maintain his
neutrality while engaging in some limited predictive risk injecting activity.
b. Interest-Based or Problem Solving Mediation
The second major mediation methodology or basis for mediation activism is
"interest-based" or "problem-solving" mediation. In interest-based mediation, the
mediator explores the needs, desires, and concerns of the parties, and assists them
in pursuing an agreement which maximizes, to the extent possible, the interests of
both parties."' Unlike rights-based mediation, the central goal of interest-based
or "problem-solving" mediation is to reach an agreement which "meets the needs
and responds to the underlying interests ofthe parties .... "113
Interest-based mediation consciously minimizes consideration of legal rights
and the likely trial outcome. Each conflict is viewed as unlike any other and
insusceptible to resolution by application of any universal rule."'
Much of the philosophy underlying interest-based mediation is shared with
the proponents of the "principled" negotiation ideas of the Harvard Negotiation
Project."'
Negotiation, whether facilitated by mediation or conducted
independently, is seen as an opportunity to develop a "win-win" solution to
disputes." 6 Unlike the standard adversarial "winner-take-all" orientation, this

109. Edwards, supra note 90, at 673.
110. Craig A. McEwen, Pursuing Problem-solving or Predictive Settlement, 19 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 77, 85 (1991).
111. See id. See alo Note, supra note9o, at 1088n.19.
112. Note, supra note 90, at 1088 n.19.
113. McEwen, supra note 110, at 79.
114. Riskin, supra note 15, at 34.
115. Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes (1991). However, the Harvard approach also
recognizes the importance ofpredictive methodology, as disclosed by the concept of Best Alternative
to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). IMat 99-100.
116. Glen Sato, The Medlator-Lawyer: Implications for the Practice ofLaw and One Argument
for Professional Rerponsibility Guidance-A Proposal for Some Ethical Considerations, 34 UCLA
L. Rev. 507, 510 (1986).
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approach seeks to examine the parties' underlying preferences and to achieve a
solution that better satisfies the preferences of both parties than the usual
adjudicatory outcome would." 7 In economic terms, the goal of mediation is
to assist the parties in achieving a joint gain."'
Another characteristic that interest-based mediation shares with the principled
negotiation philosophy is its use as an opportunity for brainstorming, or the
uninhibited generation of ideas through free association. The mediator's function
is to assist the parties to experiment in generating the greatest number and
diversity of solutions to their conflict as possible." 9 The process is seen as the
polar opposite of the linear thinking that characterizes operations within the
traditional adversarial legal system.'
Proponents of interest-based mediation argue that by focusing the parties
away from their legal rights and offering more flexible remedies than a court can
render, disputes can be resolved in ways that are better for both parties.' 2 '
c. FairnessMediation
The third form of mediator activism sometimes urged as a basis for the
mediation process is "fairness." Under this concept, the mediator is expected to
forge an agreement between the parties that is substantively "fair," or which
otherwise furthers some policy interest of the mediator or society in general. 2
The mediator is expected to take into consideration both subjective and objective
fairness. In its most strident form, the substantive fairness model conceives of
"an accountable, non-neutral mediator with power to impose his or her concerns
on the parties.""'
E. ParallelsBetween Schools of Thought and Methodologies
Although the congruence is not perfect, some identity exists between those
who support each of the three goal orientations of mediation and the advocates
of each of the three mediation methodologies or activisms. Those who look to
mediation for its efficiency in saving the parties' and the court's money and time
or to relieve congested dockets also tend to be those who advocate rights-based
mediation styles. They generally are fully entrenched in the adversarial litigation
system and do not see mediation as a radical departure from that system.'

117. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1860-61.
118. Walter Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory 161 (1972).
119. Greenebaum, supra note 54, at 774.
120. Id.
121. Riskin, supra note 8, at 27.
122. Sato, supra note 116, at 527-28; Nolan-Haley & Volpe, supra note 23, at 582; Susskind,
supra note 85, at 4.
123. Nolan-Haley & Volpe, supra note 23, at 582.
124. McEwen, supra note 110, at 80.
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This model simply seeks to improve the overall functioning of the adversary
system by offering mediation as a complementary process.
Interest-based/quality process mediation, on the other hand, began and
continues to be urged in its purest form by critics of the adversarial process. By
proposing systems that seek to resolve disputes by negotiation centered on the
parties' interests rather than their rights, these advocates challenge the very
premises of the adversary legal system." Many of those who focus on the
quality of the process and its ability to foster self-determination and recognition
in the participants also tend to pursue the interest-based approach to mediation.
Indeed, advocates often consider this approach of higher quality than the legal
solutions offered by the adversary system.
Finally, there is an obvious connection between the protection-of-rights
conception and the fairness mediation methodology, both of which call for
injection of the mediator's judgments regarding the dispute and the appropriateness ofany resolution. Proponents of both generally seek to further a substantive
agenda quite apart from saving time and money or improving the quality of the
dispute resolution process.
Purists from each of the above three broadly defined "camps" are critical of
each other. They argue that mediation of a variety other than the one they
espouse is destructive, and dangerous to the parties or to societal values.
Interest-based/quality process proponents see rights-based efficiency mediation
as a blunting and co-opting of the mediation process-which was originally
conceived as a critical challenge to the status quo-by the very forces that
mediation was intended to change.'" They see lawyers using mediation not
to improve the quality of the dispute resolution process, but to further manipulate
that process for the benefit of their clients and themselves." 7
Other interest-based/quality process purists suggest that efforts to use
mediation to further the efficiency conception result in that process being "either
useless or abusive."' 28 They suggest that if the mediator's primary motive is
to reach agreements as expeditiously as possible, he is acting as a mere
functionary with no ethical constraints. This creates perverse incentives, they
argue, opening the door to manipulative and coercive mediator behavior,
especially given the general absence of procedural and substantive rules
applicable to mediation and the cloak from public scrutiny afforded by mediation
confidentiality. 29
Interest-based mediation, on the other hand, is often criticized as being too
unprincipled because of its reliance upon the vague concept ofthe parties' needs
and wishes rather than the rule of law. There is concern that at times our
nation's most basic values conflict with local, non-legal mores and that
125.
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inappropriate solutions might be reached in individual cases. '" Some have
also suggested that mediation conducted without reference to legal principles can
and compromise "important legal and
leave the less powerful unprotected
3
rights and principles."' '
political
Finally, the fairness/protection-of-rights model has been criticized
as
undermining the basic characteristic of a mediator-neutrality.'32 Mediators
who promote substantive rights or fairness in compromises necessarily act in
ways that erode the parties' confidence in their impartiality." 3
Real, practical differences exist in the manner in which mediation is
conducted, depending upon which of the three models is being followed. The
role of the mediator, the standards applicable to his conduct, and a myriad of
other variables are influenced by the basic determination of what goals mediation
is supposed to accomplish and how those goals are to be pursued. However,
while it is important to conceptualize the discrete, stylized sets of goals and
methods underlying each of the pure theoretical models of mediation, it is even
more crucial to recognize the actual practice of mediation today.
V. THE EMERGING DOMINANT MODEL OF MEDIATION-A BLENDING OF
FORMS AND METHODOLOGIES

The mediation process remains a varied and flexible one that is constantly
evolving. Indeed, to a great extent, it is applied differently in each case. The
procedure followed in each mediation depends in large part on the particular
style of the chosen mediator. It has been observed by one commentator that
mediations "vary in as many ways as there are mediators.""
However, in recent years, as mediation has come to be used to resolve
disputes in a broad range ofmainstream civil litigation, an emerging form of the
process bearing a fairly well defined set of procedures and techniques has gained
considerable acceptance. Rather than being strictly rights-based/predictive/efficiency, interest-based/problem-solving/quality of process, or fairness/protectionof-rights in its orientation, this emerging mediation process is a hybrid of all
three models. In this hybrid model, the mediator, depending upon his style and
the particular circumstances of the case, blends the forms and methodologies of
all three types of mediation and emphasizes the techniques of one or the other
as he deems appropriate.
In what we call the emerging dominant model of mediation, the mediator
searches for the common interests of the parties and seeks to brainstorm for
creative alternatives to invent a settlement thlt will enhance the interests of the
parties and will be agreeable to them. The mediator, then, assists the parties in
130.
131.
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devising a "win-win" solution. In the course of this process, the mediator also
seeks to foster in the parties a sense of empowerment, self-determination, and
mutual recognition. At the same time, however, the reality that continued
litigation is the alternative to a mediated resolution is not ignored. The law
continues to be germane during the mediation process. This is true not only
because the participants "must understand their legal rights in order to be fair to
themselves and to make the negotiated mediation agreement self-enforcing over
the long term,"' but also because in default of settlement there will be a
determination based on legal principles. When the interest-based regimen does
not yield a solution, in varying degrees depending upon mediator style and the
nature of the case, the emerging dominant form of mediation injects predictive,
rights-based elements into the process to encourage settlement. The emerging
dominant mediation seeks to complement, not to replace, formal adjudication.' m

What follows is a very general description ofthe objectives, methodologies,
and techniques of this emerging dominant mediation procedure.'
The emerging dominant mediation procedure was primarily developed in
substantial civil cases, but offers a viable methodology for other types of cases
as well. The process begins with the selection of the mediator and initial contact
with the disputants and their attorneys. 38 During this initial phase of the
mediation process, the mediator begins the crucial task of gaining the trust of the
parties in his neutrality and integrity. 39 This objective continues into what
could be termed the "heart" of the mediation process, the mediation session
itself."
Individuals with settlement authority are required to attend the
mediation session and participate in good faith."'
The mediation begins with the opening session, typically a joint session,
attended by the mediator, all parties, and their attorneys. It starts with an opening
statement by the mediator in which he usually explains to the participants the
procedure involved in the mediation session." 2 During the opening statement,
135. Sato, supra note 116, at 515.
136. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3, at 433 & n.39.
137. See Dayton, supra note 6, at 911 (describing use of such a procedure by Judge Patrick F.
Kelly of the District of Kansas).
138. In most cases the partes are represented by counsel and the initial contact is made through
counsel. Typically, the attorneys will submit pre-mediation memoranda containing a statement of
the facts and issues and any other information they believe would help the mediator understand the
case. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1883.
139. See Irvine, supra note 29, at 159.
140. Typically, the mediation session lasts no more than one day, even in relatively complex

cases, although the session can and often does go into the evening hours. Sandman, supra note 101.
at 26-27; but see Kessler &Finkelstein, supra note 32, at 589 ("The typical small claims case ...
can be mediated in one to two hours, whereas the complex civil dispute typically takes over thirty
hours to mediate." Id.).
141. See Cad Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Fourth Circuit,50 Wash. &Lee L. Rev. 89,
103 (1993).
142.

See Condra, supra note 10, at 155.
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the mediator will usually remind the parties that all communications are of a
confidential nature, that he does not have the power to and will not impose or force
a settlement of the dispute, and that he is completely impartial and neutral."
In addition to his continued objective of gaining the trust and respect of all
involved in the mediation, the mediator's general objectives in this stage of the
mediation session are to open the channels of communication, to allow for
venting of emotion by the parties, to diffuse hostility where necessary, and to
begin the process of identifying the issues.'" Thus, following the mediator's
opening statement, each party and his attorney is given an opportunity to present
his view of the dispute.
At the conclusion of the opening session, each party and his attorney is
assigned a separate room, and the mediator meets sequentially with each party
in private meetings called caucuses." ' The objectives of the initial caucus
include: continuing to build trust, allowing the parties to vent feelings and
emotions," permitting the mediator to learn about the case, allowing the
mediator to determine the underlying interests of the parties, and generating an
offer. ' The mediation process is geared toward allowing the mediator to
acquire information from each side that would never have been disclosed in the
traditional adversarial process.'" The mediator accomplishes this by listening
actively, asking open-ended questions, and listening more." 9 Indeed, careful
listening is a key strategy used by mediators to resolve disputes."0 With the
insights the mediator gains in these private caucuses, he can begin to formulate
options for resolution of the dispute.'
The same objectives flow over into the subsequent or "interim" caucuses.
In addition, in the interim caucuses the mediator typically begins to insert reality
into the process by encouraging the parties to analyze, from all angles, the risks
they face if the case goes to trial.
One paradox of the mediator's role is that he must "be neutral and impartial,
yet at the same time, persuasive."'5 At a minimum, the mediator persuades
143.
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the parties to come to a mutually acceptable resolution of their dispute.
Typically, the mediator in the emerging dominant process seeks to persuade the
parties both by suggesting the risks of not settling-based on predictions of how
their rights would be adjudicated-and by5 promoting cooperative problemsolving rather than adversarial competition.' 3
In the emerging dominant mediation, there is a recognition that active
persuasion undermines mediator neutrality; therefore, techniques are used to
render the persuasive feature of the process imperceptible to the participants."
The techniques used derive from the classic art of rhetoric, although most
mediators who are trained to use this technique are probably unaware of its
origin. Such techniques as the dialectic (or Socratic) method, which call for the
mediator to ask carefully framed questions to the parties rather than making
direct statements, "grant to the parties the facility to persuade themselves" and
allow the mediator to maintain his appearance of neutrality."'
Mediators exercise techniques to create momentum in the negotiations, to
break "log jams," and to avoid impasses as the mediation proceeds. Should the
parties reach a settlement of their dispute, the basic agreement is usually reduced
to writing and executed by all parties and their attorneys.
VI. THE PROS AND CONS OF MEDIATION
Much has been written and spoken about the perceived strengths and
weaknesses of mediation as a dispute resolution process. The majority of this
commentary on both sides of the issue consists of expressions of opinion. As
with all opinions, these tend to be colored by the perspectives, biases, experiences, and interests of the sources. Nonetheless, any meaningful appraisal of the
desirability of institutionalizing a system of mediation must consider the views
expressed by thoughtful and knowledgeable observers of the process.
A. Benefits and Advantages ofMediation
Many of the advantages urged by proponents of mediation have been
foreshadowed in the above discussions of the goals and methodologies of the
process. 56 Mediation is touted as being less expensive, faster, and more
efficient than adversary proceedings, thus offering the potential for both the court
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system and private litigants to save money.' Another proffered advantage of
mediation is its capacity to improve the accessibility of the justice system to the
public.' 5 ' Mediation hastens the disposition of other cases that require
processing through the adversary system."'
Mediation is viewed by many as "potentially more hospitable to unique
solutions that take more fully into account nonmaterial interests of the disputants.'" ° It informs litigants regarding the needs and interests of their
opponents and of the community, and assists them in identifying mutually
advantageous courses of action.""
Considering that the vast majority of civil cases are resolved prior to trial,
mediation is perhaps more accurately characterized as an alternative to the
current settlement procedure rather than an alternative to our current system of
adjudication." Mediation speeds the settlement process by getting the parties
to the table, offering a less fragmented method of negotiation than the "impersonal and inconstant" telephone communications typically used, and facilitating
frank discussions that help lead to closure.'63
Mediation intervenes and breaks the spiral of escalating hostilities that is
often a byproduct of the adversary process. It bridges the communications gap
that frequently exists between parties and their counsel, and provides an
atmosphere for intensive, uninterrupted negotiations.'" Mediation can also
encourage the parties to exchange information, help them to understand one
another's views, and help them to realistically assess alternatives to litigation.'
Mediation is often seen as an empowering device which increases the
parties' self-determination and allows them to reach agreements that consider all
of the facts and circumstances that are important to them.'" Parties to the
dispute are more likely to be satisfied with mediated agreements than with court
orders and thus are more likely to comply with the agreements.1"6
Mediation serves as an opportunity to bring emotions into the settlement
process.'" Because of the consensual nature of its outcome, mediation offers
the parties an opportunity to devise a "win-win" resolution of their controversy
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with professional help."0 This approach is in contrast to the "winner-take-all
scenario" which often characterizes litigation.' 0 Mediation allows the parties
to exchange concessions on the issues that are most important to each of
them.'
The mediation process reduces alienation of the litigants' 17 and
permits them to view themselves as winners.' 73 As a result, mediation tends
to be more accommodative and conducive to compromise; it improves relations
among the participants, permitting continuation of long-term relationships that
might be destroyed by the adversary process. 74 It can reduce disputants'
'
anxiety caused by the "conflict situation.""tS
From an economic perspective,
it has been argued that mediation using the caucusing format can reduce
inefficiencies from "adverse selection" and "moral hazard," and thereby increase
the expected gains from the trade. 76
Advocates of the process also suggest that mediation allows the parties to
transcend the narrow issues of their dispute and focus on the underlying
circumstances that resulted in or contributed to that dispute. " Mediation has
been advocated as a method for providing an atmosphere which maximizes the
chances for reaching an agreement."7 It provides a method for exchange of
information and enables the parties to obtain special "expert information" which
might facilitate settlement.'79 The mediator also can function as a sounding
board and counselor."8
In a broader sense, mediation and other methods of alternative dispute
resolution are advanced by their proponents as "refining and improving
America's social, political and economic institutions-making them work better
and for a greater number of people."'' Borrowing an idea from Buckminster
Fuller, mediation and other forms of ADR have been likened to "institutional
'trim tabs,' small rudders that help big boats make needed, and sometimes
urgent, mid-course corrections."' 2 They have the potential for increasing
fairness, efficiency, and informed participation, and also of fostering wise
outcomes and reducing injustice.'83
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It has been argued that the combination ofmediation and the adversary process
promotes "a more sophisticated conception of social interactions that emphasizes
8
the importance of cooperation and consensus, as well as confrontation."' '
B. CriticismsofandResistanceto Mediation
As discussed above,"s there have been and continue to be criticisms leveled
by proponents of the various schools of thought within the ADR community at
particular forms of the mediation process. In addition, and in some instances in
tandem with these criticisms, various objections have been raised to mediation
generally, or to certain types of mediation, by voices in the legal practice,
academic, and political realms.' 8' At times, hostility and resistance to the
mediation process are more subtle, and perhaps even unarticulated. This section
explores some of these criticisms as well as the resistance and its causes.
1.Criticisms
Some critics have argued that there is a danger that mediation will result in
unfair settlements when there is an imbalance between the parties in terms of their
skill or power, or in the information they possess.' 7 In pure interest-based
mediation, one concern is that parties who are unaware oftheir legal position might
be dominated by their more powerful adversaries.t ' Great disparities in bargaining power can result in coercion and an unjust settlement for the weaker party.'"9
Participation in mediation can be a burden to parties with limited resources,'
and some argue that litigation has the effect of equalizing bargaining power' 9'
The danger that an unrepresented party, who is unknowledgeable about his
legal rights and in a weak bargaining position, may be taken advantage of by a
more powerful opponent. This danger is certainly one which must be guarded
against in mediation. However, this situation should seldom arise in mediations
conducted under the emerging dominant model because both parties are
represented by attorneys who can inform them of and protect their legal
rights.
There is also reason to question the legitimacy of the argument that
mediation is more threatening to weaker parties than litigation. Considering the
costs of the litigation process, a powerful and knowledgeable party has an
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Indeed, the most important

motivation for a weaker party to agree to an "unfair" settlement, whether in
mediation or outside of it, is the daunting prospect of having to engage in
expensive litigation against a financially resourceful opponent. Mediation at least
offers the possibility that the involvement of a skilled neutral party will serve to
mitigate somewhat the disparity in strength between adversaries in the negotiation process. 93
In answer to the arguments of mediation proponents that the process
promises low cost and efficiency, some observers note that these attributes are
not inherently fair. They warn of the sacrificing thoroughness and decisionmaking accuracy for an excessive concern for efficiency.'"
Another objection raised to mediation is that it unfairly coerces parties to
settle rather than to adjudicate.'" For example, some mediators prohibit the
parties from leaving the session until the mediator declares that the session is
over.'" Some feel that holding of the parties hostage in this manner inappropriately burdens their wills.
Once again, these are legitimate criticisms that must be guarded against, but
they do not seem to be fundamental objections to mediation as a process.
Indeed, the coercion that can be brought to bear by a mediator, whose role in the
parties' dispute is limited to the mediation process, is infinitesimal compared to
that inherent when a judge or a magistrate conducts a settlement conference in
a case over which he is presiding.'9
Some complain that the mediation process is unsuitable for resolving certain
types of disputes because the results of mediation are excluded from public
scrutiny, thus the public might be robbed of vital information.'" A related
argument suggests that because mediation establishes no precedents, its
widespread use could undermine the operation of stare decisis by reducing the
volume of cases which give guidance for future conduct.' 99 Some mediation
proponents point out, however, that this argument runs counter to the more
dominant concern that large caseloads prevent judges from spending the adequate
time to consider the cases requiring "serious deliberation and opinion writing.,20
There seems to be little disagreement, even among the strongest proponents
of mediation, that cases involving important or difficult issues of constitutional
or public law should not be subject to mediation or other forms of private
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resolution." Certain cases, including those in which the plaintiff seeks a
declaration of law by the court, simply do not lend themselves to resolution other
than by the judiciary."2
Some commentators have expressed concern that mediation, particularly if
it is a required step in the adjudication process, improperly burdens the parties'
ability to obtain a judicial determination of their dispute. 3 Courts generally
dismiss constitutional challenges to mandatory mediation which are based upon
a denial of the right of access to courts or the right to a jury trial because
mediation only delays and does not deny the parties the right to litigate in
court.L2 It is difficult, however, to ignore the fact that mandatory mediation
does impose some burden on a party's right to litigate.' s The appropriate
analysis is whether, as a matter of public policy, the burden of being required to
participate in mediation justifies the benefits derived from such a program.
Additional complaints about mediation include the concerns that it adds to
the cost oflitigation if the case does not settle, that it threatens litigation strategy
because parties are required to disclose positions that they otherwise could
conceal until a time closer to trial, and that bad deals come about when one of
Some
the parties is particularly "averse to conflict or a poor negotiator."'
critics have expressed the opinion that mediation is incompatible with a civil jury
resolution process based upon the premise that there is always a single
appropriate outcome to every dispute.2" Because mediation always leads to
compromise or middle ground, it conflicts with the notion that one party to a
dispute could be clearly right or absolutely wrong. 0' Moreover, the concern
has been expressed that mandatory court-annexed ADR will encourage litigants
to inflate initial settlement demands when they come to realize that the "'middle
ground' is always the goal of ADR.""'
Finally, various criticisms have been directed, not so much toward
mediation, but toward those who seek to use the mediation process for their own
purposes. First, there are those perceived to inappropriately market themselves
as mediators for personal gain and profit. In many jurisdictions, there are no
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controls on mediators or methods for licensing and regulating their practice. 1
It has also been suggested that some promoters of ADR support it as a way to
limit the courts' involvement "in areas affecting minority interests, civil rights,
and civil liberties.""' Echoing the views of the interest-based/quality process
mediation advocates, the view also has been expressed that many who support
mediation because it is efficient and inexpensive are unconcerned about the
substantive results of the process."' Additionally, critics have suggested that
lawyers manipulate the process to obtain "cheap discovery." 2 3 However, it
has also been pointed out that the costs of engaging in such abuses-long-term
damage to these attorneys' credibility and effectiveness-would usually outweigh
4
any short-term gains from such practices."
2. Resistance
In addition to the explicit criticisms, resistance by attorneys and members
of the public, who see court adjudication and the adversary system as the only
appropriate method for dispute resolution in our culture create a second obstacle
to the spread of mediation. Subtly blended with this deeply entrenched animus
against mediation is a concern that this alternative process constitutes a threat to
the lawyer's livelihood, to a successful outcome of a particular dispute, or to
both. Although this attitude is by no means universal and while it has waned
considerably in recent years, this type of resistance to mediation is still
significant in certain parts of the legal community.
Studies indicate that lawyers strongly influence the willingness of their
clients to participate in mediation. Low participation in certain mediation
programs has been tied to negative attitudes in the legal community. On the
other hand, a principal motivation for parties
to choose to mediate disputes is
2t5
their attorneys' recommendation to do so.
One basic problem is that many members of the bar do not truly understand
mediation or the mediation process. 2t6 Many lawyers fail to realize that
27
mediation is different from arbitration, particularly in its consensual nature. '
Additionally, some commentators believe that mediation is based upon
assumptions which are fundamentally different from those underlying the way
most lawyers have been taught to look at the world. Leonard Riskin has
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hypothesized that the "philosophical map" employed by the majority of
practicing attorneys and law professors varies dramatically from that used by
mediators. 218 He identified as the two essential assumptions underlying the
attorney's handling of cases: "(1) that disputants are adversaries-I.e., if one
wins, the others must lose--and (2) that disputes may be resolved through
application, by a third party, of some general rule of law." 219 He posited, as
the exact opposite of the lawyer's assumptions, the premises underlying the
mediator's activities: (1) two adversaries can reach agreement that furthers the
interests of both of them; and (2) that each conflict is different from all others
and therefore should not be resolved in accordance with any universal rule unless
the parties decide it will be.' Riskin suggested that the lawyers' two assumptions, together with the "real demands of the adversary system and the
expectations of many clients" result in lawyers' lack of interest in and distrust
of mediation."
These assumptions also prevent lawyers from recognizing
certain types of information which mediators consider, such as the parties'
emotional needs and their desire for mutual respect, security, and other nonmaterial concerns.n2
The "adversarial mind-set" of some lawyers causes an obsession with
winning.'m When lawyers "think like lawyers," in Riskin's view, they tend to
categorize people and events in ways that are legally meaningful but insensitive to
human values.22 The legal system also causes attorneys to try to translate
emotional and other intangible interests into pecuniary values, or simply to ignore
" An attorney representing a party in mediation must abandon his usual
them.m
role as a gladiator and become a negotiator, assisting the mediator in the ultimate
goal of reaching settlement.'m Often this is not an easy or comfortable transition.
Other observers offer additional reasons why members of the legal
community have a tendency to avoid suggesting mediation to their clients. One
is the lawyer's perception that the client expects him to assert the client's
position without compromise. " 7 Another inhibitor to the lawyer suggesting
mediation is his desire to achieve a result that meets the client's articulated goals,
even when that result is inconsistent with the client's true interests.2 8
Some lawyers fear that the opposing party's suggestion of mediation is
nothing more than a strategy to gain advantage rather than a genuine effort to
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settle.'
Some resistance by lawyers may simply stem from inertia.'
The
vast majority of attorneys have neither been educated about nor trained in
mediation skills and they simply may not want to try something that is unfamiliar
to them."' Lawyers may also fear that they will lose control of the process
if a mediator gets involved.'"
Finally, some lawyers see mediation as an economic threat.'
Some
lawyers who collect their fees on a contingency basis are concerned that
mediation will reduce the dollar amount recovered by the plaintiff. If the parties
substitute non-material considerations for money in settling their dispute, or if
mediation tends to result in a more moderate recovery than a windfall jury award
would afford, the contingent-fee attorney may receive correspondingly less for
his services.'
Likewise, the attorney paid on an hourly basis may earn less
if mediation results in an earlier settlement of the case, 235 and he may earn less
in the future if his client and the client's adversary learn through the mediation
process to manage their relationship so as to avoid more litigation.23
C. Potential Contributions ofMediation to the Legal System
While it is unrealistic to minimize the tensions between the practice and
premises of mediation and those of adversary adjudication, the emerging
dominant model ofmediation offers a practical accommodation between the two.
Lawyers should not fear mediation either as a threat to the adversarial philosophy
or to their economic well-being. The reality is that lawyers and the legal system
are going to dominate the methods used to resolve disputes in American
society." 7 Lawyers should feel entirely comfortable with the rightsbased/predictive aspect of the process,"' and, as they become more familiar
with interest-based problem solving by participating in mediation, this too will
become second-nature and recognized as a useful tool to resolve conflict.
With respect to the economic issue, there is no reason to expect significantly
different outcomes in mediated settlements than in ordinary settlements. Since
cases almost always settle, contingent recoveries should almost always be the same
with or without mediation. To the extent that the use of mediation results in
settlements in cases which otherwise would have gone to trial, any reduction in
windfall plaintiffs' verdicts should be offset by a similar diminution ofzero verdicts
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in favor of defendants.' Furthermore, if an attorney paid on an hourly fee basis
earns less on a particular case because mediation results in an earlier settlement, the
increased satisfaction experienced by the client as a result of achieving a
satisfactory settlement at a lower cost may lead to the client's repeated patronage
ofthe attorney's services and his referral ofother clients to the attorney. Moreover,
attorneys stand to benefit more generally from improvements in the dispute
resolution system that may be wrought by greater use of mediation, especially if
lawyers are seen as promoting rather than impeding the adoption of the process.
The demand by clients for mediation is increasing, and likely will continue to
increase.' Mediation is an innovation in the field-a better technology. In a
free market system, it is impossible to successfully hold on to an outdated
technology by refusing to accept more efficient innovations."' If lawyers refuse
to relinquish adherence to a process that works inefficiently, the profession will
ultimately suffer. 2
There is evidence that attorneys are increasingly accepting mediation, and, in
some localities, they seem to have embraced the concept wholeheartedly. Large
numbers ofattorneys in those jurisdictions which have adopted mandatory or semimandatory mediation have become "ardent mediation converts."2'43 By some
accounts, once attorneys have tried mediation, they have found that it increases
their resolution success rate, increases client satisfaction, and helps attorneys
exercise greater control over their practice by improving their time management
and efficiency.' Several studies have shown that attorneys, as well as clients
who have used mediation, are becoming committed repeat users. "'
Florida attorneys, who initially were negative about mediation under their
state's mandatory program, have revised their opinion of the process.'" Counsel
on both the plaintiff and defense side see a benefit in mediation's ability to educate
their clients, thus validating or
reinforcing the attorney's advice and placing
24 7
attorneys in,a stronger position.
Some of the Florida attorneys surveyed about their state's mandatory
mediation program expressed reservations, suggesting that at times participants
simply "go through the motions" rather than engaging in a good faith effort to
negotiate.'" However, most attorneys interviewed stated that they believed
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that this was a problem associated with the early days of the program, when
there was less familiarity with the process and when attorneys often were
unprepared for the mediation session."4
The interest-based enthusiasts, though they object to the co-option of the
mediation process by the legal system, should be heartened by the indoctrination
taking place within the legal community. Increasingly, lawyers participate in
mediations and pursue training both in mediation advocacy and in mediator
techniques. Practicing attorneys are gaining exposure to the principles and ideals
of the traditional mediation culture, as shown by the fact that the emerging
dominant mediation model-which is largely controlled by lawyers-has not
discarded empowerment, interest searching, problem-solving, and the other basic
elements of traditional mediation for a purely rights-based/predictive model. If
these procedures are in fact superior, they will gradually take root over time.
Then, the "non-legal," human-oriented values that are the essence of the quality
process mediation will become as integral a part of the "philosophical map"
employed by practicing attorneys as the adversarial assumptions are.
It is doubtful that mediation will become the dominant method of processing
disputes in the United States. However, an increased use of this method may
help satisfy the yearning by many in our society for a greater degree of the
"natural harmony ... in human affairs. ' 250 Problem-solving and rightsoriented approaches can co-exist and offer a rich blend of the competitive and
the conciliatory." The problem-solving methodology promotes "trust, respect,
love and caring," as well as fostering relationships, while the rights-based
approach stresses "protection, separation and material values. 2S 2
The melding of the two approaches can be accomplished by lawyers, by
increased participation in mediation, and by changes in their mode of practicing
law. 3 What may result is a more complex professional role for lawyers and
a broadening and deepening of the levels on which they operate.'
Lawyers
have the potential to become dispute resolution specialists rather than merely
litigators. If this promise is fulfilled, there could be great advantages to society,

the legal system, and lawyers themselves.2"
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Mediation education has the potential to help lawyers and law schools to
"fulfill the strong impulses ... to make law more responsive to the needs of
individuals and society."'
It could also enhance lawyers' awareness of the
full spectrum of their clients' needs and interests, and expand their ability to
understand, intellectually and emotionally, both sides of a case and to comprehend the interests and needs of opposing parties so as to pursue the resolution7
of controversies in a manner that maximizes the benefits to everyone. 2
Lawyers who mediate might become more sensitive to the "interconnectedness
of human beings" which the process fosters and perhaps be less prone to the
adversary excesses which have done so much to tarnish society's view of lawyers
and the entire adjudicatory system."' Participation in the mediation process
may also enhance the ability of attorneys to fully comprehend their clients'
interests and to be responsive to those interests in negotiating with opposing
counsel."5 In the opinion of one noted commentator, this expanded awareness
"could be the greatest contribution of mediation to contemporary America."2"
VII. RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Until the 1980s, there was very little empirical data to support or refute the
myriad of opinions expressed regarding the advantages and disadvantages of
mediation.26 ' However, since that time, the number of reliable studies
accompanying mediation experiments have greatly increased."
While
sophisticated empirical evaluation of mediation programs is still in its infancy,
significant advances have been made in this area. Evaluation programs
established in recent years as research components of newly-adopted mediation
programs offer great hope for increased information. These programs can be
used to evaluate mediation and optimize its functioning. 63 However, many
observers feel that current limitations in methodology and research design make
it difficult to properly assess the success of the process. 2'
The most obvious subject of empirical research into the mediation process
is an examination of how well it works. A common approach to investigating
this subject identifies three criteria used to define quality in mediation:
efficiency, effectiveness, and efficacy.2 s

While each of these concepts is
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courts and/or disputants.26" Effectiveness is usually measured (1) from the
disputants' perspective, by the degree of user satisfaction and compliance with
the agreement produced by the mediation, and (2) from the judicial standpoint,
by the settlement rate and speed of case processing. 67 There is less consensus
regarding the criteria which should be considered to measure efficacy, but, as a
general matter, this criteria relates to the fairness of the process.
A. Efficiency ofMediation
There does not appear to be a great deal of consensus regarding how
efficient mediation is.'
Differences in findings depend in part upon whether
the study considers cost savings to participants or to the courts and the type of
mediation program involved.
One study concluded that while initially there were neither substantial nor
consistent cost savings to parties in divorce mediation, there was less relitigation
and ultimately lower costs over time.'9 Other studies have found mediation to
be less costly
than adjudication in neighborhood justice centers"' and in divorce
271
cases.
On the other hand, at least two studies ofthe neighborhood justice movement
have found that mediation is not an efficient process. 272 In a study of the Denver
Custody Mediation Project, it was found that costs incurred by those who
participated in unsuccessful mediation were greater than those incurred by parties
who did not participate in mediation at all.2 3
More recent studies of new court-sponsored mandatory and semi-mandatory
mediation programs in courts of general jurisdiction tend to demonstrate a greater
degree of savings to litigants. A legislatively funded study of Florida's courtsponsored mediation program found that mediation was faster and less expensive
than adjudication. 7 Although not based upon scientific methodology, estimates
given in testimony before the California Senate Judiciary Committee in May of
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1995 by the Association of Attorney-Mediators, a Texas-based organization
founded in the 1980s, indicate that the 54,000 mediations its members had
conducted had resulted in direct savings to litigants, in attorney's fees and
expenses, in excess of $800 million." 5
In assessing public cost savings as opposed to savings to litigants, it is
questionable whether there is sufficient data to conclude that court-sponsored
mediation results in overall savings of judicial resources."' Some evidence
exists that the volume of cases processed by a mediation program strongly affects
costs. Per-case costs in voluntary mediation programs are often greater than
standard court handling largely because of the low volume of mediation.
"Mandatory mediation... programs, on the other hand, appear to be decidedly cost
effective" and helpful to the courts because they satisfactorily handle a much larger
volume ofcases.'"
Attorneys participating in the first year of the court-annexed program in
Cincinnati estimated an average savings of forty hours per case of attorney time
when their clients participated in a successful mediation.27 While this indicated
real cost savings for successful disputants, it is unclear whether the program
resulted in net gains: it is conceivable that the savings enjoyed by those who reach
a mediated settlement are largely offset by increased costs incurred by those who
fail to do so.2 " In a District of Columbia mediation study, researchers concluded
that a mediation program did not save a significant amount ofjudicial resources by
encouraging settlements.'
B. Effectiveness ofMediation
While the cost savings efficiency attributable to mediation appears to depend
largely upon the type ofprogram, there is general agreement that empirical studies
affirm mediation's effectiveness."' Studies have found a 58% settlement rate in
divorce cases," ' a 66.1% settlement rate in small claims mediation, 28 3 settlement rates ranging from 60-90% in neighborhood justice centers,2 " and an 80%
settlement rate in a custody mediation project.'
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Approximately 40% ofcustody and visitation disputes reached full settlement
in court-based mediation programs inLos Angeles, Minnesota, and Connecticut,
while another 20-30% reached partial or temporary agreements.
A study of
neighborhood justice centers indicated a 65-78% settlement rate for civil
mediations and a 81-95% settlement rate for "interpersonal mediations."2"" One
study found that in excess of 80% of couples who engaged in mediation achieved
their own custody and visitation agreements during or after the process while only
half of those not exposed to mediation did so.'
The settlement rates in mediations involving commercial cases and in other
situations where the emerging dominant process is employed appear to be even
higher than in the traditional small claims and domestic contexts. It has been
reported that commercial mediation works about 85% of the time. 29" Two large
providers of commercial mediation services have reported in recent years that they
resolved more than 90% of the cases they mediated.2' 9 From September of 1989
through May of 1992, thejudicial administrator ofthe 101 st District Court in Dallas
County, Texas reported that 964 cases were mediated and that 83% of them
settled. 9'
Early statistics from North Carolina's state-wide court-annexed mediation
projects indicate that 57% of the cases mediated were settled. 29' However, these
results may be somewhat skewed in that many of the cases initially sent to
mediation in the pilot districts were the oldest ones and thus the least likely to
settle. 9 Moreover, in at least one district which kept such statistics, following
the adoption ofthe mediation program there was an increase in the court's overall
settlement rate from 85% to 90%, or a one-third decrease in the number of cases
going to trial. 29 This decrease appeared to have been accompanied by a decrease
in the average period elapsing between the filing of a case and its final disposition.295
Florida Supreme Court administrators are of the opinion that the state's
mandatory mediation program has played a significant role in reducing the judicial
workload. ' " Statistics indicate that while civil case filings continue to rise, there
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is a substantial decrease in the number of jury trials due to more cases being
successfully mediated.'
Research also suggests that parties experience both ahigh level of satisfaction
with mediation and good compliance, with agreement rates in the range of 6090%.. Such results, together with low levels of relitigation, are the universal
findings in mediation studies."
One sample study showed a high level ofuser satisfaction among participants
both in cases which settled and in those which reached an impasse.' Whether
the case settled or not, the parties and their counsel reported that they had a positive
impression of the mediation, considered it fair, and found the mediator unbi30
ased. '
In the Denver Custody Mediation Project, 77% of those who tried mediation
reported being satisfied with the process compared with 40% who were satisfied
with the court process. 2 Seventy-eight percent of those participating in the
community mediation program in Dorchester, Massachusetts were glad they had
done so; 50% thought participation improved their situation; and 70% felt they had
been given a chance to "air their complaints."3 °3 Enthusiasm about mediation
was expressed by 88% of the respondents at neighborhood justice centers.3"
In long-term follow-up in the Denver Custody Mediation Project, 79% of
successful mediation participants reported that their spouses were in compliance
with child custody and financial terms ofthe mediated agreement compared to 67%
of those who did not participate in mediation. 305 Thirty-three percent of the
adversarial parties-versus only 6% of those who reached settlement through
mediation-stated that there had been serious disagreements in carrying out their
settlements.' In Maine's small claims mediation program, 70.6% of the parties
who participated in mediation and who had agreed to a monetary settlement were
paid in full as opposed to 33.8% ofthose who obtained a verdict." 7
A recent study from Minnesota found that a greater number of participants in
mediation than in adjudication rated the process as fair and satisfactory. '
Moreover, those who settled their cases in mediation gave the process higher
ratings for fairness and efficiency than those who did not.3°
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Another study comparing mediation and adjudication found greater
satisfaction with the dispute resolution process among parties who mediated
rather than litigated, but concluded that satisfaction with the actual outcome was

the same in either case.3 0 Interestingly, the opposite result emerged from
another study. In that study, there was no difference in the level of satisfaction
with the process, but mediation participants reported greater satisfaction with the
outcome.3"' One study analyzed the differences in satisfaction rates among
plaintiffs and defendants. It showed that 74% of plaintiffs and 71% of
defendants expressed satisfaction with the mediation process compared to 66%
of plaintiffs and 68% of defendants who litigated their claims and expressed
satisfaction with the litigation process."'
A 1993 study reported greater satisfaction with outcome among all groups
who mediated rather than litigated with the exception of white women.3' 3
Another survey found plaintiffs more satisfied with the outcome of mediation
while defendants preferred the outcome of adjudication.314 Paradoxically, the
groups who appeared to fare better in the outcome of mediation tended to be less
satisfied with both the process and the outcome.3 '
Judges in North Carolina state that the recently implemented court-annexed
mediation program there has "great potential for benefiting the judicial system
as a whole." 316 Attorneys have found participation in that program a "highly
satisfying experience." ' 7
C. Efficacy ofMediation

While efficacy or fairness is harder to measure,"' the general satisfaction
of the participants with the mediation process suggest that they perceive that it
is fair. In a study conducted after the first year ofoperation of the court-annexed

program in Cincinnati, both disputants and their counsel described the mediation

process as fair, regardless of outcome.319 Similarly, a legislatively-flnded
study of Florida's state-wide, court-annexed mediation programs found that
participants believed mediation to be fair to the parties.320

310.
311.

Id.
Id.

312.

Galanter & Cahill, supra note 280, at 1357 n.72.

313.

Id. at 1357-58.

314.
315.

Id. at 1357 n.72.
Id. at 1358.

316.

Mebane, supra note 102, at 1891.

317.

Id.

318. "Efficacy is the least explored, owing to the difficulty of determining the relationship of
outcome and process and to the amorphous nature of identifying fairness." Tomain & Lutz. supra
note 265, at 7-8.
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D. Other Information About Mediation
In addition to telling us how well mediation has succeeded, empirical studies
also furnish various other types of information about the mediation process. For
instance, some studies have attempted to explain the reasons for variations in
cost and success rates in different programs. One study explained a program's
high cost per case by the intense style of mediation practiced."' In another
study, it was found that the source of the mediator-whether the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Public Employee Relations Board, or ad
Researchers
hoc mediators--determined the settlement rate of cases."
concluded that varying degrees of training among the groups and different styles
Still
of mediation techniques resulted in different degrees of success."
another study suggests that variations in the outcome of the mediation can be
explained entirely by the degree of admitted liability of the defendant."
Some empirical studies have explored the extent to which the characteristics
of mediation as a process affected the perceptions of the parties and outcomes.'" The studies concluded that characteristics of mediation such as
privacy, self-determination, perceived neutral role of the mediator, and the
removal of the formal limitations of the adversarial process did influence, and
in fact enhanced, the participants' perceptions of the legitimacy of the dispute
resolution process and of our legal institutions.326
Research supports the accuracy of mediation theory, which holds that
mediation is more accommodative and conducive to compromise than the
traditional adversary adjudication system. 7 For instance, studies have found
joint custody to be a more common result of mediation than of court adjudication. " More visitation characterizes those mediated settlements which did not
provide for joint custody. 2 While plaintiffs were awarded all (or almost all)
of the damages in nearly 50% of the adjudicated cases as compared to 20% of
mediated cases, they were found to be "more likely to win something in
mediation than in adjudication. " "
A 1992 study conducted by the National Institute for Dispute Resolution
found that the more accurate information individuals had about mediation and

321. Tomain & Lutz, supra note 265, at 10.
322. Id.; David A. Dilts & Lawrence J. Haber, The Mediation of Contract Disputes in the Iowa
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other ADR processes, the more likely they were to use those processes. 3 '
After being told about what mediators and arbitrators do, 62% of the respondents
indicated that they were likely to use the services of a mediator, 32% somewhat
likely, and 30% very likely. 32 Eighty-two percent stated that the next time
they were involved in a dispute, 3they
would like to use an arbitrator or a
33
mediator instead of going
VIII. THE

to

court.

CREATION OF STATE-WIDE, COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION

PROGRAMS

Since the 1960s, various forms of mediation programs have been established
throughout the country. Some of these were affiliated with or sponsored by
individual courts, while others functioned independently. As mediation has
gained greater acceptance and its usefulness in a wide variety of cases has
become increasingly recognized, broader programs have emerged. The clear
trend in the late 1980s and into the 1990s is toward the creation of comprehensive, state-wide mediation programs annexed to civil courts of general jurisdiction.
In 1984, the National Institute of Dispute Resolution (NIDR) instituted a
modest effort at establishing state offices of mediation.33 NIDR's goal was
to "systematically build capacity" by strengthening the mediation venues,
focusing the use of mediation more carefully on complex cases, seeking to have
"services offered on a state-wide basis," encouraging the marketplace for
"increasing numbers of private mediators," and developing "more thoughtful and
systematic applications [of mediation] in government. ' 133S Although the NIDR
initiative has lost some of its momentum in recent years due to the decreased
availability of funding, many state offices are still operating.
As a result of the seeds planted by the NIDR program, and in response to
other forces and developments, a number of states enacted legislation or
established task forces or commissions culminating in the creation of state-wide,
court-connected ADR programs. 336 Court-connected or court-annexed mediation encompasses programs or services under which courts refer lawsuits pending
before them, whether with the consent of the parties ("voluntary") or without
("mandatory"), and whether or not the mediation programs or services are
331. Zerhusen, supranote 216, at 1168.
332. Id. at 1168-69.
333. Id. at 1169.
334. Adler, supra note 26, at 1017.
335. Id. NIDR established state-wide offices located in various branches of government,
selecting Alaska, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Hawaii as recipients of its
initial grants. Id. Additional state-wide offices were funded in Ohio, Florida and Oregon between
1989 and 1991. Id. at 1019.
336. Press, supra note 68, at 1029 n.l. These states include Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Washington, D.C. Id.
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actually operated by the referring court. 3" The program of each jurisdiction
has evolved in a slightly different way. Some states have created state offices
to administer court-annexed mediation, 33 while others have state-wide programs but do not have a central administrative authority. 339 Likewise, states
must choose between establishing a uniform state-wide program and leaving it
to local circuits and jurisdictions to decide whether to participate in developing
mediation programs.'
The advantages of state-wide programs include
uniformity, known expectations, universal availability of mediation, and
economies of scale in providing technical assistance.?3
A variety of agencies coordinate state-wide offices ranging from the
executive, legislative, or judicial branches to state university systems.3 2 Statewide programs have been established by statute or by a combination of statute
and court rule. 3 Funding for state offices varies, but typically the state entity
of which the office is a part supports it, with the assistance of income from filing
and mediator certification fees that are dedicated to the office. 3"
Progressive southern states have been at the forefront of the state-wide
mediation movement. In 1987, Florida and Texas adopted legislation empowering judges to order mediation in any civil case.345 The growth of mediation
in Florida's circuit courts has been explosive and frequently applied in large civil
cases.'
Reported caseload from mediation annexed to these courts nearly
tripled between 1989 and 199047 Almost 50,000 reported cases sta*te-wide go
to mediation.'
As of 1994, over 4,800 individuals had completed mediator
training in the state of Florida and over 2,300 mediators had been certified by the
Florida Supreme Court.3" Florida's statute calls for mandatory mediation only
in cases referred to mediation at the trial court's discretion.50
The Florida legislation passed in 1987 culminated a process begun in 1984,
when the Florida legislature established the Study Commission on Dispute
Resolution.35' The commission issued two reports, the second of which
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"proposed legislation for the comprehensive court mediation and arbitration
program" which was eventually adopted.3S2 The provisions governing Florida's
mediation program are found both in state statutes and in court rules."3 As a
part of the Florida structure, the Florida Dispute Resolution Center ("FDRC'),
a joint program of the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida State University
College of Law, was established in January, 1986. The first ADR center to
combine the resources of an academic institution with that of a state supreme
court,"3 FDRC experiments with ADR methods, serves as a research center
and information clearinghouse on ADR, conducts educational programs, and
provides technical assistance."
The North Carolina Bar Association established a subcommittee, composed
of judges, court administrators, mediators, law professors, and attorneys, to
examine the desirability of adopting a mediation program in that state.3" 6 After
careful study of Florida's program, they drafted proposed legislation.357 In
1991, Senate Bill 791 (a substituted and amended form of the proposed
legislation) unanimously passed the North Carolina Senate and House of
Representatives.3 " To implement the Act, the North Carolina Rules of
Mediated Settlement Conferences were adopted." 9 The mediation program in
North Carolina began with the establishment of pilot programs in eight districts,
all of which had commenced operation by July of 1992."'0 The gradualist
approach used in North Carolina and the absence of a centralized state office
contrasts with Florida, whose program was implemented more quickly and
uniformly.
The impetus for the adoption of a state-wide mediation program in Georgia
was the urging of Chief Justice Harold Clark of the Georgia Supreme Court.3"
Contrary to the non-activist tradition of his office, Chief Justice Clark made
alternative dispute resolution a major theme of his tenure and aggressively
pursued implementation of a mediation program.36
The Georgia State Bar Association ("GSBA") president joined the Chief
Justice, at his invitation, in creating a joint commission on ADR.3 3 In 1990,
the commission-composed of fifteen members selected jointly by the Chief

352. Id. at 1043-44. The Florida Bar Association did not take an active role in working on the
mediation initiatives, but it also did not oppose them.
353. Id. at 1048.
354. Id. at 1044 n.61.
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360. Ld.
at 1863.
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Justice and the GSBA president-was charged with exploring "the feasibility of
a comprehensive court-annexed alternative dispute resolution program" focusing
on mediation and arbitration. 3" The commission first gathered information and
studied alternative dispute resolution programs throughout the country. Then, the
commission then developed pilot programs in Georgia and evaluated the
functioning of those programs, receiving input from all interested parties.'
After a year of studying and experimentation, in September of 1992 the commission presented to the Georgia Supreme Court a set of eight recommendations. ' "
Among other suggestions, the commission recommended that the supreme
court adopt rules implementing a state-wide ADR system and create a successor
commission that would certify and adopt rules for court-annexed programs as
well as govern mediator training and standards of conduct.' 7 Thus, within two
years of the creation of the commission, a state-wide comprehensive program of
alternative dispute resolution was adopted with little controversy and with the
approval of both the GSBA and the appellate courts. ' "
These three case studies demonstrate that each state must pursue its own
path to adopt state-wide, court-annexed mediation programs, depending upon the
particular circumstances and dynamics at work in that jurisdiction. Likewise, the
form of the program, the manner in which it is implemented, and the degree to
which administration is centralized are matters which are handled differently in
each state.
IX. CRUCIAL ISSUES

POSED BY INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MEDIATION

PROCESS

Aside from details regarding how state-wide programs are initiated and
implemented, there are a number of issues regarding mediation that should be
considered when establishing such a program or otherwise institutionalizing the
practice of mediation. Because mediation is being practiced on an ad hoc basis,
these issues exist in practice today but are not being systematically addressed.
In a sense, institutionalization means confronting and deciding crucial issues
posed by mediation practice in order to inject structure and certainty into the
process.
Our primary goal in this section is to identify and to explain to some degree
important mediation practice issues. In some instances, we suggest how we
believe the issues raised should be decided. In others, we merely venture that
there should be some resolution of the issues to assure certainty and fairness in
the mediation process and to those who participate in it.
364. Id.
365.
366.
367.
368.
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A. Purposes and Goals of the Mediation Program
First, we must consider the goals and purposes of mediation. The competing
goals advanced by various proponents of mediation are discussed in part IV of
this article. States adopting mediation programs should establish the goals
policy-makers wish mediation to achieve in order. That way parties and
mediators will know both what to expect from the process and what is expected
from them.
We have seen that the emerging dominant process seeks to achieve a number
of potentially contradictory goals. If the decision is made to pursue all or some
of these goals, the state should establish priorities among them to provide
participants guidance in the process.
While establishing goals and priorities has the disadvantage of crystallizing
the process and arguably stifling creative growth of mediation, this inhibition is
outweighed by the increased certainty infused into the system. Moreover,
nothing done at this stage of the institutionalization process is immutable.
Continued experimentation may result in changes in goal orientations in the
future, and the mediation frameworks set up by the states should be structured
so as not to discourage corrections and revisions in the system.369
B. Qualities and Qualifications of Mediators
In setting up a mediation program, there must be some determination of who
can serve as a mediator. Studies indicate that the success of mediation is largely
dependent on the skill, training, and experience of the mediator.70 However,
substantial disagreement exists regarding what qualifications should be required
to be a member of the profession. A threshold question should be what personal
qualities, background characteristics, and training make for an effective mediator.
1. Personal Characteristics
It is generally recognized that a mediator should facilitate contact between
the parties in an atmosphere calculated to enhance their ability to exchange
information constructively and to seek consensus. 3 7' A mediator should
possess "a degree of empathy and subtlety in personal interaction."37

369.

Because of the fewer number of decision-makers involved and the greater simplicity of the

procedures for revising court rules as compared to passing amendatory legislation, the authors believe
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Other suggested desirable mediator characteristics include "demonstrated
integrity and impartiality, basic knowledge of and belief in the negotiation
process, ...

faith in voluntarism, ...

belief in human values and potentials,

tempered by the ability to assess personal weakness and strengths, hard-nosed
ability to analyze what is available in contrast to what may be desirable," and
"drive and ego" tempered by an ability "to be self-effacing."373
2. Background and Experience
Because modem mediation is still in the development stage, there is no
consensus regarding the skills, knowledge base, and background that are suitable
for mediators."
It has been suggested that mediators can be recruited from lawyers, social
workers, and psychologists if they are properly trained and have the ability to
conduct an orderly meeting, identify issues, and deal with people.37 Those
who believe that lawyers are well-suited to serve as mediators point out that
lawyers' training and experience in "negotiating, consulting, researching,
conciliating,. . . planning," and active listening make them well suited to serve
as mediators.37 Because mediation must, as a practical matter, be complementary to the adjudicative process, and because society and most individuals
consider lawyers as protectors of their rights and the appropriate source of
assistance in asserting and protecting such rights,'" lawyers are logical
candidates to be mediators. However, others suggest that, because of their
adversarial orientation, lawyers are poorly suited to serve as mediators."'
Nonetheless, some state court-annexed mediation programs not only allow but
require that mediators appointed by the courts be attorneys. 79
There is also serious disagreement regarding the importance of a mediator
having knowledge in the substantive field involved in the dispute. While
many suggest that knowledge of mediation techniques is the only relevant
criterion for qualification, others believe that familiarity with the subject
matter of a dispute enhances the mediator's ability to perform successfully.,,
One view suggests that substantive knowledge in the field of the dispute

field dodging ability of a halfback; (6)the guile of Machiavelli; (7)the personality-probing skills of
agood psychiatrist; (8)the confidence-retaining characteristic of amute; (9) the hide of a rhinoceros;
and (10) the wisdom of Solomon." Sato, supra note 116, at 526 n.118.
373. Irvine, supra note 29, at 155 n.l.
374. Nolan-Haley & Volpe, supra note 23, at 573.
375. Moberly, supra note 33, at 707.
376. Sato, supra note 116, at 514.
377. Riskin, supra note 15, at 42. It has also been suggested that lawyers are more likely to
refer cases to mediators who are lawyers. Id. at 43.
378. Irvine, supra note 29, at 156 n.2.
379. See, e.g., Mebane. supra note 102, at 1860; Irvine, supra note 29, at 156 n.3.
380. Edwards, supra note 90, at 683; Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediator Immunity, 2 Ohio St. J. on
Disp. Resol. 85, 87 (1986).
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enhances 38the
mediator's ability to suggest "options and possible settlement
1
formats."
3. CertificationStandardsand Training
Certification and training requirements for mediators are advanced as
methods to protect the public from unqualified persons holding themselves out
as mediators. 38
A number of national professional dispute resolution
organizations and state and municipal governing bodies have developed position
papers and direct legislation addressing the establishment of mediator qualifications.183
In 1989, the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution ("SPIDR")
published a report of their Commission on Qualifications.3 ' It suggested that
protection of the consumer of mediation services and the integrity of the
mediation process prompted the need for establishing mediator qualifications.3 s
The commission also identified three central principles with respect to qualifications: first, a variety of organizations, rather than any single entity, should
establish mediator qualifications; second, the more choice the parties have over
the process, program or identity of the mediator, the less mandatory the
qualifications of the mediator should be; third, qualification criteria should be
based on performance, not paper credentials. 36 The SPIDR Commission made
four recommendations: (1) experience and ability should be the criteria for
selection and qualification; (2) performance criteria and performance-based
testing should be used in training and apprenticeship programs; (3) trainers
should be qualified; and, (4) participation in continuing education programs
should be required of neutrals."8 7
It has been suggested by some that mediation is an insufficiently developed
field to require certified mediators?8
Others oppose certification on the
grounds that inappropriate barriers to entry into the practice may be created,
impeding innovative development of the profession.38 9
As of 1993, it was reported that twenty states had adopted qualifications for
practicing as a mediator, either by statute or by court rule.39 However, in
some of these states, the qualifications only relate to limited programs that are

381. Stulberg, supra note 380, at 87.
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not state-wide in character or that only apply to certain types of cases.39' The
typical qualification requirements include some combination of attending
mediation training, participating in apprenticeship or mentorship programs, and
meeting specified educational or professional requirements. 392 The training for
certification usually must be performed by a certified and specialized trainer; it
tends to include instruction in "general dispute resolution theory" and mediation
skills, as well as participation in a mock mediation as the mediator.393 Great
variations exist in the type and intensity of the apprenticeship, but these programs
usually require the certification applicant to observe a real mediation and conduct
an actual mediation under the supervision of an experienced mediator who
critiques his or her performance.
Typical educational and professional criteria require mediators to be lawyers
or judges, and, in some cases, include other "related" professionals as well, such
as social workers and psychologists. 35 Many mediation proponents are critical
of the "Florida model," which limits court-appointed mediators to lawyers and
other professionals . 3" They argue that reliance on academic credentials as
qualification criteria is "patently exclusionary," and contrary to the practical
reality that many excellent mediators are not lawyers or other professionals. 3
Florida's rules have been revised to permit the parties to chose "non-professional" mediators, although credentials as a professional continue to be mandatory
for court-appointed mediators. 3 '
There is increasing support for performance-based testing of the type
suggested by the SPIDR Commission, which evaluated the credentials of
mediators based on the observation and assessment of the skills that seem to
make for a good mediator. 3" A research study conducted by the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission analyzed mediation skills in terms of five
elements: investigation, empathy, persuasion, invention, and distraction." In
addition, the study found that knowledge of the substantive area involved in the

391. For instance, Louisiana is listed as one of the states establishing a certification requirement.
and the only such requirements in effect in 1993 were those of the Orleans Civil District Court/First
City Court Pilot Program.
392. Id. at 1037.
393. Id. Law schools are beginning to become involved in education regarding mediation and
mediation training. At present more than 25 law schools in the United States have mediation clinics.
Oriffin, supra note 383 (citing Leonard Riskin, Director of the University of Missouri School of
Law's Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution).
394. Press, supra note 68, at 1037.
395. For instance, North Carolina requires that mediators in its court-affiliated program must be
members of the North Carolina State Bar for at least five years. Mebane, supra note 102. at 1860
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dispute was helpfiul.'O' The Wisconsin study concluded that this combination
of skills can be used to develop a training program and "a reasonably reliable
oral examination for selecting mediators."'
A test design project was created by the Wisconsin Commission in 1990 "to
pursue development of guidelines for performance-based selection of mediators."' 3 These guidelines formed the basis for an experimental mediator
selection program at Suffolk County Superior Court in Massachusetts.*0
Oklahoma, while emphasizing training, also requires that mediators who apply
for certification be observed conducting actual mediation.,'0
Although
expensive, performance testing is increasingly being accepted as the preferred
method of selecting qualified mediators."
Once a state determines what qualifications to establish for mediators, a
decision must be made between a formal certification process and self enforcement.'
When formal certification involves uniform state-wide qualification
requirements, consistency in the application of standards and convenience to
mediators are served by adoption of a centralized certification process."
Moreover, if the state establishes uniform standards of conduct and rules of
discipline for mediators, such a central system is essential.'
As an additional check on mediation service providers, it has been suggested
that reporting requirements be imposed on entities and individuals who provide
private dispute resolution services."' For example, there should be disclosure
of the owner of the entity, possible conflicts of interest, and the identity of repeat
client users."' Individual mediators should likewise be required to disclose the
kinds of cases they mediate and their typical clientele. 12
C. Ethics and Standards of Conduct
As the practice of mediation has grown, increasing attention has been paid
to the absence of standards of practice, ethical guidelines, and rules applicable
to mediators. In addition, questions exist regarding the interplay of standards of
conduct and ethical rules when persons who are members of other professions
act as mediators.
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1. CreatingStandardsfor Mediators
Critics and advocates of mediation generally agree that the public interest
requires that mediators "be subject to appropriate and uniform professional
standards."" There is at present no single accepted code of professional conduct
for mediators. This absence is viewed as a danger to the users of mediation
services who might be exposed to unscrupulous practitioners."'
One view is that in formulating mediator standards of practice and ethical
rules, policy-makers should first come to grips with the fundamental question ofthe
role of the mediator in the process. Standards of conduct and ethical rules should
reflect society's conception of what it wants mediators to do."" Just as the
lawyer's role as a loyal and zealous advocate ofthe client's interests largely shapes
the ethical code ofthe legal profession, some basic overall vision ofthe mediator's
function is essential. This, in turn, refers back to the need for a determination of
the purposes and goals of mediation.' Indeed, the lack of consensus regarding
such goals has constituted a crucial impediment to formulating professional
standards to guide the mediator in the performance of his functions."1 7
An opposing view is that mediator standards ofconduct should not necessarily
be designed to further any particular conception ofmediation, but rather simply to
prevent what is "clearly unacceptable conduct."' 8 This belief is based upon the
recognition that differences in mediation styles and theories make it difficult to
establish detailed rules ofappropriate conduct applicable to specific circumstances
and that there likely will be considerable evolution of standards over time as
mediation matures as a profession. 19
During the 1980s, there were a number of efforts to draft uniform standards of
practice and codes of professional conduct for mediators, especially in limited
fields of mediation, such as divorce.20 More recently, ethical rules have been
adopted by at least three states-Florida, Texas, and Indiana. 42 ' Moreover, in
September, 1995, the first set ofmodel ethical standards for mediators was adopted,
endorsed by the ABA's Dispute Resolution and Litigation sections, the American
Arbitration Association, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.'
Some of the earlier proposed standards of conduct have been criticized as
placing limitations on mediation's greatest potential for good.'
A prime
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example of the limiting nature of some proposed codes is the prohibition against
meeting separately with the parties without the prior consent of both sides.42 '
Many mediation practitioners and, certainly, proponents of the emerging
dominant model of mediation, recognize separate caucusing as a vital and
valuable technique in the process."u Separate caucusing allows the mediator
to push for a "full understanding and consideration of all information and
options,"'' 6 allows for the infusion of risk and reality testing without unacceptable disclosure to the other side or peril to the mediator's impartiality, and
permits the mediator to facilitate a dialogue between the parties which would not
take place in a face-to-face meeting. Sometimes, because of the adversary
dynamics in play during the course of a dispute, there may be resistance to such
separate caucusing by the parties or their counsel, and it should not be unethical
for the mediator to require use of this device over the objection of the parties.
Some themes that commentators have suggested should be included in
mediator standards based on the empowerment and recognition notions include
that the mediator should (1) insure "that the parties act with full information and
understanding"; (2) encourage disclosure of all pertinent information by the
parties and assess the importance ofany missing information; (3) have the parties
"fully identify and consider all possible options for resolving" their disputes and
"understand fully the consequences" of settlement or a failure to settle; (4) urge
unrepresented parties to consider legal advice before entering into an agreement
but not to render inappropriate deference to legal experts; (5) seek to have the
parties clearly express their positions and the underlying rationale supporting that
position; (6) translate and explain the parties' positions and their rationales; (7)
seek recognition and empathy of each party for the other's position in such a
way that no party feels threatened; and (8) pursue "active impartiality" by being
visibly evenhanded so that the mediator can serve both as a translator between
the parties and as devil's advocate. 27 These principles seem to be consistent
with the role of the mediator in the emerging dominant mediation process.
Also consistent is another concept suggested for establishing appropriate
standards of conduct 'for mediators. This concept is "accountability," defined
more broadly than neutrality and relating to "ethical, moral, and legal obligations" of the mediator."2 s Under this concept, the mediator is obligated to
insure a procedurally fair process, an atmoshpers of dignity and respect, and
freedom from abusive or intimidating behavior by either party. 29 Generally,
accountability would not encompass an obligation on the part of the mediator to
insure the fairness of the outcome of the mediation because it is "the parties'
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mutual sense of fairness," and not the mediator's, which is to determine the
appropriateness of a particular outcome.'" The mediator, in this view, should
not attempt to impose an agreement merely to adjust for an imbalance of power
between the parties.'"" A mediator should become involved in assessing the
outcome only when a resulting agreement
will be "illegal, grossly inequitable,
2
or based on false information."'3

. The new Model Ethical Standards for Mediators, which took three years to
draft, are designed to provide a general framework of ethical guidance to
mediators.'" The diversity of mediation practice clearly had its effect on the
standards, as evidenced by the drafters' concentration on the "common
denominators."'' There was a split of opinion among the drafters regarding
whether mediators should simply facilitate formulation of a settlement by the
parties, or whether mediators should forthrightly evaluate the parties' positions
and offer opinions regarding the likely litigation outcome."' As drafted, the
standards, to a great extent, adopt the former philosophy of facilitation. One
official comment to the standards states that the mediator should "refrain from
providing professional advice."4"
Under the model'rules, the mediator is to: (1)conduct himself on the
premise that mediation is based on principles ofself-determination of the parties;
(2) conduct the mediation in an impartial manner; (3) disclose actual and
potential conflicts of interest; (4) mediate only if he has the necessary qualifications; (5) maintain the "reasonable expectations" of the parties regarding
confidentiality; (6) conduct the mediation fairly and diligently; (7) be truthful'in
advertisement and solicitation; (8) make full disclosure and explain the basis for
fees; and (9) make efforts to improve the practice of the profession. 37 These
requirements are fairly basic and do not conflict with the practice under the
emerging dominant process. The predictive/rights-based aspects of that process
could be carried out in conformity with the proposed rules so long as subtle
rhetorical techniques are used to avoid risking the mediator's impartiality.
Among the crucial provisions of the model code are those relating to
confidentiality. A fuller discussion of mediation confidentiality appears in part
IX.F of this article.
Florida has led the way in the field of formalizing mediator standards. 3 s
In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court Standing Committee on Mediation and
Arbitration Rules, composed of fifteen mediators, judges, attorneys and law
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professors, was established. Over a two-year period it held public hearings and
meetings, received written commentary, and created two subcommittees, one
focusing on standards of conduct and the other on rules of discipline.439
The committee reviewed pertinent literature, considered existing standards
of mediator conduct from other jurisdictions and organizations, and, on
November 1, 1991, submitted a report to the supreme court. The court issued
an opinion on May 28, 1992 substantially adopting the committee's proposals." The Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators consist of three
parts. The first part sets forth the qualifications for certification, the second
consists of the standards of conduct for mediators, and the third constitutes the
rules of discipline."' The standards of conduct address "the mediation process,
self-determination, impartiality, confidentiality, professional advice, fees and
expenses, training and education, advertising, and relationship with other
professionals." '
Significantly, Florida is the first state to adopt a procedure to enforce
mediation standards of conduct. A Mediator Qualifications Board, complaint
committees, and the Florida Dispute Resolution Center staff are the elements of
the enforcement mechanism." 3 When a complaint committee finds probable
cause that a complaint is valid, a panel of the Board hears and decides the
case." 4 Adverse decisions may be appealed to the Florida Supreme Court."s
The panel has the power to conduct the proceedings, including compelling
witnesses and ordering production of documents.' Upon a finding of "clear
and convincing evidence" supporting violation ofthe rules, the panel may impose
sanctions, ranging from assessment of the cost of the proceeding to decertification or disbarment from service as a mediator." 7
2. Attorney EthicalStandardsand the Attorney-Mediator
A second,, separate set of ethical issues arises when the mediator is also an
attorney-the usual situation in the operation of the emerging dominant model.
In this situation, the basic question is whether the standards of conduct and
ethical rules which apply to lawyers generally apply when the attorney is acting
as a mediator. If so, what happens if there is a conflict between the attorneymediator's duties as an attorney and his duties as a mediator?
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Although attorneys play many roles in society, ethical guidelines for their
conduct primarily envision the attorney's functioning within the adversarial
justice system." This is a problem in that many assumptions underlying the
adversarial system are inappropriate in other contexts within which attorneys
function." 9 Ethical standards requiring that lawyers be zealous advocates,
employ legal procedures to the fullest in order to further the client's cause, and
adhere to other similar standards, while useful in the adversary process, "limit
the problem-solving abilities of lawyer-participants" in mediation.'"
Even more so, these adversarially spawned values are inconsistent with the
role of the attorney-mediator. Although the attorney-mediator is loyal to the
basic precepts of the adversarial system, the role of a zealous advocate of one
party, which is inherent in the adversarial context, is fundamentally different
from the mediator's duty to promote the interests of all participants in the
process.s' While both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (which was adopted in Louisiana as the
Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 1987) acknowledge nonadvocate functions of attorneys, they fail to develop meaningful guidelines for
lawyers acting as negotiators, advisors, or mediators. '"'
Moreover, neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility applies to attorney conduct which does not
constitute the practice of law."' Thus, if acting as a mediator falls outside of
the range of conduct considered "the practice of law," attorney professional
standards and disciplinary rules of conduct should not apply to attorneymediators when functioning as mediators.' Case law from other jurisdictions
supports a cogent argument that under most circumstances what mediators do
does not constitute the practice of law. Under these authorities, an attorney is
only "acting as a lawyer" when (1) the party alleged to be his client reasonably
believes that he is representing her, advocating her interests, and otherwise acting
as her attorney, and (2) the lawyer is applying rules of law to specifics of the
party's situation disclosed to the lawyer in confidence and, based upon this
analysis, offering legal advice.'
Under these standards, it seems that the
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mediator who makes clear that he is not representing either or both of the parties
and who does not purport to give advice applying law to the facts of the case is
not practicing law.'
Indeed, when the parties are represented by counsel in
the mediation, it seems difficult to envision a situation in which the mediator
could be considered to be practicing law.
It is unclear, however, whether the Louisiana courts would adopt this same
approach. Our courts have not applied a quite so analytic approach in considering
the question of what constitutes the practice of law. In Louisiana State Bar
Association v. Edwins,'" the Louisiana Supreme Court quoted an amalgam
definition of the practice of law"" and also cited as "persuasive, but not binding"
the legislative definition of the practice oflaw found in Louisiana Revised Statutes
37:212."' Literal application of parts of these definitions could arguably result
in the conclusion that mediator activities constitute the practice of law. However,
there is nothing in the case law suggesting that a more sophisticated and realistic
analysis would not be applied, distinguishing the attorney-mediator's function from
that of an attorney acting in a representative capacity.
Model Rule 2.2 and its Louisiana analog' ° have introduced the concept of
an attorney as "intermediary."6' The role contemplated by this rule "seems to
be primarily to negotiate agreements among clients whose interests are basically
compatible."
Thus, in cases of contentious negotiation of or imminent or ongoing litigation, which is almost always the case in a mediation, the attorney could
not act as a mediator under this rule." 3 Moreover, no mediation could be
conducted consistent with this rule unless it was purely voluntary on the part of
both parties.'
It is arguable that the ethical constraints of Rule 2.2 would not apply to the
attorney-mediator. The official comments to Model Rule 2.2 state that the rule
"does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between... parties who
are not clients of the lawyer.... " However, nowhere in the text of the
Louisiana rule is this limitation stated, and it is unclear the effect that a Louisiana
court would give to this comment.

Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 81 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1948); Elenstein v. Herman Body Co., 129 A.2d 268 (N.J.
1957).
456. Under the emerging dominant model, asking open-ended questions to instill doubt regarding
a party's legal position likewise should not be considered the practice of law.
457. 540 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989).
458. Id. at 300 (citing Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 571 (La. App. Or. 1936), quoting from
Balientine's Law Dictionary; Boykin v. Hopkins, 162 S.E. 796, 799 (Ga. 1932); People v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 168 N.Y.S. 278, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917), to similar effect).
459. 540 So. 2d at 300.
460. La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4 App., art. 16, Rule 2.2(a) (1988 and Supp. 1996).
461. Pumell, supra note 11, at 990.
462. Id. at 991.
463. Id.
464. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1863-64.
465. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.2 cmt. (1983).

19971

BULLOCK & GALLAGHER

939

Some opinions issued during the 1980s by various state and city legal ethics
commissions apply the adversarial expectation and assume that the role of the
attorney-mediator "implies independent representation of both parties."' These
opinions led some ofthese bodies to rule that lawyers acting as mediators violated
the Disciplinary Rules.40 The Oregon State Bar committee concluded that an
attorney-mediator acting as part of an interdisciplinary team in a family mediation
represented all of the parties.'
Other state bar opinions similarly viewed the
mediator as a representative ofthe parties to the mediation and concluded that the
attorney cannot appropriately champion the interests of the opposing parties
involved in litigation, or in a pre-litigation dispute, that is in a highly adversarial
posture.'
A second group of opinions during the 1980s found that while the
general rule against dual representation of actively adverse parties applied, the
70
particular facts of the case constituted an exception to the general prohibition.1
A third set of opinions held categorically that attorney-mediators were not
functioning' 7as attorneys regardless of their particular actions in conducting the
mediation.
At this point, the most that can be said about the applicability of attorney
standards of conduct and ethical rules to attorneys acting as mediators and the
effect of such rules if they do apply, is that there is a tremendous amount of
uncertainty. A danger exists that potential attorney-mediators will be deterred from
pursuing that role by this "present ethical ambiguity.' ' 7 Likewise, attorneys who
do opt to become mediators may tend to protect themselves by constructing an
elaborate procedural framework which may have the effect of restricting, rather
than promoting, the resolution of disputes.'"
A number of solutions have been proposed to resolve the confusion that
presently surrounds the duties of attorney-mediators. One suggestion is that a
separate set of ethical guidelines be developed for attorney-mediators that would
govern in place of either attorney or mediator rules."' An alternative solution is
to broaden the scope of the "practice of law" concept to encompass such non-

adversarial activities as serving as a mediator." 5 However, such an approach
would require a correlative broadening and a revision of the ethical rules. 76
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A third approach is the one taken in Florida. There, mediator standards of
conduct have been adopted which parallel and run concurrently with the ethical
standards applicable to the mediator's other profession.4" However, the mediator
ethical standards take precedence when a conflict arises between the two sets of
applicable standards.' 78 This solution does not entirely eliminate the uncertainties
addressed above because it does not answer the basic question of whether an
attorney-mediator represents the parties to the dispute. This omission could be
remedied by a revision of the standards ofconduct for lawyers to clearly establish
that attorney-mediators do not engage in the practice of law when they act as
mediators. Such a rule would clearly comport with reality in cases in which the
parties are represented by their own attorneys. In addition, mediator standards of
conduct could be drafted to prohibit specified conduct ofattorney-mediators which
in fact would constitute the practice of law. This would have the effect of
protecting unrepresented parties from attorney-mediators who might overstep the
bounds of their appropriate function.
Confidentiality obligations of attorney-mediators sometimes conflict with their
ethical obligations. This subject is discussed in part IX.F of this article.
3. Obligations ofAttorneys to Advise Clients RegardingADR
A final ethical issue which must be mentioned relates not to attorneymediators, but to practicing attorneys advising their clients regarding their disputes.
Under Rule 1.2(a) of the Model Rules ofProfessional Responsibility, lawyers must
consult with their clients in determining the means that will be used to pursue the
client's objectives.'" The comments to that rule further suggest that the lawyer
should defer to the client regarding practical considerations such as expenses and

the effect of the means pursued on third parties.'s
It has been suggested that this ethical standard imposes a duty on practicing
attorneys to inform clients of the alternative to mediate their cases and to
meaningfully explain the benefits and risks of all alternatives.'
A California
court held that lawyers can be liable for malpractice if they fail to pursue settlement
negotiations, "even if the client is initially opposed to settlement."" 2 In 1992, the
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct were amended to require specifically that:
"In a matter involving or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer should advise the
client ofalternative forms ofdispute resolution which might reasonably be pursued
to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach the legal objective sought."8

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

Moberly, supra note 33, at 707.
Id.
Moberly, supra note 33, at723.
Id. at 723-24.
Id. at 724.
482. William R. Pitta, The Changing Legal Landscape: Multiple Forms ofADR, 41 La. B. J.
203, 204 (1993) (citing Garris v. Sevenson, 205 Cal. App. 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dis. 1988)).
483. Pitts,
supra note 482 (quoting Colo.Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2.1).

1997]

BULLOCK & GALLAGHER

Louisiana's version of Rule 1.2 does not contain the same language as the
Model Rule, but rather states that the lawyer and client both have authority and
responsibility in the objectives and means of the representation.' It has been
urged that regardless of current ethical compulsion, the lawyer's role in society
should be revised so that the primary function is to serve as problem-solver. '
As such, the attorney should seek the most appropriate avenue to resolve his
client's problems, including disputes with third parties. It may well be that such
a conception of the lawyer's role is the "wave of the future" which will not only
enhance the depth and significance of that role, but also will restore to the bar
an appropriate degree of faith, trust, and respect.
D. MediatorLiabilityand Immunity
Another issue created by the use of mediation is the potential liability of
mediators in connection with the performance of their functions. Few reported
cases exist dealing with mediator liability, and there appear to be no reported
cases in which a claimant has prevailed against a mediator. 4' However, the
increasing use of mediation in a wide area of dispute contexts may result in an
increase in the number of cases in which plaintiffs seek to assert such
claims. ' 488 Indeed, the question of mediator liability is a matter of growing
concern.
1. MediatorLiability
Generally, three legal theories are advanced as potential bases for establishing liability of a mediator: tort, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary

duty.

4

The tort theory relies upon standard principles of professional liability
employed in actions involving professions such as attorneys and physicians. One
of the essential elements of a tort cause of action would be "a breach of the duty
by failure [of the mediator) to comply with acceptable standards of practice." '"
It is highly doubtful that the mediation profession is sufficiently developed at this
time to support an ascertainable set of professional standards for mediators that
could be used as a benchmark to establish delictual liability.49'
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There is a great diversity of opinion regarding the appropriate course of
action a "reasonably competent mediator" should take under given circumstances.9
There are no generally accepted professional standards for mediators.'
It has been argued that mediation is more an art than a science,
requiring the exercise of highly subjective judgment, and making it difficult to
prove that a given action by a mediator has fallen below minimum professional
standards.' This situation is further complicated by the different contexts in
which mediators operate, which often vary widely in the degree of formality
employed.' 3 The degree of uniformity and consistency which typifies
activities of other professionals who function under established standards of care

simply does not yet exist among mediators. Indeed, there is a question whether
such a degree of uniformity and consistency will ever exist in the profession.'
The second theory which might form abasis for mediator liability is the breach
ofan express or implied contractual duty. Generally, to furnish some independent
basis for a claim against the mediator, a contract would have to contain some
specific undertaking by the mediator, such as a promise to achieve a particular
result or provide certain procedural protections. 9" For instance, if a mediator
undertakes in his contract to insure a fair exchange of information between the
parties, or if he promises to hold the mediation within a set period of time, and fails
to fulfill either undertaking, liability could arise under a contractual theory."'
Typical mediation agreements used in practice today do not include such
undertakings by the mediator. Such agreements tend to be much more general and
primarily serve as a vehicle to insulate the mediator and inform the participants."M
A third possible theory of liability that might be applied to mediators is breach
of fiduciary duty.' Under the law of fiduciary duty, an equitable remedy arises
in favor of a claimant who placed his trust in another with whom he has a
confidential relationship if the trusted party fails to carry out the justifiable
expectations of the claimant.s" Liability may result from even the "slightest
breach" of the fiduciary's duty.'
Although some commentators have argued that the breach of fiduciary duty
is the most appropriate remedy in the mediator liability context, 3 others
disagree and have expressed concern that judging mediators under such a
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495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
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S02.
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Richardson, supra note 15, at 626.
Chaykin, supra note 487, at 63.
Id.
Id.
Richardson, supra note 15, at 626-27.
Id. at 626-27; Chaykin, supra note 487, at 55-56. 68.70.
Chsykin, supra note 487, at 55.
Chaykin, supra note 178, at 738.
Chaykin, supra note 487, at 70.
Chaykin, supra note 178, at 742.
Id. at 738, 757.
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standard may inhibit the development of mediation.s
Mediators do not
represent the parties as do other fiduciaries." The mediator's duty is to the
mediative process itself, which embraces and includes all of the parties to the
This concept views the mediator as more akin to a judge or
mediation.arbitrator, whose primary duty is not to the individuals but to the abstract value
of fairness.'
In this context, as in others, it may be appropriate to draw a
distinction between a mediator who presides over a mediation in which the
parties are represented by counsel and one in which the parties are unrepresented.
Another factor to be considered in the area of mediator liability is the
difficulty in establishing causation and damages. Assume, for instance, that the
mediator has promised to furnish a fair procedural forum and fails to deliver, or,
that he has provided inaccurate information upon which the parties relied during
negotiations; or, that he breaches his confidentiality obligations. In each of these
situations it will likely be very difficult to prove either that the conduct of the
mediator caused damage to the party or the amount of that damage.'
The
claimant will likely have a difficult time establishing what the result would have
been but for the mediator's
alleged conduct, and the difficulties of proof may
0
well preclude recovery.3
As a practical matter it seems that there are very narrow circumstances under
which mediators are likely to be held liable under the present state of the
law. 10 There is no legal theory into which mediator liability fits comfortably.
Practical impediments to establishing causation and damages also work against
such verdicts. Nonetheless, a tremendous amount of uncertainty exists in this
area of the law, and few guidelines are available to courts which increasingly
may be faced with lawsuits against mediators. As with the absence of ethical
rules and standards of conduct, uncertainties regarding potential civil liability
may be undesirable not only from the point of view of mediators, but also from
that of parties to mediations and the public. Although some commentators have
expressed the opinion that mediator liability should be allowed "to develop
naturally from common law," '' the opposite argument-that a greater degree
of certainty is desirable--has much legitimacy. t
A related question is whether an attorney-mediator can be liable for legal
malpractice for conduct in the course of his performance as a mediator. The

504. Richardson, supra note 15, at 627.
505. Chaykin, supra note 178, at 745.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Chakin, supra note 487, at 60, 64-70.
509. An often cited example of these difficulties is the case of Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d
237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). Lange is one of the few cases considering mediator liability and its result
may well have deterred other parties from bringing similar actions.
510. Chaykin, supra note 487, at 50.
511. Id.at83.
512. One important basis for potential mediator liability involves disclosure of confidential
information and related issues. This subject is discussed in greater detail infra part IX.F.
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principles discussed above in connection with the applicability of attorney
standards of conduct and ethical rules to attorneys acting as mediators should
apply in this context as well.5" 3 A lawyer acting as a mediator should not be
subject to a legal malpractice claim if his activities as mediator fall outside the
scope of what is considered to be encompassed within the practice of law.
However, uncertainties regarding the scope of the practice of law and the
resulting potential for liability add to the need for clarified attorney-mediator's
responsibilities.
2. Immunity
One proposed "solution" or partial solution for dealing with mediator
liability is to grant immunity from liability to mediators acting in the course of
their functions as mediator. Immunities from liability generally exist when the
law considers an activity's social importance sufficient to allow those carrying
out the activity to do so without threat of civil suit."1 4 The two related types
of immunity to which potential mediator immunity is usually compared are
judicial immunity and arbitrator immunity.
There is a difference of opinion as to whether mediators should enjoy
immunity in the same way that judges and arbitrators do. While a mediator, like
a judge or arbitrator, "performs a socially useful function demanding a high
degree of independence" which is threatened by the prospect of civil actions,, "
mediators do not decide cases, the essential conduct with respect to which judges
and arbitrators are insulated from liability.516 It has also been suggested that
empirical evidence establishing that immunity is necessary to avoid discouraging
qualified mediators from engaging in the practice"' is lacking and that
mediator immunity could destroy the "prophylactic" factor that potential civil
liability can have to insure the quality of professional services. " '
Others are less categorical, suggesting that qualified immunity be extended
such that mediators' liability would be limited to "bad faith" conduct."' 9 Another
compromise proposal suggests extending immunity only to mediators acting as part
of court-annexed projects, under the theory that the judge's immunity should be
transferred with the function. 5 However, this approach has been criticized as
creating a distinction which has no sound practical basis. 2'

513. See infra part IX.C.3.
514. Chaykin, supra note 487, at 52.
515. Chaykin, supra note 178, at 762.
516. Id.
517. Richardson, supra note 15, at 640.
518. Chaykin, supra note 487, at 50-51. This commentator, however, admits that liability can
have a negative and demoralizing impact on the service providers. Id. at 51.
519. Chaykin, supra note 178, at 762.
520. Chaykin, supra note 487; at 53 and 83.
521. Id.
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If immunity is to be extended to mediators, it could be done by the courts
In Butz v.
under general principles of immunity or by legislation.
Economou,su the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-pronged test
for determining the existence of absolute immunity. If the official's function is
judicial in nature and an allegedly injured party's constitutional rights are
protected by safeguards built into regulatory procedures, then the officer's
conduct is immune.'"' Thus, grand jurors, prosecutors, witnesses, and petit
jurors enjoy immunity. Mediators, though they have no decisional authority,
might qualify for immunity under the Butz test.324 However, it is probably
preferable s3that immunity be legislatively enacted if it is to be extended to
mediators.

By the late 1980s at least fourteen states had enacted some form of
immunity applicable to mediators in certain types of mediation. 26 The recent
trend in states adopting state-wide, court-annexed mandatory mediation appears
to be to extend absolute immunity to mediators in the programs.
In 1989, the Florida Legislature, for the purpose of assuring participation of
qualified mediators, enacted legislation extending to court-appointed mediators
absolute judicial immunity. 27 This legislation was enacted on recommendation
of the state's Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee, the Family Law Section of the
Florida Bar Association, and the Mediation and Arbitration Committee of the
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438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978).
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Id. at 510-13, 98 S. Ct. at 2912-14 (1978).
See Richardson, supra note 15, at 631.

525.

Stulberg, supra note 380, at 85.

526. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-305 (Supp. 1988) provided qualified immunity except for willful
or wanton misconduct. Fla. Stat. ch. 44.307 (1989) provided absolute judicial immunity to court.
appointed mediators and arbitrators. Iowa Code § 679.13 (1987) provided immunity for Dispute
Resolution Center mediators except conduct "in bad faith, with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety or property." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 4, 9 18(2-A) (1989) provided for mediator immunity from any civil liability. Minn. Stat Ann.
§ 583.26(7) (West 1988) provided immunity for farm-lender mediation panelists. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 69-2-49 (Supp. 1988) provided immunity for farm-debt mediators. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-6-106
(1987) provided absolute immunity for medical malpractice mediators. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:23A-9(d)
(1987) provided immunity for dispute resolution umpires. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38(j) (1995)
extended absolute judicial immunity to mediators. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 1805(A) (West Supp.
1990) provided immunity to mediators except for "gross negligence with malicious purpose or...
willful disregard of the rights, safety or property of any party to the mediation." Va. Code Ann. §
8.01-581.223 (Michie Supp. 1988) provided qualified immunity for acts or omissions done in good
faith during mediation. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.75.100 (West Supp. 1989) provided qualified
immunity for Dispute Resolution Center directors and mediators acting in good faith. Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 9.35(2Xc) (West Supp. 1988) provided immunity for Department of Agriculture trade and consumer
protection mediators. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 655.465(6) (West Supp. 1988) provided qualified immunity
to medical malpractice mediators acting in good faith. Wyo. Stat. § 11-41-105 (Supp. 1989) provided
qualified immunity to mediators under agricultural program acting in good faith. See Richardson.
supranote 15, at 631-32.
. 527. Richardson, supra note IS, at 623.
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Supreme Court of Florida.In The stated purpose was to protect mediators from
harassing litigation brought by parties disappointed with the outcome of their
mediations." The Florida Bar Association took the position that such immunity
was necessary to assure availability of mediators in the state's program.'-'
As discussed above,"' Florida also adopted a detailed set of ethical rules
and standards of conduct for mediators, together with a comprehensive
enforcement mechanism. Thus, the Florida model eliminates the availability of
private civil remedies against mediators, but places into effect a highly structured
system of professional regulation. 32 Although the Florida system does not do
so, legislation or court rules might be adopted to afford relief in appropriate
cases to parties who have been subjected to mediator misconduct. Such relief
could allow the aggreived parties to rescind settlement agreements that have been
inappropriately entered.
North Carolina followed the Florida model in its court-annexed program by
extending "the same immunity from criminal and civil penalties as that given 'a
judge of the General Court of Justice."'3 This immunity was bestowed not
primarily to protect mediators but to benefit the public by encouraging mediators
to carry out their duties free from fear of adverse consequences.1'
3. Exculpatory ContractualClauses
In the absence of immunity legislation, mediators sometimes attempt to limit
or exclude their liability by inserting general exculpatory clauses in mediation
agreements executed by the parties prior to mediation. An example of a standard
clause of this type states: "The mediator shall not be liable for any act or
omission in connection with his role as mediator." 5" Grave doubt exists
regarding the enforceability of general exculpatory clauses. Such provisions are
disfavored and courts often have found them unenforceable in other cohtexts."3
Mediators should not rely on the effectiveness of these clauses, and, if it is
determined that insulation from liability is in the public interest, legislation is a
more appropriate method of achieving this end.

528. Id. at 636-37.
529. Id. at 636.
530. Id. at 638.
531. See supra text accompanying notes 438.447.
532. It has been suggested that there may be an argument that granting absolute immunity to
court-appointed mediators violates the constitutional fight of access to the courts. Richardson. supra
note 15, at 641-43. Presumably, the analysis to determine constitutionality would consider whether
-the state's purposes in recruiting volunteers and easing case loads are sufficiently compelling to deny
a constitutional right. However, a more appropriate analysis might consider whether the state has an
obligation to allow a cause of action against a mediator.
533. Mebane, supranote 102, at 1870 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38(j) (1995)).
534. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1870.
535. Chaykin supra note 487, at 47 n.2.
536. Id.
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E. "Mandatory" Versus "Voluntary" Mediation
One of the issues posed by the institutionalization of mediation about which

the most controversy exists is the extent to which participation in mediation
should be "mandatory" or "voluntary." Mandatory in today's ADR vernacular
does not mean that every case is referred to mediation, but rather that the judge
has authority to order the parties to mediate in cases he feels are appropriate,
even though one or both parties would prefer not to participate.537 Some
mediation referral schemes are "semi-mandatory," allowing one or both parties
to opt out, with or without showing good cause. 3 The methods for selecting
the cases to be referred to mandatory mediation are discussed elsewhere in this
article. " 9
The philosophy behind compelling mediation in some cases is that initial
compulsion is sometimes required to get the parties to concentrate on settlement,
and that, particularly in jurisdictions where mediation is not yet a common
practice, some period of forced participation is required to overcome opposition
to this innovative dispute resolution process.
Experience has shown that initial participation in alternative dispute
resolution programs tends to depend on the degree to which it is compulsory.
Voluntary programs initially attract a substantially lower number of participants
than do compulsory programs.'
This phenomenon has been attributed to the
attitudes of attorneys toward new programs as well as the expectations of most
parties for the traditional judicial forum.' 4 Low levels of coercion appear to
result in high rates of refusals to mediate and failures to appear: "the less the
cost of rejecting the mediation (the less unpleasant the alternative), the less likely
the respondent will be to agree to mediation." 2 These findings suggest that
mandatory mediation may be necessary to bring about interest in and allow
exposure to the mediation process. By such exposure that the public and the
legal community will realize mediation's value.-'3

537. See Morgan, supra note 37. at 502 n.70.
538. Note, supra note 90, at 1103-04. See, e.g., Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 154.022
(West 1994) ("allowing parties to object to an ADR referral but prohibiting a court from referring
a case only if it finds a 'reasonable basis' for the objection'). Note, supra note 90,at 1104 n.125.
539. See Infra part IX.H.
540. Pearson, supra note 10, at 426-27.
541. Id. at 427-28.
542. Id.at 428-29 (citing William F. Felstiner & Lynn Williams, Community Mediation in
Dorchester, Massachusetts 18 (1979/1980)).
$43. Pearson, supra note 10, at 429. In the federal District Court pilot programs, it is typically
in the districts where the program is mandatory that the volume of cases mediated issubstantial.
However, two of the voluntary programs enjoy a large number of referrals per year. The
distinguishing factor of these programs from those which "lack substantial volume is that they are
formally organized and administered," with active solicitation by the courts of volunteers and efforts
to "make participation easy." Also,both programs are "in states with established mediation programs
in the state court systems" which therefore have a large number of attorneys experienced in
mediation. Dunworth & Kakalik, supra note 43, at 1333.
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Voluntary mediation programs, because they do not attract significant
numbers of participants, generally are not cost effective, are unsuccessful in
reducing crowded dockets, and are unable to establish a core of experienced
mediators.3" Because there is some evidence that mediation resolution rates
are related to the level of experience of the mediator, it is essential that the
volume of mediations be sufficient to afford mediators on-the-job training.-"
In the belief that court-ordered mediation will promote "valuable long-term
changes in the civil justice system," and because there has been an under-use of
voluntary mediation, some observers have argued that Congress and state
legislatures should allow courts to mandatorily impose mediation on a widespread basis.'
One way to allay fears of coercion in association with
mandatory mediation is to adopt safeguards to assure that mediation is fair and
effective.' 7 Some suggested safeguards include requiring the presence of both
lawyers and clients willing to participate meaningfully; providing appropriate
oversight mechanisms to assure quality in confidential proceedings; insuring that
trial is not significantly delayed; and screening to exclude cases more appropriate
for handling through the traditional adversarial process. "
Studies indicate that those who voluntarily choose mediation over traditional
judicial process tend to be those who are generally more willing to try new
things. s' 9 Frequent exposure to particular ideas influences individuals to
choose those ideas.ss" For the same reason companies spend billions of dollars
to advertise their products, forced exposure to systems, programs, and practices
may be the best way to overcome opposition and convince the public to try
alternatives to the traditional. 5s' "Most people learn about mediation most
efficiently and effectively by participating, and the vast majority are pleased with
what they learn."'
Although there initially appears to be some contradiction between the
voluntariness and self-determination that mediation is intended to foster and the
coercion of a mandatory mediation requirement, mandatory proponents argue that
there is no real inconsistency. Because no party can be forced to settle or
otherwise alter his or her position in a mediation, the coercion only relates to
requiring that parties try to reach an agreement to resolve their dispute.
It has also been noted that non-mandatory mediation is not really a voluntary
system. 53 In a non-mandatory mediation program, either party can force the
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other to forego mediation by refusing to mediate." The issue is perhaps more
appropriately framed not as one of voluntariness or coercion, but rather as which
preference will have veto power over the other.
The law can mandate attendance at mediation sessions without mandating
agreement. Compelled mediation does not interfere with constitutional rights
because parties retain their right to litigate in court."' The premise underlying
mandatory mediation is that many who could have opted not to mediate but are
forced to mediate end up satisfied with the process and glad they were ordered
to participate.'"
The voluntariness with which the parties participate does not appear to affect
mediation outcomes. Studies indicate that there is no difference in the likelihood
of reaching settlement in cases where the parties choose to mediate as opposed
to those in which mediation is mandatorily imposed upon them." 7 "Empirical
studies have suggested that most parties involved ih mandatory mediation express
greater satisfaction than do those involved in adjudication. 5' s On the other
hand, opponents ofmandatory court-annexed programs argue that merely because
parties, judges, and attorneys express satisfaction with mandatory mediation, this
satisfaction does not justify a practice which they consider an affront to
established notions of "fairness and due process.""' 9
One interest-based mediation proponent has questioned whether mandatory
programs can serve an educational function."s Her skepticism is based upon
doubt that those who are totally ignorant ofmediation can be properly instructed.
This is based on the conviction that "a certain consciousness" is required in order
for "quality solutions" to be achieved." Another concern expressed by others
is that mandatory programs "may force litigants to endure a costly procedure
implemented on an ad hoc basis with minimal benefit."56
Brown and Ayres have advanced what amounts to be a compromise of the
mandatory versus voluntary mediation debate, at least in connection with
contractual disputes. They suggest that legislation be enacted which would
"imply a default mediation provision" into contracts in the absence of an explicit

554. Id.
555. Note, supra note 90, at page 1094.
556. Id. at 1093; Rosenberg, supranote 5. at 468. While one-third of spouses in certain studies
would have refused to participate in mediation if given the choice, when mandatory mediation was
imposed on them, 75-80% expressed satisfaction with the process and were happy mediation had

been ordered. Id. at 504-05.
557. Note, supra note 90, at 1094. A study of small claims mediation in Maine reported a
nearly identical settlement rate (77.7%) in cases where mediation was elective and in cases ordered
to mediation (73.2%). Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & Soc'y Rev. 11, 21, 26 (1984).
558. Note, supra note 90, at 1093.
559. Kerbeshian, supra note 194, at 424.
560. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 68, at 45.
561. Id.
562. Rammelt, supra note 46, at 988.
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opt-out, such that any dispute arising out of the contract would be mediated
They argue that many of mandatory
unless the parties agreed otherwise. '
mediation's advantages ire retained with such legislation.'
Certainly, such
apresumption would eliminate the power of one party to prevent submission of
a dispute to mediation by refusing to consent. Moreover, the "private information" that makes it difficult for adverse parties to affirmatively opt for mediation
under the current system when it would be efficient to do so might also make it
difficult for them to opt out of a default requiring mediation. '
F. Confidentiality and Privilege ofCommunications During Mediation
One of the propositicns regarding mediation with respect to which there is
a strong consensus is the importance of confidentiality to the integrity of the
process. Confidentiality is essential to the functioning of mediation. '6
Confidentiality engenders frankness and facilitates a complete exploration of the
issues underlying the parties' dispute.5' Parties usually work more cooperaThey generally resist
tively in an "atmosphere of privacy and discretion.""'
disclosing information, personal needs, and strategies if there is concern that such
disclosures can be used against them.-69
Given that mediation is conducted in the context of a dispute--often hotly
contested and charged with emotion-the participants ordinarily approach one
another with a great deal of distrust. Under such circumstances, a disputant is
understandably hesitant to give his adversary information which could be used
to his great detriment.'" Confidentiality is essential to create the kind of safe
environment which will permit meaningful interaction between the parties.
separate caucuses that characterize the emerging
Candid discussions in th,:
dominant model often are premised upon a belief that all that transpires will be
held confidential."7 '
Disclosures during private caucuses are crucial to enable the mediator to
understand the parties' hidden motives and interests and thereby to formulate
creative suggestions to reuolve the dispute. 5" Such disclosures would not be
made if there were a possibility that mediators, whether voluntarily or in response
to coercion, could divulge such confidences, in court or otherwise."7 Additional-
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ly, if conduct and statements made during mediation are inadmissible, the risk that
74
mediation will be used as a subterfuge for unprincipled discovery is reduced.
Finally, confidentiality encourages parties who wish to shield their disputes or
certain aspects of it from public view to participate meaningfully in the mediation
process.5'
Quite simply, if confidentiality is absent, both the mediator's
effectiveness and the disputant's willingness to risk exposure would be destroyed,
as would the future viability of mediation as a dispute resolution process.57"'
Typically, mediators represent to the parties and their counsel that any
disclosures made during the course-of mediation are confidential. They generally
state that anything said during thejoint sessions cannot be introduced into evidence
in court; that the mediator will not and cannot be forced to disclose anything he has
been told in separate caucuses; and that all information generated by the mediation
process "will go no further." The only caveat usually added to these broad
assurances is that facts which otherwise would be discoverable cannot be shielded
merely by virtue of their disclosure during the mediation.
There are serious questions regarding the accuracy of such sweeping
representations. The bases available to shield disclosures made during mediation-which vary from onejurisdiction to the next-determine the degree to which
such assurances deviate from reality.
1. Confidentiality Versus Privilege
In order to properly conceptualize the protection afforded communications
made during mediation, a distinction must be made between confidentiality and
privilege. If a communication is confidential, it may not be offered as evidence in
proceedings in the same case.'" If a communication is privileged, on the other
hand, virtually any disclosure, in or out of court, is prohibited. 78
There are different points of view regarding the degree of protection that
should be afforded to communications made during mediation. Some believe that
confidentiality is so important to mediation and that mediation is so important as
a means ofdispute resolution that there shouldbe "sweeping protection" preventing
disclosure under all circumstances. 5" Others express the opinion that "narrow
coverage.., limited to subsequent proceedings in the same case" is sufficient."'
As discussed below,58' a number of states have adopted statutes relating to
confidentiality in mediation. In the absence of such a statute or a court rule,
mediators rely upon general evidentiary exclusions and agreements between the

574. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1872.
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parties to the mediation as the basis for asserting that disclosures made during
mediation are privileged or confidential. 8 2 However, the confidentiality
expectations under these general principles and under private agreements-and
indeed even under many mediation confidentiality statutes-are often much greater
than the protection actually afforded."8 3
2. Mediation Communications as Settlement Negotiations
A logical basis for shielding from disclosure communications made during
mediation is the notion that they are part of settlement negotiations which are
58
inadmissible under the common law and under modem rules of evidence. 4
While this evidentiary exclusion does provide some protection, it does not offer the
degree ofcoverage sometimes suggested. Under the common law exclusion, it was
only an actual offer of settlement that was inadmissible at trial. In fact, if the offer
included an independent statement of fact, that statement could be offered as an
admission against the offeror.'
Perhaps even more crucial, the offer itself was
admissible to prove any relevant matter other than liability, including agency, bias,
and impeachment. 586
While the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Louisiana Code of Evidence
have expanded the scope of confidentiality accorded to communications during
settlement negotiations, s 7 there are still large gaps in the protection afforded.
Federal Rule 408 and Louisiana article 408 (hereinafter "Rule 408") make
inadmissible not only offers, but statements made in an attempt to settle disputes.
However, such inadmissibility still only applies with respect to proofofliability for
or invalidity of a claim.588 Such statements or conduct may be offered for a
legitimate purpose other than to prove liability or amount. 8 9 This constitutes a
huge loophole which able counsel seeking to use the evidence can often exploit.
In particular, because of the nature of mediation, the scope and type ofdisclosures
made by the parties often are very broad and likely to furnish valuable sources of
impeachment and bias. 5
Additionally, the risk that damaging information disclosed in confidence
during the mediation may be used to establish liability in the case is only one of the
dangers that a party may consider when determining whether to make a disclosure.
Rule 408 only applies to admissibility at trial; it does not protect parties from
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discovering mediation communications."' 1

Nor does it prevent disclosure of
statements to the public or others outside of court.591 Such uncertainty regarding

possible disclosure ofsensitive information operates as a serious impediment to the
frankness and open disclosure which are so essential to successful mediation.'".

Neither the common law rule nor Rule 408 would block compelled disclosure
or prohibit the introduction into evidence of the mediator's own "perceptions,

statements, and conduct."' ' 4 Finally, Rule 408 does not offer any protection for

agreements arising out of mediation.'" Therefore, if parties admit liability or
guilt in settlement agreements, those admissions could later be used against them
in criminal trials or in civil suits brought by third parties.'"
3. Creation ofa Mediation Privilege?
Another possible source of protection for communications made during
mediation is the judicial recognition or creation of a new privilege applicable to
such communications.5'" Various courts and commentators have considered
whether the traditional professional privileges enjoyed at common law between
doctors and patients, priests and penitents, and attorneys and clients should be
extended to the mediator-mediatrant relationship."'
The decision to create a new privilege is left to each individual court.'"
Historically, a four-part test formulated by Wigmore has been employed to evaluate
this question: (1) does the communication originate in confidence that it will not
be disclosed?; (2) is confidentiality essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the parties?; (3) is the relationship one which the
community considers worthy of protection?; and (4) would the injury to the
relationship caused by the disclosure of confidential communications be greater
than the benefit to be gained by accurate disclosure?6m
A number of judicial opinions disclose a growing solicitude for mediation
and a recognition of the importance of confidentiality to the process. While most
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discussion assumes, of course, that the attorney operating as a mediator is not engaged in the practice
of law and therefore that neither he nor a party to the mediation could claim the attorney-client

privilege.
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of the cases upholding non-disclosure merely confirm the enforceability of
existing mediation privilege or confidentiality statutes and do not create a new
privilege, the attitudes disclosed may presage the outcome of future judicial
efforts to create a mediation privilege."sI
In United States v. Gullo,6° a defendant who was before a federal court
on criminal charges had previously participated in a mediation under an
agreement which provided that "the neutral... will hold all information received
during the hearing as confidential and will not voluntarily divulge that information." 603 Moreover, the New York statute under which the mediation was
conducted made all proceedings confidential and inadmissible in the state courts.
After finding that the federal court was not bound by the New York law, the
court considered whether it should find a common law privilege under
Wignore's four-part balancing test.4M The court noted the strong public policy
favoring admission of all relevant facts in a criminal case, but also recognized
that confidentiality is at the very core of a successful mediation. The court also
noted that the state had failed to demonstrate any particularized need for the
information sought to be admitted. Considering the damage to the local policy
if the privilege was not recognized and concluding that any disclosure would
undermine the overall effectiveness of the mediation system, the court held that
the mediation communications were privileged. The court excluded all
statements, terms, and conditions of the settlement from use at trial.
Though the facts of Gullo favored a finding of privilege, other courts in
other circumstances may reach a different conclusion. Mediators should not rely
upon the possibility that a new privilege will be created as a basis for giving
parties assurances regarding the confidentiality of their disclosures. Definitive
statements of the availability of a special mediation privilege are simply not
accurate at this point in time and threaten to undermine the trust parties must
have in mediators.

601. Brown, supra note 4, at 309-30, 316, 321-22. The author cited the following cases as
reflective of such judicial attitudes: International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (characterizing mediation "as a subtle and
delicate process, where the mediator functions as a catalyst, and where privacy is a key element."
Brown, supra note 4, at 309-10.); Local 808, Building Maintenance, Service & Railway Workers v.
National Mediation Bd., 888 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (praising mediation process "as ablack box
where mediators work their own brand of magic to break deadlocks" and as "an art form
fundamentally different from ajudication." Brown, supra note 4, at 316.); In re Parkway Manor
Health Care Center, 448 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing "compelling need for
confidentiality in the mediation process because it fosters party confidence" and perception of
mediator impartiality and recognizing mediation privilege before effectiveness of newly passed
statutory privilege. Brown, supra note 4. at 321-22.); Byrd v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. App. 1988)
(holding, subject to a strong dissent, that admission of guilt in mediated settlement agreement could
not be introduced in criminal trial, noting there might be a different outcome in a private, voluntary
mediation rather than a court-ordered one).
602. 672 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
603. Id. at 102.
604. See also NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980).
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4. Private ConfidentialityAgreements
A third basis often relied upon by mediators for confidentiality ofmediation
proceedings are private agreements entered into by the parties. However, once
again, the effectiveness of such agreements is dubious.S Under private
confidentiality agreements, the parties generally promise not to call the mediator
to testify if the case does not settle nor to subpoena records maintained by the
mediator."
Such agreements usually include a promise not to attempt to
introduce into evidence any statements made by any other party during the
mediation and often prohibit the parties and the mediator from disclosing conduct
that occurred during the mediation.t'
Private confidentiality agreements do not guarantee protection from legal
discovery. Some courts have upheld while others have overturned confidentiality
agreements challenged on public policy grounds. 8 However, a trend to
uphold such agreements has been noted.* It is generally held that except in
certain limited circumstances, courts have "the right to every man's evidence."6 0" While the law can establish privileges when called for by public
policy, such privileges may not be created by private parties.6 '" The reality is
that if a court wants to receive evidence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
prevent it from doing so."'
Moreover, when the information purportedly protected by a private
agreement is sought to be used in some context other than as evidence in
litigation between the parties to the mediation, the difficulties become even more
formidable. In State v. Castellano,' it was held that the mediator's guarantee
to the parties that everything said in the mediation was confidential did not bar
compelling testimony from him in the criminal trial of one of the parties for
murder of the party with whom he was mediating." 4
5. ContradictoryObligationsof the Mediator: The Duty to Disclose
Even more threatening to the mediator than the possibility that his assurances
of confidentiality cannot be realized is the dilemma posed when the mediator

605.
606.
607.
608.

Brown, supra note 4, at 318.
Zerhusen, supra note 216, at 1170.
Mebane, supra note 102, at 1874.
Id. at 1874.

609.

Id.

610. Murphy, s pra note 598, at 227. See also Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence,
46 Harv. L. Rev. 138, 142-43 (1932) C'a contract to deprive the court of relevant testimony... is

an impediment to ascertaining the facts.').
611. Murphy, supra note 598, at 227.
612. Id.
613. 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
614. Id. at 482. The defendant claimed self-defense and wanted the mediator to testify regarding
threats that the victim had made during the mediation sessions.
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actually owes a conflicting affirmative duty to disclose information he promised
to hold confidential. Such an obligation to disclose may be imposed by statute,
may arise from common law, or may be derived from the mediator's ethical duty
as a member of another profession. 6"

a. Statutory Obligations
The most common duty to disclose established by statute relates to child
abuse. There are statutes in every state mandating reports of child abuse by
covered professionals," 6 including lawyers, social workers, and psychologists,
who often act as mediators. Some commentators have suggested that mediators
may be civilly or criminally liable for failure to disclose information about child
abuse to proper authorities."' 7
In recognition of this conflicting duty of mediators who belong to other
professions, the Colorado Council ofMediation Organizations drafted a Code of
Professional Conduct for Mediators."' The code states. that "information
received by a mediator in confidence, private session, caucus or joint session
with the disputants is confidential and should not be revealed to parties outside
of the negotiation . . .'"
".
However, an exception is made "in the event of
child abuse by one or more of the disputants," in which case the mediator is
"obliged to report these actions to the appropriate agencies. ' a Thus, the
mediation confidentiality, is limited.
Also, freedom of information laws may place obligations on mediators to
disclose information they consider confidential. Although such laws should have
no applicability in totally "private" mediations, when mediations are conducted
under programs which receive public funds, mediators may be subject to
them.''
b. Common Law Liability
In addition to obligations imposed by statute, mediators may also have a
duty under certain common law principles to disclose confidential information
which they have learned from the parties. A primary example occurs when a
party discloses to the mediator information indicating the existence of a risk of
danger to one of the other parties to the mediation, or to a third party who is not

615.
616.
617.
618.

Mebane, supra note 102, at 1874-75; Irvine, supra note 29, at 160-61.
Murphy, supra note 598, at 221.
See., eg.. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1874-75 no. 138-39.
See Murphy, supra note 598, at 221.

619.

Id.

620. Id. See infra note 634 and accompanying text regarding the further exception in the
Colorado code for information learned by the mediator indicating that a crime which may result in
drastic psychological or physical harm to another person will probably be committed.
621. Brown, supra note 4, at 319.
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a participant. Similarly, if the parties enter into an illegal agreement which is
damaging to others, the same type of duty may arise. In either of these
situations, in the absence of a statutory or other basis for overriding the duty, any
potential privilege or confidentiality obligation of the mediator to the parties
would likely be secondary to the duty to disclose.'
A primary jurisprudential basis for the concern that mediators might be held
liable under the duty to disclose theory found in Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California.6" In that case, the California Supreme Court found
a psychotherapist negligent for his failure to warn a third party of a patient's
threats to murder her.'2 That decision constitutes a departure from the general
rule that one is not liable for the wrongful conduct of others. It is generally felt
that Tarasoff will not be broadly extended.'
The psychotherapist's duty to
disclose in Tarasoffprimarily was based upon his special relationship with his
patient, which "places the psychotherapist under a duty to control the patient's
conduct."'6'
Unlike a psychotherapist, a mediator ordinarily does not have the intimate
relationship with the parties that typically exists between a psychotherapist and
his patient.'" In addition, mediators generally are not trained in areas that
enable them to judge the true danger of a particular threat.'28 Thus, it is
possible that the Tarasofftheory will not be applied to mediators.
On the other hand, because mediators urge the parties to openly disclose
their thoughts and feelings, and "to delve into collateral issues that would not be
raised in formal litigation," participants sometimes admit wrongdoing or liability
during the course of the process.'2 9 Such self-incriminating statements may
suggest to mediators that third parties or parties to the mediation are in serious
peril unless warned.'" In this situation, the mediator faces a dilemma, not
only because of potential liability to which he might be exposed, but also
because it is hard to know to whom the mediator owes the greater duty
professionally and morally-to the party whom he has promised confidentiality
or to the person whom the mediator believes to be threatened with harm.
There is a basic difference of opinion among commentators and policymakers as to which interest is more worthy of protection. 3 ' The choice

622.

Chaykin, supra note 487, at 73.

623.

551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).

624.

Chaykin, supra note 487, at 73 (citing Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343).

625.

Id.

626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.

Id.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Murphy, supranote 598, at 210.
Chaykin, supra note 487, at 75.
Compare, e.g., Stulberg, supra note 380, at 87-88 (arguing that "as a matter of policy and

practice" it is preferable that the mediator have "no obligation to block such conduct once the

mediation conference has concluded") and Murphy, supra note 598, at 212 (arguing "that legislation

should be adopted to reflect apublic policy that favors the long-terni benefits derived from mediation
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between the two is a matter of policy which should be addressed by the
legislature and the courts. However, it is crucial that the issue be resolved in
some manner in order to establish certainty in this area. Mediators must know
what their obligations are and they must be able to inform parties whose disputes
they mediate of the extent of confidentiality afforded their disclosures.
It has been recognized that imposing a duty on a mediator to disclose that
a participant has an intention to commit future crimes, engage in conduct
contrary to public policy, or cause injury to another, may have a "negative effect
... on a disputant's willingness to engage in mediation"; or, it may significantly
diminish the party's sense of comfort and trust with the mediator. 32 Likewise,
it may deter the mediator "from inquiring too deeply into the root causes and
collateral issues" in cases before him out of concern that he may uncover
information that would require disclosure.'33 For these reasons, imposing as
narrow a duty as possible might be advisable.
For example, the Colorado Council of Mediation Organizations Code of
Professional Conduct for Mediators excepts from the rule of mediation
confidential information indicating probable cause that a "crime will be
committed that may result in drastic psychological or physical harm to another
person.'" Another solution may be to limit duties of disclosure by establishing exceptions to the mediator privilege comparable to the exceptions applicable
to the attorney-client privilege.
c. Conflict With ProfessionalResponsibility
Ethical rules to which mediators are obligated as members of other
professions may clash with the confidentiality obligations they owe as mediators.
A particularly vexing example of such potential conflict arises under Rule 8.3 of
both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct (hereinafter "Rule 8.3").
Under Rule 8.3, an attorney-mediator who observes an attorney-advocate
engaging in unethical conduct during the course of a mediation has a duty to
report the conduct to disciplinary authorities.' s When the attorney-mediator
has both an obligation to maintain confidentiality of the proceedings and an

programs over relatively short-term benefits gained from disclosure of individual criminal acts') w/th
Chaykin, supra note 487, at 75 (arguing that "no reason exists to require the mediator to keep...
information confidential").
632. Murphy, supra note 598, at 222-23.
633. Id. at 223. In addition to the moral and professional duty of mediators not to disclose
information revealed by mediation participants in confidence, some jurisdictions actually impose
criminal sanctions on mediators who disclose confidential mediation information. Irvine, supra note
29, at 157 (listing Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New Mexico and

Virginia).
634. Murphy, supra note 598, at 221 n.75.
635. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.3 (1995); La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4 App., art. 16,
Rule 8.3 (1988).
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obligation to report attorney misconduct, he faces an irreconcilable conflict.'
The attorney-mediator in this situation is confronted with the stark choice
between being faithful to his obligations as a mediator to the mediation process
or to his duties to the legal profession. He cannot honor both.' 3'
The only satisfactory manner in which this and similar conflicts can be
resolved is through legislation or court rule. As will be discussed below,"
legislatures are increasingly addressing the confidentiality issue. Unfortunately,
even those jurisdictions which recognize the need to establish certainty in the
mediation confidentiality area are neither thinking through nor fully addressing
potential conflicts of this nature. Colorado and Oklahoma have adopted both
Section 8.3 of the Model Rules and mediation confidentiality statutes which do
not include an exception for reporting unethical conduct.' 3' The combination
of such broad mediation confidentiality provisions with an unqualified duty to
report attorney misconduct exacerbates this "ethical quagmire."" Attorneymediators have a right to know what is required of them in this contest. '
6. ConfidentialityStatutes
It is generally agreed that the most appropriate basis for establishing
mediation confidentiality is by statute or court rule." 2 While state confidentiality enactments probably do not bind federal judges and may not apply to state
criminal trials, these are well-defined exceptions that mediators can fairly and
easily use to accurately inform participants of the true scope of confidentiality.643

636. Irvine, supra note 29, at 162.
637. A less daunting but practically important pressure upon mediators conflicting with their
confidentiality obligations is the reported practice of judges in some areas to routinely ask the
mediator "to evaluate the parties or to reveal information obtained during mediation." Zerhusen,
supra note 216, at 1171. This practice should also be curbed by statute or court rule.
638. See infra part DLF.6.
639. Irvine, supra note 29, at 181.
640. It
641. There is no reason to suspect that requiring attomey-mediators to disclose attorney
misconduct would chill the proper operation of the mediation process. Indeed, there is no interest
in shielding attorneys from such reports. It is critical, however, that mediators know what the rules
ae so that they can be accurately disclosed to the parties and their attorneys as a basis for the
mediation.
642. Guarantees of confidentiality should be based upon the public policy that mediation is a
valuable dispute resolution device. See Murphy, supra note 598, at 231. There is some question
regarding whether a court rule or order purporting to create a mediator privilege will be upheld.
Lomax, supranote 36, at 77. Under federal practice, "privileges are governed by the principles of
common law 'unless otherwise required by the Constitution ofthe United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.'" Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 501). It is questionable "whether a court can, by order, create and enforce
a privilege that does not otherwise exist." Lomax, supra note 36, at 77.
643. Brown, supra note 4, at 317-18.
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The American Bar Association has developed a Model Rule on Confidentiality in Mediation ("Draft Model Rule'). 6" The Draft Model Rule was the
product of collaboration among dispute resolution experts and practitioners as
well as representatives of concerned sections and committees of the ABA."'
Undoubtedly, the lack ofconsistency and structure in this area and the conflicting
obligations of mediators constituted the impetus for adoption of the Draft Model
Rule.
The Draft Model Rule provides that "all mediation documents and mediation
communications are privileged and confidential and shall not be disclosed. They
are not subject to disclosure through discovery or any other process, and are not
admissible into evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding."" The
Draft Model Rule calls for each jurisdiction to "insert appropriate expressions of
deemed to override the general rule of confidentiality."" 7

public policy ...

Aside from the exceptions that each jurisdiction might tailor, the privilege created
by the Draft Model
Rule is analogous to the attorney-client privilege in its scope
6
and operation.

A symposium panel was held on the subject of the Draft Model Rule and
mediation confidentiality generally." 9 The panel produced a document entitled
the Symposium Rule: Confidentiality in Mediation ("the Symposium Rule').se
Like the Draft Model Rule, the Symposium Rule bars disclosure whether
"through discovery or any other process" of communications agreed to be
confidential by the parties and the mediator and excludes admission of such
communications "into evidence in any judicial or administrative proceedings."6 l' The Symposium Rule establishes its own confidentiality exceptions
rather than leaving their formulation to the states. The exceptions are divided
into "disclosures that the parties may make, and those disclosures the mediator
...may make."'

2

644. Irvine, supra note 29, at 165.
645. Id.
646. Id.
647. Id. at 166. The drafters envisioned such standard exceptions as information regarding child
abuse and attorney misconduct. Id.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 167.
651. Id.
652. Id. The parties may disclose information: (1)"by agreement of the parties"; (2)"if a legal
claim against the mediator is made"; (3)"if there is evidence of ongoing or future criminal activity";
(4) "to prevent manifest injustice"; (5) "to resolve disputes about the agreement that resulted from
the mediation"; (6) "if disclosure is required by statute"; (7) "to enforce the agreement to mediate";
or (8)"if the parties .. are together engaged in litigation with third parties and a court determines
fairness to third parties requires disclosure." Id. at 167-68. The mediator is allowed to disclose
information: (I) "if required by statute"; (2) "as evidence of ongoing or future criminal activity";
(3) "if it is necessary to prevent manifest injustice"; (4) "if the parties agree to disclosure"; (5) "if
there is a legal claim against the mediator"; and (6) "to resolve disputes about the agreement that
resulted from the mediation." Id. at 168 & n.68.
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The Draft Model Rule and the Symposium Rule both meet the objectives of
commentators who urge that the privilege accorded to mediation communications
be broad, cover "any matters discussed in mediation," and include not only
statements made to the mediator but also communications between the
parties. 3 However, the exceptions to confidentiality under the Symposium
Rule are somewhat more expansive than those urged by many mediation proponents. 64
A number of states have enacted mediation privilege or confidentiality
statutes. As of October, 1995, 47 states and one territory had enacted some sort
of mediation confidentiality statute, although some of these applied only to
certain types of mediation.'
The statutes vary in the breadth of their coverage. Some extend only an immunity from subpoena; while others bar any
disclosure, even for purposes relating to interpretation or nullification of
settlement agreements produced by a mediation. 656 Some statutes specifically
exclude protection of the confidentiality of settlement agreements: others protect
only "disclosures related to the topic of the mediation" rather than other topics
which might surface during a session.5 7 At least five states extend to mediation communications a privilege that is comparable to the attorney-client
privilege." 8
Many statutes incorporate exceptions to the confidentiality rule, most
commonly including reports of elder or child abuse. 5' The rationale for these
limitations is that unrestricted confidentiality would cause far more harm to the
parties than benefit."0 However, some supporters of mediation argue that a
blanket privilege is required in order to assure that parties participating in
mediation will disclose all relevant information."'
Some mediation statutes, such as Florida's, apply only to court-referred
mediation. Others, like the Oregon statute, apply to private mediation as
well.'
A survey of a few of the typical mediation confidentiality statutes
demonstrates the variety of the provisions adopted by the states.
653. Murphy, supra note 598, at 242.
654. See id. (suggesting that the disclosure of information should be "only under the most
compelling circumstances," such as "saving a life or preventing drastic psychological or physical

harm").
655.

Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Mediation: Law, Policy and Practice, Appendix

B.
656. Brown. supra note 4, at 317.
657. Id. at 317-18.
658. Irvine, supranote 29, at 168-69 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. §44.102(3) (West Supp. 1994); Fla.
Stat. Ann. §44.201(5) (West Supp. 1994); Iowa Code Ann. § 679.12 (West 1987); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 233, § 23 C (West 1986); N.Y. Jud. L. § 849.b(6) (McKinney 1992); Or. Rev. Stat. §
107.600 (1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.785(2) (1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 36.205 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 7.75.050 (West 1992)).
659. Irvine, supra note 29, at 182 n.154.
660. Id. at 182.
661. Id. at 183.
662. Id. at 169.
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The Oklahoma mediation confidentiality statute provides sweeping
protection: "[a]ny information received by a mediator... through files, reports,
interviews, memoranda, case summaries, or notes and work product of the
mediator, is privileged and confidential." 3 Under the statute, no mediator and
no party to a mediation proceeding is "subject to administrative or judicial
process requiring disclosure of any matters discussed or shall disclose any
information obtained during ... mediation proceedings."' " An exception to
confidentiality in Oklahoma occurs when a disputant waives the privilege by
suing the mediator for damages.' Also, there is an exception to confidentiality in cases involving child or elder abuse, when the mediator has a duty to report
such abuse.'
Massachusetts designates "any communication made in the course of and
relating to the subject matter of any mediation and which is made in the presence
of such mediator by any participant, mediator or other person... " as a
confidential communication not subject to disclosure in any judicial or
administrative proceeding."' The only exception to the confidential communication provision is for mediations of labor disputes.' There is no exception
for reporting child or elder abuse."9
Under the Colorado Dispute Resolution Act, neither the parties nor the
mediator may "voluntarily disclose or through discovery or compulsory process
be required to disclose any information concerning any mediation communication
or any communication provided in confidence to the mediator ....'"
Exceptions include written consents by all of the parties and the mediator,
communications revealing an "intent to commit a felony, inflict bodily harm, or
threaten the safety of a minor child," a statutory requirement that a mediation
communication be made public, and disclosure of the information if it is
"necessary and relevant to an action alleging. willful or wanton mediator
misconduct."'' Unlike the attorney-client privilege, there can be no unilateral
waiver of the statutory mediation privilege by a disputant.7 2 Moreover,
663.

Id. at 170 (citing Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1805(A) (West 1993)).

664. Irvine, supra note 29, at 170 (citing Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1805(C) (West 1993)).
665. Irvine, supra note 29, at 170 n.81.
666. Id. at 171 n.84. However, the Oklahoma statute immunizes from liability the mediator who
breaches his duty to maintain confidence unless he engages in "willful disregard of the rights ...of
any party to the mediation." Id. at 170 (citing Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1805(E) (West 1993)).
667. Irvine, supra note 29, at 171 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986)).
668. Irvine, supra note 29, at 171 n.90.
669. Id at 171. Iowa's mediation confidentiality statute provides similar broad protection
without "exceptions for elder or child abuse, commission of a crime, or attorney-advocate
misconduct." Id. at 172 (citing Iowa Code Ann. § 679.12 (West 1987)).
670. Irvine, supra note 29, at 172 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-307(2) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1994)).
671. Irvine, supra note 29, at 172-73 (citing Colo.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-307(2)(a)-(d) (West
1987 & Supp. 1994)).
672. Irvine, supra note 29, at 173 (citing Colo.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-307(2)(a) (West 1987

& Supp. 1994)).
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mediators cannot sua sponte report attorney misconduct occurring during the
course of a mediation unless a felony or bodily harm is involved.6"
Under Florida law, each party has a privilege to refuse to disclose communications made during a mediation. Such communications, except for an executed
settlement agreement, are confidential and inadmissible, unless all parties agree
otherwise.'
Mediators must maintain confidentiality except when otherwise
required by law to disclose information. The information protected includes that
obtained in individual caucuses. ' Under the Florida statute, "subsequent legal
proceedings" are defined as "any legal proceeding between the parties to the
mediation."676
Texas protects from disclosure all "communications made in the course ofany
ADR proceeding," and makes them "unavailable as evidence against a participant."'" Moreover, "conflicts between confidentiality requirements and a duty
to disclose are... heard in camera to determine the proper course of action."" 8
The North Carolina General Assembly has made all conduct and communications in their state-wide mediated settlement conferences subject to Rule 408 of
the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which is analogous to Rule 408 of the
As discussed above, this offers relatively little
Federal Rules of Evidence.'
.
protection for mediation communications.'
Some cases interpreting statutes and court rules establishing mediation
confidentiality have not extended protection as broadly as might be expected.'
In a number of instances, however, courts interpreting mediation confidentiality
statutes have given them a broad reading and allowed the policies underlying
confidentiality to overcome other competing policies.6 2
673.

Irvine, supra note 29, at 173 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-307(2)(b) (West 1987

&Supp. 1994)).
674. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 44.102(3) (West Supp. 1994).
675. Id.
676. Id. § 44.102(4).
677. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1873-74 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
154.073(a) (West Supp. 1993)).
678. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1875 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rein. Code Ann. § 154.073(d)
(West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added)).
679. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1872.
680. See supratext accompanying notes 584-596.
681. See. e.g., Brown. supra note 4. at 330-32 (discussing Newark Bd. of Educ. v. Newark
Teachers Union. 377 A.2d 765 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1977) (holding that a rule providing that
information disclosed by a party to a mediator in the performance of his duties would not be divulged
did not apply to documents given by one side to the mediator merely for transmittal to the other
side); Krueger v. Washington Fed. Say. Bank, 406 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
a state confidentiality statute "did not prevent access to discussions as to why the mediation should
take place"); Harriman v. Maddocks, 518 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1986) (holding that a blanket mediation
communication exclusion barred admission of communications only when offered to prove liability.
The court apparently read into the statute the limitations of common law and Rule 408 upon the
exclusion of offers of settlement)).
682. See. e.g., Brown, supra note 4. at 321-22 (discussing People v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890,
891-892 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1985) (construing New York mediation confidentiality statute as being non-
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7. The Needfor Truth andAccuracy in DescriptionsofConfidentiality
From the above discussion, it is clear that under any circumstances there are
limitations upon the protection afforded to confidential disclosures made during
the course of mediation. In some jurisdictions, there are enormous ambiguities
regarding when confidentiality actually will be enforced. This is particularly true
in those states, like Louisiana, which have not adopted confidentiality statutes.
In order to maintain the integrity of the mediation process and to engender the
trust that is essential to make the process work, mediators must be precise and
honest in explaining to the parties and their attorneys the degree of protection
afforded communications made during the mediation.
At present, a mediator cannot represent with any certainty that statements
made during mediation will be held in confidence.8 3 Yet, an ABA survey of
288 mediation programs showed that most participants believed that their
disclosures were privileged when they probably were not.'" Truthfulness is
essential if parties are to trust mediators.'
Accurate disclosure of the
confidentiality limitations initially may result in fewer disclosures and reduce the
effectiveness of mediation, but "(i]n the long run, ... it is the only viable
solution."'6
As subpoenas seeking information from mediators increase, 67 it becomes
increasingly important for mediators to honestly and forthrightly disclose the status
of confidential protection in their respective jurisdictions. 688 "Inducing disclosure
of private information from a reluctant party on representation of confidentiality
which the mediator knows to be false is an unacceptable practice. 8 9 Mediators
at least should inform mediatrants that they can only guarantee confidentiality to
the greatest extent permitted by law.'" However, this vague commitment is
likely insufficient, and a full and more precise disclosure seems the better practice.
Moreover, policy-makers should clarify the rules applicable to confidential

waivable. Snvder involved a mediation following which one party allegedly killed the other. The
mediation records were subpoenaed by the district attorney. The court quashed the subpoena,
rejecting the state's argument that the defendant had waived the privilege and holding that New
York's statute guaranteed absolute confidentiality that even the parties could not waive. The case
suggests that the policy behind confidentiality is intended to protect not only the individual mediation
participant, but also to further the social goal of resolving "disputes without resort to the courts");
Minnesota Educ. Ass'n v. Bennett, 321 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1982) (holding that a mediation

confidentiality law overcame an open meetings law applying to school boards and permitted the
mediator to authorize a private caucus involving the school board as a party)).
683.

Brown, supra note 4, at 308 (quoting Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 Harv.L.

Rev. 441, 441 (1984)).
684. Brown, supra note 4, at 311.
685. Id. at 334.
686. Id.
687. Id. at 308.
688. Id. at 311.
689. Id.
690. Nolan-Haley & Volpe, supra note 23, at 585.
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communications so mediators are better able to accurately explain to the parties
precisely what protections are afforded to disclosures made during mediation.
On the other hand, some commentators have more ambitious aspirations
regarding the disclosures mediators should make about how confidential information will be treated. In particular, Brown and Ayres argue that, while mediators
often claim that they should and do maintain complete confidentiality of all
communications learned in the private caucus, in reality, mediators often make
indirect disclosures of such information to the other party. 0 ' For example, they
suggest that mediators often "determine whether a zone of agreement exists"
between the parties or calculate "a set of trades that will bring the participants as
close to agreement as they can possibly get." They maintain that revealing to
either party that such gains might exist indirectly discloses the mediator's private
discussions with the other side." 3 Indeed, Brown and Ayres argue that such
indirect disclosure is a valuable part of what the mediator does and is one of the
benefits of the caucus technique. They see a "tension between the mediator's duty
of confidentiality and the need for indirect disclosure," and urge mediators to be
more frank with the parties in explaining how they use confidential information.'
They suggest that in the absence of contrary language in mediation
agreements, the courts enforce an implicit provision requiring strict mediator
confidentiality in order to encourage more explicit contracting about how mediators
will use caucus information, reasoning that to contract out ofthe strict confidentiality default, the mediator would have to precisely specify all circumstances in which
departure from absolute confidentiality is allowed."5
While there is some validity in their thesis, it might be questioned whether the
disclosures and explanations Brown andAyres urge are justified by the benefits that
might be derived, particularly considering the potential detriment. The "indirect
disclosures" made by mediators are extremely subtle and appear to be noninjurious. Indeed, the parties and their attorneys must realize they are taking place
ifthey are paying any attention at all to the process. Moreover, both parties benefit
from the disclosures and neither is hurt. Given the much larger problem ofproperly
disclosing to the parties the uncertain parameters ofthe mediation privilege, which
involves risk of direct and potentially notorious disclosure of sensitive and
damaging information, attempting to deal at this stage of the evolution ofmediation
with the relatively innocuous indirect disclosure issue seems ill-advised.
G. Coercion in Mediation

Although empirical research does not seem to support the concern, another
issue often raised about mediation and considered in the institutionalization
691.

Brown & Ayres, supra note 176, at 326-27.

692.

Id. at 327.

693.
694.
695.

Id.
Id. at 326-27. 389-90.
Id. at 390-91.
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process is the danger of coercion. The first type of potential coercion is that
which might be applied by the mediator against the parties. It has been
suggested that legislation and mediator ethical rules should prohibit coercion of
settlement by mediators.' There is also sentiment that policy-makers should
invent safeguards to insure that the confidentiality guaranteed to parties in
mediation is not used to veil coercive tactics by mediators.'
Some states,
such as Texas6' and Oklahoma,' have enacted such prohibitions.
One example of coercion that has been cited by observers of the Florida
program relates to the question of who should determine when there is an
impasse calling for an end to the mediation. Many mediators in Florida have
expressed the opinion that it is their prerogative to decide when a session is over
and that the parties are not permitted to leave until the mediator has so
decided.' ° It has been suggested that such an approach is contrary to the
traditional mediation practice, which allows the parties the right to withdraw
whenever they wish.'
While such mediator tactics do sound rather high-handed, it is generally
recognized that a certain amount of "pushing" is required at times to keep the
parties on track with their negotiations. If there is no pressure to continue with
negotiations when the parties reach a "log jam," many settlements which could
be concluded with a little bit of hard work will be missed. At the same time, it
is important that this pressure not be applied in such a way as to destroy the
parties' trust and confidence in the mediator or the self-determination that is the
hallmark of the mediation process.
The mediator may be able to retain control over determining when to declare
an impasse without strong-arm tactics. At the beginning of the mediation, the
mediator might request from the parties a voluntary commitment to allow the
mediator to determine when an impasse has been reached and the mediation
ended. This approach usually achieves the mediator's goal in a manner which
enhances rather then denigrates both the mediator's trustworthiness and the
parties' self-determination. A commitment of this sort from the parties, based
upon logic, reason, and trust in the mediator, should result in self-imposed
pressure on the parties to continue on with the mediation, if so urged by the
mediator, when it reaches a point common to many mediatons at which there
seems to be little hope that a settlement will be concluded.
696. Note, supra note 90, at 1098-99. The danger of this type of coercion seems to be much
greater in cases in which a mediation or settlement conference is conducted by the judge who will
preside over the trial of the case if it does not settle. See id.
697. id.at 1098.
698. Tax. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 154.053(a) (West Supp. 1989) (prohibits neutrals from
coercing parties to settle). Note, supra note 90, at 1098 n.87.
699. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, Ch. 37 App. A, § B(lXd)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1995) ("provides that
a mediator must never force parties to reach an agreement or make decisions for them"). Note, supra
note 90, at 1099 n.93.
700. See Moberly, supra note 33, at 717. See also Alfini, supra note 196, at 74-75.
701. Moberly, supra note 33, at 717; Alfini, supra note 196, at 74.
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It also has been suggested that mediation legislation should seek to prevent
a second type of potential coercion-that which might be applied by a powerful
party against a weaker one resulting in an unfair settlement."re This is an
increasingly controversial issue as mediation seems to be shifting away from a
protection-of-rights philosophy. This shift may reflect the increasing frequency
with which mediation is conducted between parties represented by attorneys. It
may be that in this area, as in others, it is appropriate to apply different
standards, depending on whether the parties are represented by counsel in the
mediation or not.
H. Selection of Cases Appropriate for Mediation
Legislatures adopting statutes creating mediation programs, judges deciding
whether to assign cases to mediation, attorneys representing parties, and many
others involved in the system would like to know which cases are appropriate for
referral to mediation. There are really two levels at which this inquiry is made.
The first level asks the question whether there are certain types of cases which,
as a matter ofpublic policy, should not be resolved by mediation. At the second
level, the question is whether there are particular characteristics of cases, or of
the disputes underlying them, which render them more amenable to resolution
through the mediation process than through traditional adjudication or some other
form of alternative, dispute resolution.
With respect to the first question, there seems to be general agreement that
public disputes, including those "concerning constitutional issues, issues
surrounding existing government regulation, and issues of great public concern"
are not appropriate for mediation. 73 In addition, other more "private" disputes,
where there is a need for an authoritative third-party ruling or a public airing, are
similarly not proper candidates for non-judicial resolution.
The second question is more complex and is surrounded by more controversy. What types of cases are most amenable to mediation? And, in the policymaking sphere, what procedures should be adopted to select cases for assignment
to mediation? There are essentially two methods for selecting cases-the
categorical approach and the case-by-case approach. 7' Categorical selection
automatically refers cases to mediation on the basis of specific criteria, such as
minimum or maximum monetary amounts sought, case subject matter, type of
70
relief sought, number of issues, number of parties, and the like."
Case-bycase referrals, on the other hand, involve review by a screening agent or the trial
judge to determine individual appropriateness."6

702. Note, supra note 90, at 1100.
703. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1867 (quoting Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: PanaceaorAnathema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668, 671 (1986)).
704. Note, supranote 90, at pages 1103; Press, supra note 68, at 1040-41.
705. Press, supra note 68, at 1041; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 68, at 34 n.170.
706. Note, supra note 90 at 1103; Press, supra note 68, at 1041.
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Categorical assignment of cases is easy to administer and provides
consistency and uniformity, 07 attributes which tend to encourage widespread
use of mediation.' However, the more subjective and analytical case-by-case
method allows consideration of "additional factors that may be unique to the
controversy" or which can only be evaluated by the intervention of a human
being.'
Factors which practical experience or empirical research have
indicated are important in determining whether mediation will be successful
include the need in any particular case for privacy and secrecy, the predominance
of legal as opposed to factual disputes, time pressures for resolution, the nature
of the relationship between the parties, and the potential for a continuing
relationship into the future, the parties' attitude toward settlement, whether the
attorneys perceive that mediation will save their clients money, whether one or
both parties are reluctant to go to trial, the nature and standard of proof, the cost
of formal adjudication (including potential delays), the financial strength and risk
aversion ofthe parties, their willingness and ability to act in good faith, and their
commitment to prudently and intelligently enter into negotiations."o
From this litany of factors believed to influence the likelihood of a
successful mediation outcome, it is apparent that the process of selecting cases
could become as complicated as the mediation itself. There is some question
whether the cost of engaging in such a sophisticated screening process is justified
by the benefits that would be derived. Moreover, there is a good deal of
skepticism regarding whether it is possible to develop, much less apply, such
predictive criteria with any degree of success. In any case, application of these
numerous criteria often gives contradictory indications regarding amenability to
mediation. It seems highly unlikely that any accurate predictive model could be
7
created for use either in a categorical or a case-by-case screening system. 1
At the least, additional study is required to understand more about the types of
cases that are being referred to mediation, other forms of alternative dispute
resolution, 7 2 and which characteristics are indicators of cases most likely to
be good candidates for mediation.
One lesson learned from experience thus far is that there is no particular
case subject matter or amount in controversy which renders a dispute insuscepti-

707. Note, supra note 90, at 1103; Press, supra note 68, at 1041.
708. Note, supra note 90, at 1103.
709. Press, supra note 68, at 1041.
710. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 68, at 34 n.170; Patterson, supra note 12,at 602; Lomax,
supra note 36, at 74; Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3, at 438; Moberly, supra note 33, at 709.
711. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 68, at 34-35 n.170. Actual experience under the North
Carolina program suggests "that there is no accurate way to determine the probability that a case will
settle." Under the North Carolina program, the senior resident superior court judge may send any
civil action to mediation. At least one of the senior judges originally selected cases which "he felt
had a good chance of settling." However, as a result of his experience, he now refers all cases to
mediation. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1865-66.
712. McEwen, supra note 1i0, at 84.

1997]

BULLOCK & GALLAGHER

ble to resolution by mediation."' Perhaps because mediation was originally
used to settle small claims, it was once considered inappropriate for large or
complex cases. However, this premise has proved untrue. It is now recognized
that mediation is not only suitable, but often particularly appropriate, in large
complex cases." 4
In Florida, with a few discrete exceptions, cases of all types may be referred
to mediation."' A survey of Florida mediators and attorneys disclosed their
conviction that mediation was "appropriate for a wide range of substantive case
types.""16 There was no consensus among those surveyed regarding case
characteristics which might presage a successful mediation.7"7
L Good Faith ParticipationIn Mediation
Because mediation is a consensual process, its effectiveness necessarily
depends upon the meaningful participation of the parties and their counsel in the
process. Unless all participants are serious about trying to settle a dispute,
mediation almost certainly will not be successful.
When mediation is fully voluntary, all parties generally will approach the
mediation seriously with an intent to try to settle the case, unless one or more of
them has agreed to participate in the mediation solely for strategic purposes such
as delay or to engage in "informal" discovery. In situations in which cases have
been referred mandatorily to mediation, however, the likelihood increases that
one or more of the parties may "go through the motions" and fail to participate
meaningfully.
One of the issues to be considered in constructing a mediation program is
whether a rule or statutory requirement should be adopted requiring that parties
engage in "good faith" mediation. Opposition to adoption of such a mandatory
good faith standard is often grounded on the criticism that the requirement is too
vague and can be held coercively over the heads of parties so as to distort the

713. In fact, many believe mediation is flexible and adaptable enough to "make it suitable for
any kind of dispute." Mebane, supra note 102, at 1866-67.
714. See Mebane, supra note 102, at 1866 (North Carolina's statewide mediation program
applies to cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000); Alfini, supra note 196, at 60
(under the Florida program, the predominant type of case ordered to mediation was one which the
"likelihood of settlement [was] between $25,000 and S100,000," and numerous cases were reported
settled in excess of $1 million); Sandman, supra note 101, at 27 (mediation has been used to great
benefit in complex bankruptcy matters); Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3. at 437 ("[t]he best use
for ADR may be to resolve... cases that are extremely difficult or exceedingly costly to resolve in
court," including multi-party cases); Tomain & Lutz, supra note 265, at 3 (criteria for referral to
court-annexed mediation program in Cincinnati include $25,000 minimum claim and cases "involving'
complex rights and duties"). See also Honorable Gladys Kessler & Linda . Finkelstein, The
Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse, 37 Cath. U. L. Rev. 577, 582, 589 (1988).
715. Moberly, supra note 33, at 708.
716. Alfini, supra note 196, at 60.
717. Id.
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mediation process."' Another danger in the imposition of the standard is that
it will cause the mediator to become embroiled in the parties' controversy.7 '
When one party charges another with a breach of the good faith standard, it
leaves the mediator as the sole disinterested party who is available to testify on
the issue.'
Such a role constitutes a frontal assault on the mediator's
neutrality"' as well as the confidentiality of the mediation process. The
imposition of a good faith standard would result in additional litigation and
fiustrate several of the primary attributes and objectives of mediation.m
One proposal suggests that the good faith mediation standard be made more
concrete by legislation which punishes only those parties who act affirmatively
to frustrate the process by their lack of cooperation.7' While this approach
does ameliorate the vagueness objection to the good faith requirement, it does not
eliminate the need for involving the mediator in an inappropriate role. Nor does
it prevent the proliferation of litigation that such a standard would spawn.
If mediation works as well as its proponents claim, parties and attorneys will
want to participate meaningfully in the process once they become familiar with
it and realize its value. If a party is so recalcitrant that he must be sanctioned
for a flagrant refusal to cooperate, it is highly unlikely that a successful
mediation would result in any case. It is not worth the risk posed to the
mediation process to impose a legally enforceable good faith requirement in
order to achieve a highly uncertain benefit.
A much more accessible alternative-and one which may be equally
effective in practice-is for the mediator to request from the parties a voluntary
commitment that they will use their best efforts to settle the case and that they
will engage in good faith negotiations toward that end at the beginning of the
mediation session. Such an approach is much more in keeping with the realities
of what brings parties to settlement and with mediation's role as a facilitator of
the parties' self-determination.
J The Timing ofMediation
Another issue which must be considered in establishing a mediation program
is the point at which mediation is injected into the adjudicatory process. While
timing is very important to a successful program, there is no consensus as to
when cases are "ripe for mediation.""' One point of view suggests that

718. Alfini. supra note 196, at 64-65. Most Florida lawyers interviewed expressed the opinion
that a mediation-in-good-faith requirement and sanctions should be imposed on parties to discourage
artificial paricipation in mediation. Id. at 63.
719. Mebane, supra note 102, at 1868.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.

723.

Note, supra note 90, at 1097.

724.

Alfini, supra note 196, at 61.
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mediation at too early a stage, especially at a time when insufficient discovery
has been taken, is unlikely to be successful.' Under this argument, mediation
is much more meaningful once the facts have been sufficiently developed and the
issues clarified. r' This certainly makes sense if one of the things the parties
do during mediation is to assess likely litigation outcomes.
Others argue that mediation should intervene as early as possible after suit is
filed.' Those advocating early mediation contend that it will increase efficiency
by eliminating unnecessary expenditure of time and money on discovery.7n
While there is some appeal to the idea of an immediate diversion of cases at
the beginning ofthe process, as a practical matter, it seems unlikely that parties or
their counsel would be willing, in most instances, to seriously consider settlement
without conducting some discovery to enable them to evaluate their case and, more
particularly, their litigation risks. Automatic and formalistic referral at too early a
stage generally results in a waste ofresources and can create an impression that the
mediation process does not work." 9 While mediation should be available to the
parties at any time during the proceeding, including the very earliest stages, the
ordinary time for referral should be some point after there has been sufficient
opportunity to conduct meaningful discovery. Certainly, mediation on the eve of
trial comes too late.! "
One proposal calls for "a more focused and limited discovery process" aimed
specifically toward preparation for mediation. Under this system, intervention
would occur at filing, unless the parties requested discovery. In this event, a court
official would establish a limited discovery schedule.3' After this discovery
period, a meeting would be held to determine whether the case should remain on
the mediation track." 2 While this system would require some administrative
effort, it, or some similar device, might be worth considering as a method for
achieving both the savings of early mediation and the enhanced predictability
afforded by the availability of an appropriate amount of discovery.
X. MEDIATION IN LOUISIANA

Over the years, Louisiana has adopted by statute various forms of mediation
to be applied in resolving disputes in limited, specified areas. State law has long
725. Id. See also Tomain & Lutz, supra note 265, at 3 (Cincinnati court-annexed mediation
program requires that counsel "have a sufficient period for discovery in order to recommend
settlement" before case is referred to mediation); Honorable E. Joseph Bleich, Meandering on
Mediation, 43 La. BJ. 149. 149 (1995).
726. Note, supra note 90, at 1102.
727. Alfini, spranote 196, at 61.
728. Note, supra note 90, at 1102.
729. Some practitioners believe that this is true of referrals under the Louisiana workers
compensation statute. See infra note 735 and accompanying text.
730. Bleich, supra note 725, at 149.
731. Note, supra note 90, at 1102.
732. 1d.
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provided that no restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any
complainant in a labor dispute who has failed to make every reasonable effort
to settle such dispute, either by negotiation or with the aid of any available
machinery of governmental mediation or voluntary arbitration." Since 1984,
Louisiana statutes have provided for mediation in matters involving child custody
and visitation issues."
In worker's compensation cases, since 1990 an
informal conference has been required within fifteen days of receipt of a claim
before a dispute resolution officer who is to mediate and encourage settlement
of the case." Complaints claiming discriminatory housing practices under
Louisiana's Open Housing Act are referred to mediation panels within ten days
of filing of the answer." Finally, Louisiana laws on professions and occupations provide, in certain instances, for mediation by professional regulatory
7
boards in controversies between members of the profession or occupation. 7
More recently, Louisiana has begun to experiment with the use of mediation
on a broader basis. With participation by the Legislature, the Supreme Court,
Orleans Civil District Court and First City Court, and others, Louisiana has taken
its first steps toward the institutionalization of mediation in the State.
A. The Orleans Parish Pilot Program
During the 1991 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the Louisiana
House of Representatives passed House Resolution 32 which urged and requested
the Judicial Council, the State Bar Association, and others "to supervise and
oversee the work of a task force to develop a plan to implement
a pilot program
73s
of alternative dispute resolution in the city of New Orleans."
After meeting on five occasions, the task force agreed upon the-implementation of a pilot program in Civil District Court and First City Court in Orleans

733. La. I.S. 23:845 (1950), enacted by 1934 La. Acts No. 203 § 7. There is an exception if
irreparable injury is threatened.
734. 1984 La. Acts No. 788 (formerly La. R.S. 9:351-56 (1950), replaced by La. I.S. 9:331-333
(Supp. 1996) (effective January 1, 1994)). During the 1995 Regular Session of the Louisiana
Legislature, Act No. 287 § I was passed by the Legislature establishing qualifications of mediators
in child custody dispute cases. Prior to this legislation, there was no provision regarding the
qualifications of such mediators.
735. La. R.S. 23:1310.3 (Supp. 1996) (effective January 1, 1990).
736. La. R.S. 51:2611 (Supp. 1996) (effective January 1, 1992).
737. See, e.g., La. I.S. 37:381 (Supp. 1988) (barbers) and La. R.S. 37:541 (1988) (cosmetolo-

gists).
738. H.R. Res. 32, Reg. Sess. La. Leg. (1991). As provided, the task force was composed of
two members of the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee to be designated by the speaker, two
members designated by the Judicial Council of Louisiana; two members designated by the Louisiana
State Bar Association; two members designated by the Louis Martinet Society; one member
designated by the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association; and one member designated by the American
Arbitration Association. As finally constituted, two additional members, a representative of the
Judicial Council and retired First Judicial District Court Judge John R. Ballard, also served on the
task force.
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Parish,"' limited to mediation only.' ° The task force also decided to include
all types of cases in the program, except
for domestic cases, which were already
7
subject to mediation under state law. 1'
Because the task force considered that "the pilot program might be deemed
'experimental,' it decided to ask the Louisiana Supreme Court to authorize the
program."7 42 The task force decided not to request that enabling legislation be
submitted. It anticipated implementation of the program through local rules of
court." The task force also anticipated the pilot program running one year, with
a possible additional one-year extension, 7 " and expected to report at the
conclusion of the pilot program to the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee
regarding the program's success and possibly recommending legislation regarding
mediation. 7"
The task force submitted a report to the legislature which embodied its
recommendations, and, in response, the legislature passed House Concurrent
Resolution No. 76 of 1992. In that resolution, the legislature urged and requested
the Louisiana Supreme Court to authorize implementation of a pilot program as
proposed in the task force report. The resolution also urged and requested the task
force to continue its work toward implementing the pilot program and to supervise
its inception.7 "
On September 3, 1992, the Louisiana Supreme Court authorized the establishment and implementation of the pilot program, finding it "would advance the
administration of justice in Louisiana.... ."7 Finally, on June 1, 1993, the
judges of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans adopted Rule 18 of its
Rules of Court to implement the pilot mediation program envisioned by the prior
legislative and judicial resolutions."8 The pilot program commenced on September 1, 1993, and was originally set to terminate on August 31, 1994.749 All
twelve divisions ofCivil District Court were to participate in the pilot program. 710

739. Report of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Task Force to the Louisiana House of
Representatives, Civil Law and Procedure Committee, undated, I (on file with authors) (hereinafter
Task Force Report].
740. Id. at 2.
741. Id. See La. R.S. 9:331-33 (Supp. 1993). See also supra note 734 and accompanying text.
742. Task Force Report, supra note 739, at 2.
743. Id.
744. Task Force Report, supra note 739, at 4.
745. Id. at 114.
746. H.R. Con. Res. 76 (1992).
747. Resolution of the Louisiana Supreme Court, September 3, 1992 (on file with the Clerk's
office of the Louisiana Supreme Court).

748. On that same date, the judges of First City Court for the City of New Orleans adopted a
parallel Rule 30 of its Court Rules implementing the pilot program in that court. The provisions of
Orleans Parish Civil District Court Rule 18 discussed herein also appear in First City Court Rule 30.
749. Orleans Parish Civil District Court Rules of Court, Rule 18, § I(the termination date has
now been extended until August 31, 1997).
750. The task force originally proposed that only 4 of the 12 divisions would participate in the
program.
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The basic parameters ofthe program as envisioned by the Task Force Report were
included in the program as implemented by the Civil District Court, with Rule 18
providing some additional details not included in that Report.
The task force's concept of a "semi-mandatory" or "opt-in" mediation
program"' was adopted by the court s2 Under Rule 18, a form letter is to
be "forwarded to all parties after issue is joined" advising litigants of the
mediation program and encouraging their participation. Any party may then
request mediation, and, upon receiving such a request, the court is required to
issue an Order of Referral for Mediation. However, any other party is entitled
to object by filing a written motion stating the basis for the opposition within ten
days. The court then considers the opposition, and for good cause shown "may
retract the Order of Referral for Mediation.""53 This semi-voluntary program
was considered by the task force to offer the best opportunity to balance7 4the
interests of those who wanted their cases mediated and those who did not.
To avoid imposing additional administrative responsibilities on the court as a
result of the pilot program, the task force recommended that the greater part ofthat
burden should be borne by the appointed mediators. The judges would order
mediation and simply await the results while the mediator scheduled the mediation
and reported back to the court.7 $S This approach was adopted by the Civil District
Court in Rule 18. After appointment, the mediator is required to file notice ofhis
acceptance with the court and to report back to the court following the mediation
regarding the outcome."' The Task Force Report "anticipated
that statistics
77
concerning the success of the pilot program will be kept.
Under Civil District Court Rule 18, the alternative dispute resolution task force
was authorized to "develop an approved list of mediators for use by the judges in
appointing mediators" under the pilot program." 8 Attorneys and non-attorneys
are eligible to serve as mediators. 7 9 As a prerequisite to appointment, a mediator
"must have participated in and successfully completed a mediator training and
certification course" sponsored by one of several named organizations or some
other provider certified by the task force.76 Originally, Rule 18 required 16
hours ofapproved mediator training, but this was increased to thirty-two hours as
of January 1, 1995.76 Rule 18 encourages parties to select their own mediator.

751.
752.
753.

Task Force Report, supra note 739, at 3.
Orleans Parish Civil District Court Rules of Cowl, Rule 18, § 2.
Id.

754.

Timothy F. Averill, Assessing the Orleans Parish Civil District Court Pilot Mediation

Program,43 La. B. J. 150 (1995).
755. Task Force Report, supra note 739, at 3.
756. Orleans Parish Civil District Court Rules of Court, Rule 18, §§ 8(a) and (d).
757. Task Force Report, supra note 739, at 3.
758. Orleans Parish Civil District Court Rules of Court, Rule 18, § 3.
759. Id.
760. Id. The named organizations are the Louisiana State Bar Association Continuing Legal

Education Committee, and the American Arbitration Association.
761.

Orleans Parish Civil District Court Rules of Court, Rule 18, § 3.
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In such cases, the mediator need not be on the approved list and presumably is not
required to meet the training and certification standards. Ifthe parties do not select
a mediator within fifteen days after notice ofthe Order ofReferral for Mediation,
the court appoints a mediator from the approved list.'62
Each person on the approved list is required to furnish a statement of his or her
fee schedule prior to being placed on the list." The mediation costs are initially
shared by the parties and ultimately "taxed as costs ofthe litigation in the event the
mediation does not resolve the dispute." In order to be placed on the approved
list, mediators must volunteer to handle 10% oftheir assigned cases on a pro bono
basis.'
Rule 18 further provides that mediators are to "preserve and maintain the
confidentiality of mediation proceedings," keeping "confidential from opposing
parties any information obtained in individual caucuses" unless otherwise
authorized. 7"6 They are also to "maintain confidentiality in the storage and
disposal of records" and insure that any identifying information in materials used
for research, training, or statistical purposes is rendered anonymous.767 Rule
18 also states that "all proceedings of the mediation, including statements made
by any party, attorney or other participant, are privileged in all respects."
The proceedings are not to be "reported, recorded, placed into evidence, made
known to the trial court or jury, or construed for any purpose as an admission
against interest."70 The Rule prohibits the naming of the mediator as a
witness, the subpoena or use of his records as evidence, the taking of the
mediator's deposition, or prosecution of any other type of discovery against the
mediator.'
Absent express authorization of the disclosing party, the. mediator is
forbidden from revealing to one party information disclosed to him in confidence
by the other party. The mediator "shall at all times maintain confidentiality with,
respect to communications relating to the subject matter of the dispute.''
Rule 18 reiterates the degree of confidentiality applicable to the mediation
proceeding by stating that "[u]nless the parties agree otherwise, all matters,
including the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their counsel during the
settlement process, are confidential and may never be disclosed to anyone,
including the appointing Court. '' 2

762.
763.
764.

Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.
Id.

765. Id.
766.

Id. § 6.

767.
768.
769.

Id.
Id.
Id.

770.

Id.

771.

Id. § 8(c).

772. Id. § 8(d). Itis not entirely clear that a local court has the power to create a mediation
communication privilege by local rule. Lomax, supra note 36, at 76-77.
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Unless the time is extended by court order or stipulation of the parties,
mediation must be completed within ninety days of notice of the Order of
Referral for Mediation.m Rule 18 is extremely general in its directives to the
mediator regarding how mediation should be conducted. The only substantive
affirmative directive is that the mediator "encourage and assist the parties in
reaching a settlement of their dispute."" 4 The rule also specifically prohibits
the mediator from coercing the parties to enter into a settlement agreement."'
Finally, Rule 18 provides for enforceability ofany written agreement memorializing a mediation settlement "in the same manner as any other written contract. 776
In June, 1994, the judges of the Civil District Court extended the term ofthe
program for an additional year, to terminate on August 31, 1995. Subsequently,
during the 1995 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, House Concurrent
Resolution No. 197 sponsored by Representative Farve was passed. It urged the
continuation of the pilot mediation program.777 In conformity with that
resolution, the judges of the Civil District Court extended the pilot mediation
program through August 31, 1997.
As of mid-1995, approximately 200 cases had been referred to mediation
through the pilot program."' The average of 100 cases per year is extremely
low compared to the number of referrals in other jurisdictions where mediation
is more established.
The majority of referred matters were personal injury disputes, but virtually
every type of case handled by the court has been referred to mediation.'m
According to the deputy judicial administrator for the Louisiana Supreme Court,
who is charged with monitoring the pilot mediation program, "approximately
54% of the completed mediations in the pilot program have been successful."" This percentage appears to fall into the lower range of success rates
reported in the literature, but is not totally out of line.' The peak number of
mediators on the approved list for the pilot program at any one time was 213.
773. Orleans Parish Civil District Court Rules of Court. Rule 18, § 7.
774. Id. § 8(b).
775. Id.
776. Id. § 9.
777. Averill, supra note 754, at 150; H.R. Con. Res. 197 (1995).
778. Averill, supra note 754, at 150.
779. Id.
780. Id. ("For statistical reporting purposes, a successful mediation is one in which a major
portion of the litigation settled at mediation, or shortly thereafter, and a participant in the mediation
indicated that mediation played a role in the settlement of the case.').
781. See supra text accompanying notes 281-297. Timothy Averill, Deputy Judicial
Administrator for the Louisiana Supreme Court, characterizes this success rate as comparing
"favorably to those shown by empirical studies of civil case settlement rates in Florida and
Minnesota." Averill, supra note 754, at 150. Averill argues that higher reported settlement rates
generally come from private mediation service providers whose results would not be expected to be
comparable to those of a court-annexed program. Telephone Interview with Timothy F. Averill,
Deputy Judicial Administrator for the Louisiana Supreme Court (Feb. 12, 1996).
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The vast majority of that number were attorneys-171 compared to 42 nonattorneys. 782 The number of qualified mediators dropped precipitously from
213 to 94 on January 1, 1995, when the number of training hours required for
qualification increased. Still, the vast majority of qualified mediators continue
to be attorneys-79 compared to 15 non-attorneys 783 Interestingly, there
appear to be no cases in which a non-attorney has served as a mediator in the
pilot program.'
A survey of attorneys who participated in mediation under the auspices of
the pilot mediation program indicated that 85% believed that the process was
fair: this perception was not substantially affected by the success or failure of
the mediation.7'
Of surveyed attorneys who participated in successful
mediations, approximately 83% reported that they were "at least somewhat
satisfied with the agreements reached in, or as a result of, mediation. 78 '
Nearly two-thirds of the attorneys surveyed were at least somewhat more
satisfied with mediation than with other court experiences. 87 And finally,
"[m]ore than 80% of the surveyed attorney-participants would recommend
'
mediation to others and would use mediation again."788
At the end of October, 1995, a program organized by judicial personnel of
First City Court and volunteers from the New Orleans Bar Association began.
Under that program, one volunteer is available to the judges of First City Court
each day court is in session for referral of cases to mediation. The volunteers
are all mediators certified by the pilot program and they perform all services
under the project on a pro bono basis.
In some degree due to the low number of reported mediations, there is some
concern among those involved in the pilot mediation program that the participating courts and thejudicial administrator's office are not "capturing" all cases that
have been mediated under the auspices of the pilot program. 789 Under Section
8(a) of Rule 18 of the Civil District Court, the mediator is to "file with the Court
notice of his/her acceptance of the appointment" and send a copy of the notice
of acceptance to the Louisiana Supreme Court judicial administrator's office.
In December, 1995, the Judicial Administrator's office notified mediators
participating in the pilot program that the intent of this provision was to
encourage notification of mediation whether or not there was formal court
intervention and requested that mediators file acceptances whether they were

782. Averill, supra note 754, at 150, 153.
783. Id. at 153.

784.
785.

Id.
Id.

786.

Id.

787. Id.
788.' Id.
789. Letter from Timothy F. Averill. Deputy Judicial Administrator for the Louisiana Supreme
Court, to mediators on pilot program "approved" list (Dec. It, 1995) (on file with authors).
790. Orleans Parish Civil District Court Rules of Court, Rule 18, § 8(a).
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chosen through agreement of the parties or through court appointment.79' At
the same time, the Judicial Administrator asked all mediators to retroactively
report all cases mediated since the beginning of the pilot program, regardless of
the manner of appointment.'m The decision of the task force to leave administration of the pilot program essentially to the mediators themselves, while
reducing the cost of the program, may reduce the quality of the information
generated about the utilization and success of the program.
However, retroactive reports after December, 1995 do not indicate a large
number of failures to report. Thus, the reasons for the low number of reported
mediation may lie elsewhere. A likely cause for the low level of reported
mediations is the fact that in many cases, and perhaps in most, no letter notifying
the parties of the availability of mediation is sent to the parties despite the
explicit requirement of Rule 18, section 2 of the Local Rules. It appears that
there is no standard procedure implemented in the clerk's office to trigger the
transmission of such a letter and, therefore, that it is often not sent. It is not
surprising that only a minuscule percentage of the cases filed at Civil District
Court is referred to mediation.
B. House Bill 1367 of the 1995 Regular Session
During the 1995 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, three bills
were introduced to establish a state-wide mediation system.7" 3 None of these
legislative proposals succeeded, but House Bill 1367 sponsored by Representative
Farve enjoyed greater success than any of the other state-wide mediation bills
introduced since 1993 . ' House Bill 1367 was reported, with amendments, by
a vote of 5-4 of the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure, but failed
to pass the House by a vote of 36-55. A motion to reconsider the bill on the
House floor was tabled and the bill died at the end of the session.
As originally proposed, House Bill 1367 embodied a procedure very similar
to the one used in the Civil District Court pilot mediation program. Among the

791.

Averill, supra note 789, at I.

792.

Id.

793. H.L 4, 21st Reg. Ses., La. Leg. (1995) by Representative Landrieu, H.R. 641, 21st Reg.
Sess., La. Leg. (1995) by Representative Farrar and H.R. 1367, 21st Reg. Sess., La. Leg. (1995) by
Representative Farve all dealt with this subject. In the two prior sessions, three bills regarding
mediation were introduced. In the 1993 Regular Session, two bills would have established a
statewide court-annexed alternative dispute resolution program. See H.R. 909, 19th Reg. Sess., La.
Leg. (1993) by Riddle, Vitter and Green. See also H.R. 1542, 19th Reg. Sess., La. Leg. (1993) by
Landrieu and Deano. Martin, supra note 166, at 207. Neither bill passed. Following that session,
one authority suggested that many anticipated that similar legislation would pass during the 1994
legislative session. Martin, supra note 166, at 207. H.R. 348, 23rd Extraordinary Session, La. Leg.
(1994), was introduced by Representative Landrieu in 1994, but it also did not pass.
794. H.R. 4 was withdrawn while H.R. 641 was never reported out of the House Committee on
Civil Law and Procedure. 1995 Legislative Calendar of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana,
21st Reg. Sess., La. Leg., 524, 749.
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salient features of the bill were a provision requiring that upon the filing of suit,
the court was to furnish prompt notice to the parties stating that mediation was
available and encouraging the parties to participate in mediation. 5 Each party
then was to be afforded a period of twenty days from notice from the court to
Upon receipt of such a request, -the court
request a referral to mediation.'
then would render an Order of Referral for Mediation.' Under the original
bill, any party opposing mediation would have been required to file an objection
and to show good cause why the mediation should not proceed." As amended in committee, no good cause showing would have been required for either
party to opt out of mediation and any objection within fifteen days of the court's
Order of Referral would have required the court to rescind its Order.' Thus,
defeated House Bill 1367, as amended, would have given either party an absolute
veto over the referral to mediation.
As with the pilot program procedure, House Bill 1367 would have permitted
the parties to choose their own mediator, in default of which the court would
make an appointment.' Under the bill, the judicial administrator's office of
the state supreme court was to develop the policy and procedure for qualifying
as a court-approved mediator, including educational and continuing training
requirements, and ethical, disciplinary, and disqualification provisions consistent
where applicable with the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Louisiana State
Bar Association. The court was also to establish application fees and mediator
dues sufficient for administration of the provisions of the Act and to insure that
the costs of any program or office established pursuant to the Act would be
funded.8' In addition, for certification as a mediator, the bill would have
required completion of a minimum of thirty-two hours of approved mediator
training and satisfaction of all continuing mediator education requirements
established by the Louisiana Supreme Court." 2
House Bill 1367 included very strong provisions regarding confidentiality.
First, it stated that "the mediator may not disclose to either party information
given in confidence by the other and shall at all times maintain confidentiality
with respect to communications relating to the subject matter of the dispute,"
unless expressly authorized by the disclosing party. 3 It further provided that,

795.

H.R. 1367 § 4104(A).

796.

Id. § 4104(B).
Id. § 4104(C).

797.
798.

799.

Id.

Id. (as amended).

800. Id. § 4106(B). The amended bill provided for a more involved procedure for court
appointment of a mediator. The court was to furnish the parties with a list of the names of five
mediators selected by the court from the approved list. Within 15 days each party would have had
the right to eliminate two of the five listed and the court would then have appointed one mediator
from the modified list. H.R. 1367, § 4106(B) (as amended).
801. H.R. 1367, § 4107(B).
802. H.R. 1367, § 4107(C).

803.

H.R. 1367, §4108(C).
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unless the parties agreed otherwise, "all matters, including the conduct and
demeanor of the parties and their counsel during the settlement process, are
confidential and may never be disclosed to anyone, including the appointing
court."' Mediators would have also been required to "maintain confidentiality in the storage and disposal of records ... ." Additionally, "[a]ll proceedings of the mediation, including statements made by any party, attorney or other
participant," would have been privileged.'
As under the pilot program, the
proceeding could not have been "reported, recorded, placed into evidence, made
known to the trial court or jury, or construed for any purpose as an admission
against interest."
The mediator could not be named as a witness nor his
records "subpoenaed or used as evidence," nor could "the mediator's deposition
be taken, nor any other discovery had against the mediator."''
However, the
bill did make clear that an "oral communication or written material used in or
made a part of the mediation procedure" was not thereby made inadmissible or
undiscoverable if otherwise admissible or discoverable apart from disclosure in
mediation.'
Unlike the pilot program provisions, House Bill 1367 confronted the difficult
situation where mediation confidentiality conflicted with other legal requirements
for disclosure. In this situation, the issue of confidentiality would have been
"presented to the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings to determine, in
camera, whether the facts, circumstances, and context of the communications or
materials sought to be disclosed warranted a protective order.., or whether the
communications or materials are subject to disclosure." ' This provision was
not entirely satisfactory for a number of reasons. First, it did not provide the
standard for determining when disclosure is appropriate. Second, it did not
specify in sufficient detail the types of "other legal requirements for disclosure"
envisioned. For instance, would an ordinary subpoena constitute a "legal
requirement for disclosure," or does this provision contemplate more explicit
disclosure obligations such as those provided by "sunshine laws," or child abuse
disclosure laws? Finally, the conflicts provision in House Bill 1367 did not
describe in sufficient detail the circumstances under which information conveyed
in confidence might have to be disclosed so that mediators could convey this
information to mediation participants.
There was very little stated in House Bill 1367 concerning the details of the
mediator's role. Section 4108(B) stated that mediators were to encourage and
assist the parties in reaching a settlement of their dispute, but specifically
provided that they may not compel or coerce the parties to enter into a settlement
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Id. § 4108(D).

805.

Id. § 4108(E).
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Id. § 4112(A).

807.

Id.

808.

Id. § 4112(B).

809.
810.

Id. § 4112(C).
Id. § 4112(D).

19971

BULLOCK & GALLAGHER

agreement."' Section 4110(B) of the bill would have required that all parties
"meaningfully participate in all mediation proceedings." 12'
While this
provision stops short of imposing a participation in good faith requirement, it
does impose an obligation regarding the manner of participation which could
give rise to litigation similar to that caused by the good faith requirement.
Finally, House Bill 1367, in its opening section stating the policy behind the
legislation, implicitly established the goals and purposes intended to be furthered
by the mediation program proposed in the legislation. These goals were
articulated as: (1) "lessening already crowded court dockets," (2) "reducing
litigation costs to all parties," (3) "expediting resolution of the disputes between
the parties," (4) "encouraging resolutions that are suited to the parties' needs,"
(5) "increasing voluntary compliance with settlements," and (6) "improving the
public's overall satisfaction with the justice system.""' 3 This list of goals
discloses a mixture of the efficiency and-the quality of process approaches to
mediation, with a somewhat greater emphasis on the former.
The failure of House Bill 1367 to achieve the necessary support to pass the
House of Representatives will not deter future efforts to institutionalize mediation
in Louisiana. On the contrary, it appears likely that supporters of state-wide
mediation will continue to seek passage of legislation each year." ' Interestingly, the only persons to appear or speak in opposition to House Bill No. 1367
when it was considered by the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee were
two representatives of the local branch of a national franchisor of mediation and
arbitration services.'" One of the representatives of the franchise operation
told the committee that in his opinion the vast majority of mediations are taking
place outside the court system and that the decision of when and where to
mediate should be the decision of the parties involved." 6
In addition to the representatives of the franchise mediation services
operation, there was organized opposition to House Bill 1367 from the Louisiana
Trial Lawyers Association."' It seems likely that both of these groups are
opposing the enactment of mediation legislation in Louisiana because they view
such legislation as a threat to their own interests. This attitude is shortsighted,
not only because it is detrimental to the public interest, but also because
institutionalizing mediation and injecting certainty and predictability into the
8eI.

Id. § 4108(B).

812.

Id. § 4110(B).

813.

Id. § 4101(A).

814.

Telephone Interview with Timothy F. Averill, Deputy Judicial Administrator for the

Louisiana Supreme Court (Feb. 12, 1996). Such legislation was not appropriate during the 1996
Regular Session because that session was a fiscal session.
815. Minutes of meeting of House Civil Law and Procedure Committee, 14.15 (May 2, 1995)
(on file with authors). Roger Lanre, indicated to be associated with "United States Arbitration and
Mediation," is shown as having spoken in opposition to the bill and Robert Jenks, indicated to be
associated with "United States Arbitration," is shown to have appeared in opposition.
816. Id.
817. Telephone Interview with former State Representative Edward J.Deano, Jr. (Feb. 27, 1996).
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system offers long-term benefits to attorneys, including the plaintiff's bar, and
to mediators, including those who already have cornered a sizeable share of the
market for mediation services.
XI. SHOULD LOUISIANA ADOPT A STATE-WIDE MEDIATION PROGRAM?

The great weight of considered opinion is to the effect that mediation holds
tremendous promise as a form of dispute resolution. Mediation offers the
prospect of eliminating unnecessary litigation, saving scarce judicial resources,
and accelerating substantially the speed with which parties reach the inevitable
outcome of nearly all litigation, settlement. Whether mediation is accepted as
efficient oreffective in terms of saving money or increasing settlement rates and
party satisfaction, there can be little disagreement that, at the very least, it
enhances settlement possibilities by getting the parties to the table and helping
them to talk to one another. Perhaps mediation's greatest value, though, is its
capacity to empower the parties to control their own affairs.
We believe mediation should be encouraged and promoted as a dispute
resolution process in Louisiana. We also believe that institutionalization of
mediation by adoption of a state-wide, court-annexed program is the best method
of encouraging and promoting it. However, institutionalization is in the public
interest for another reason. Because mediation is such a powerful tool, it has
been very successful in those jurisdictions where it has been given a fair chance.
Mediation has spread rapidly, and its popularity is continuing to grow throughout
the country. National businesses, as well as local parties who have heard about
mediation, are demanding it. Mediations are being performed in relatively large
volumes by certain providers in the State of Louisiana, away from the scrutiny
of the courts or any other regulatory body. Unless the state is willing to outlaw
mediation entirely, there will be mediations in Louisiana and it is likely that they
will become even more pervasive in the future. Thus, the real question is how
mediation will be conducted and what sort of controls will be exercised over it.
Whether motivated by a desire to promote mediation or simply to establish
consistency and order, it is desirable that policy-makers institutionalize mediation
on a state-wide basis by adopting some form of regulation and structure to
protect the public, parties to mediation, mediators, and attorneys. The necessary
result of a failure to institutionalize mediation is that many critical issues, as
discussed in part IX of this article, are not addressed or resolved.
The need for enacting provisions offering guidance is particularly great in
the area of mediation confidentiality and privilege. As discussed above,' it
is essential to the mediator, to the parties, and to the public that the precise
contours of the privilege be established. Without such guidance, not only is the
mediation process crippled, but mediators and parties participating in the process
are placed at risk.

818.

See supra part IX.F.7.
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Regardless of the degree of complexity or the precise framework of the
mediation program enacted by the legislature or established by court rule, the
following matters should be addressed and provided for:
(1) The precise contours of the privilege and confidentiality to be
afforded to communications and conduct that occur during mediation.
(2) The qualifications, training requirements, testing requirements, and
continuing educational/experiential requirements for mediators.
(3) Rules of conduct, ethical standards, and ethical enforcement
mechanisms applicable to mediators, including reconciliation of conflicts
between attorney and mediator standards and rules.
(4) Civil liability and immunity from liability for mediators.
(5) Appropriate timing for the intervention of mediation into the
adjudicatory process.
(6) Adoption in appropriate categories of different rules incorporating
special protections applicable to parties who are not represented by
counsel in the mediation.
(7) A determination of whether mediation will be mandatory under
certain circumstances or purely voluntary.
We submit that history, including Louisiana's own experience with underutilization of the Orleans Pilot Program, demonstrates that mediation should at
least initially be implemented on a mandatory or semi-mandatory basis. Such
an approach offers the best practical hope that mediation will be permitted to
take root and to flourish.
Although it is not essential, it would be best if the mediation program
adopted in Louisiana provided that some agency, perhaps the office of the
Judicial Administrator of the Louisiana Supreme Court, keep statistics and
conduct research regarding the program, to test the effectiveness of mediation
and to determine ways in which the program might be changed to improve its
operation. The cost of this rather modest effort could be financed by certification and annual fees paid by mediators.
As demonstrated in this article, each state takes its own route to establishment of its state-wide, court-annexed mediation program. It may be that the
most appropriate approach for the State of Louisiana is to gradually expand
institutionalized mediation by court rule and by extension of the function and
operation of the existing task force in coordination with the Louisiana Supreme
Court and its Judicial Administrator's office.
The Legislature might adopt a resolution requesting that the Louisiana
Supreme Court adopt court rules implementing a state-wide program of
mediation, to be gradually expanded until it eventually encompasses all judicial
districts in the state. The task force could broaden its work to advise the
supreme court regarding the substance of the rules that should be adopted to
implement a state-wide program. Such rules could make provisions regarding
the seven essential issues listed above, as well as the general contours of the

984

LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 57

mediation program and any other details that the task force and the court might
feel appropriate. The only two areas in which legislative enactment is probably
preferable are with respect to confidentiality/privilege of mediation communications and in the area of civil liability and immunity.
In addition to other advantages, implementing the state-wide program by
Louisiana Supreme Court rule offers the opportunity to easily make appropriate
revisions in the details of the program over time. This is a convenient feature
in an area in which flexibility and change are almost as important as certainty
and predictability.
The task force could also serve as the coordinator of the research function
suggested above. On a more ambitious level, the task force and its staff could
function as a state office of mediation under the auspices of the judicial branch,
networking with other state offices to refine and perfect over time Louisiana's
system of state-wide court-annexed mediation.

